CHAPTER 12 - COMMUNIST POLICY AND PROPAGANDA (II) | MALAYA : Communist or Free?



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In Europe and America at this time very little account was taken of the currents of propaganda in Asia. Some papers (notably the London Times) were excellently served by their correspondents in Malaya, who tried to emphasize the greater importance of the political over the military aspect of the situation, but for most papers the Malayan problem was long reduced to a comfortable simplicity. How was the shooting war progressing? How fast were we liquidating the Communist bandits? For the first year or so of his appointment General Templer enjoyed an enthusiastic ‘ press ’ in those journals that pinned their faith to a successful war of attrition.

Another Chinese bandit gone below,
Praise God from whom all blessings flow.

The effect of this was that the real issues of the campaign were overlooked by the general public, while the ‘bandit-killing’ book Jungle Green had an enormous sale. The damaging consequence was that there was not enough knowledge or interest in Britain—even in Parliament—to influence policy.

The people of Asia, on the other hand, were systematically fed with propaganda relating to Malaya which was never heard or seen by the British public. In most Asian countries this came largely from Communist sources, though (as the Asian Socialist Conference at Rangoon indicated) it was supplemented from other sources hostile to Britain or to ‘imperialism’. Some of the charges were of a highly plausible kind to which ‘hand-outs’ featuring ‘village councils’, ‘living a man’s life’, ‘slave-mistresses of the jungle’ (i.e. girls who voluntarily joined the terrorists even now), ‘loyalty to (e.g.) Perlis’, etc., were a feeble answer outside Malaya to claims that the terrorists are a ‘Liberation Army’, or to stories of the allegedly enormous profits of rubber and tin companies.

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Outside Malaya (where the facts are not known), the most telling piece of Communist propaganda was the charge that ‘Britain was suppressing a national movement’. It found contemporary expression in the book of a Communist writer, Mr. Palme Dutt. Here is what he says:

It is often said in quarters hostile to Malayan national aspirations that there is no Malayan nation.

‘There is no Malayan people and no Malayan national sentiment, let alone a national movement’ (Victor Purcell, author of The Chinese in Malaya, in The Times, August 24, 1948).

This approach is typical of the contemptuous attitude of imperialism to a developing nation and a national struggle for freedom. In the same way, a century ago the official spokesmen of the old Austrian Empire dismissed the Italy of the Risorgi-mento, of Mazzini and Garibaldi, and proclaimed that Italy was ‘only a geographical expression’. In the same way two generations ago the official spokesman of the British Empire in India airily dismissed Indian national aspirations. ‘There is not and never was an India, or even any country of India,’ pontificated Sir John Strachey in 1888. ‘The notion that India is a nationality rests upon vulgar error,’ proclaimed Sir John Seeley in his Expansion of England in 1883, utilizing the familiar argument from diversity to counter the demands of a national liberation movement, and continued, unconsciously echoing the Hapsburgs: ‘India is not a political name, but only a geographical expression.’ Indeed, the denial of nationality may be regarded as the hallmark of imperialism at a certain stage in relation to a subject people; and the time may yet come when a learned American thesis will be written, with abundant factual evidence, to prove the ‘vulgar error’ of ‘ British ’ nationality.1

Since I was reconsidering my whole position from first principles, this statement also deserved careful attention. Was Malaya, after all, a nation? Mr. Dutt and General Templer said that it was. If it was a nation, and we were merely attempting to suppress a national movement, then I would say that the sooner we got out

1 R. Palme Dutt, The Crisis of Britain and the British Empire (Lawrence & Wishart, 1953), p. lot. (Mr. Dutt, it is worthy of remark, avoids the trap of exampling the Indian Mutiny as a ‘national movement’.)

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of Malaya the better. General Templer and others of his school of thought would not, presumably, be impressed by this reasoning and would hang on as long as possible whether Malaya was a nation or not, since the General believed that ‘the fighting in Indo-China and the resistance there to Communist pressure were all part of the same problem’.1 For my part, I believed that the war in Indo-China was essentially a national movement and, as such, was bound to prevail in the end. It was possible, however, and, I think, realistic, to accept the Communist revolution in China, and even to approve it, and to be sympathetic to the rise of nationalism in Asia, and at the same time to feel that, owing to the special circumstances, Communism did not offer an acceptable solution in Malaya—and, while feeling like this, to vote Conservative at the elections in Britain (as I have known more than one well-informed person to do). But when these lines were written, I could see few signs of a similar national movement in Malaya.

Let me consider Mr. Dutt’s historical analogies. First of all that of the Italian Risorgimento.

It was no doubt in the interest of the Austrian Empire to dismiss Italy as a ‘geographical expression’, and while Italy remained politically divided there was some plausibility in the claim. But the fact was that Italy consisted of homogeneous elements with a common culture and a common language and had been increasingly conscious of its unity since the Renaissance. Nationalism (being, as Mr. Nehru has said, an ‘anti-movement’) was stimulated by the presence of a power in Italy which was universally regarded as ‘foreign’ and ‘un-Italian’. To compare Italy with Malaya is absurd. Whereas the people from Sicily to the Alps had a common language and culture, Malaya has several languages and cultures and only an embryonic sense of being ‘Malayan’. Italy had also a powerful memory of an ancient unity: Malaya has none. Malaya, moreover, had produced no Mazzini and no Garibaldi. There is, indeed, no point of similarity between the two countries.

In citing the case of India, however, Mr. Dutt has chosen a more plausible comparison. India, like Malaya, consists of a number of peoples of different race and language. India, on the other hand, had never been a political unity as Italy once had been (Asoka and the Moguls notwithstanding). The bulk of

1 The Times, 19 May, 1953.

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the Indians nevertheless possessed a common cultural inheritance and a common religion, namely Hinduism. India had, therefore, the makings of a modern nation. But when Sir John Strachey and Sir John Seeley spoke or wrote in the 1880s they were quite right in saying that there was no ‘Indian people and no Indian nation’. Remember, too, that they were speaking of what are now India and Pakistan together and not of what is now India alone. Taking the sub-continent as a whole, they are still right. If one accepts Mr. Dutt’s analogy, then one must visualize his ‘Malayan nation’ as the partition of Malaya, like India and Pakistan, into a Malay and a Chinese state. Indian nationalism came into being (again to quote Mr. Nehru) as an ‘anti-movement’ in opposition to government by a foreign race. Gandhi himself said that the ‘founder of Indian nationalism’ was the Parsee Dadabhai, who converted him to his views in 1892.1

It is possible to distinguish the phases of the process, none of which have so far been reproduced in Malaya. There is a Malay nationalism, a Chinese nationalism, and an Indian nationalism, all products of an opposition to foreign control, but so far nothing that deserves to be called ‘ Malayan nationalism ’.

But when I say that there was no Malayan nationalism I would not go so far as to say that such may not have germinated. It probably had. When the progressive elements in Malaya came together, as they were allowed to do before the Emergency controls were imposed, they showed a strong sense of having problems in common, of ‘being in the same boat’. In many essential respects, too, the communal elements showed a much better disposition to compromise on intercommunal questions than were evinced by their middle-class counterparts who have been occupying the stage without competition for nearly five years. But what I did say in 1948, and what I still said in 1953, was that so far Malayan nationalism has not become a political force, and Communism has failed to induce it to emerge. The Communist leaders were Chinese with Chinese names and not ‘Malayan’ names, as Mazzini and Garibaldi were Italians with Italian names.

What was as important—indeed more so—was that the Malayan communities were not represented among the guerillas in any way proportionate to their numbers. Mr. Dutt’s answer was that the Malay and Indian guerillas did approach the Chinese in numbers; and, in any case, it was reasonable to expect the Chinese

1 Romain Rolland, Mahatma Gandhi, Paris, 1948, p. 19.

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to be in a majority, as they were mostly workers, while the Malays were mostly peasants, and the workers had elsewhere provided the leaders of the Communist revolution.

Mr. Dutt says, ‘The official reports of British Intelligence officers brought back by Malcolm MacDonald in May, 1949, had to admit that 25 per cent of the guerillas were Malays’ (Sunday Times, 15 May, 1949). The report in the Sunday Times was that of their correspondent and it did not state that it was supported by Mr. MacDonald, and it has certainly never been stated by an official source that 25 per cent of the guerillas were Malays. Casualty lists, published by the Federal Government in Kuala Lumpur, and covering the period from the beginning of the Emergency, in June, 1948, to 31 January, 1952, show that, out of a total of 2,778 bandits killed in that time, 2,599 were Chinese and 102 Malays—a proportion of twenty-five Chinese to each Malay. The remaining 117 were Indian, Siamese, Indonesian and aborigine (the aborigines are the nomadic hill men of central Malaya). The official figures published in January, 1953, show 3,791 terrorists as having been killed since June, 1948, of whom 3,510 were Chinese. That is to say, that only 7.4 per cent were Malays and Indians, and, while these are not separated in the returns, we can assume that the proportion of twenty-five Chinese to each Malay still held.

According to the official White Paper, No. 24, of 1953, the total number of persons in detention camps on 1 June, 1952, was 7,480, of whom 750 were Malays. However, a large number of Chinese Communists and Communist sympathizers had been sent back to China, as the following figures from the same source show:

Repatriations from June 1948 to March 1953



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Taking this evidence together it is safe to say that the proportion of Malay to Chinese guerillas was only about one in twenty.

As regards Mr. Dutt’s subsidiary arguments, his actual words are, ‘ Since the working class is the vanguard and main fighting force of the national movement, equally against Japanese domination and against British domination, with the peasants in general acting as suppliers of food and other assistance, it is not surprising that the bulk of the guerillas should be Chinese.’ That there are Malay Communists there can be no doubt; but though the Malay are peasants, by far the greater part of the guerillas ’ supplies has come from the 500,000 squatters of their own race. In China, Mao Tse-tung had been able to rally the peasantry to the Communist banner; the Communists in Malaya had failed to any important degree to rally the Malay peasantry to their side. Again, if the war was a nationalist movement, would the Malays—police, soldiers, Home Guard, etc., have provided the great bulk of the opposition to the Communists? If it was a national movement, why should the great bulk of the people, Chinese and Indians, have remained indifferent, if not actively hostile, to the rising?

Quite apart from his invalid analogies, I feel that Mr. Dutt’s error lies in a doctrinaire ‘blanket’ application of Marxist doctrine in precisely the same way that his comrades in Malaya have erred. International Communist propaganda alleges that the rising was forced on the Malayan Communists by the action of the British. But surely the Communists would not have taken up the gage unless they had believed in their ability to win a military victory? There was nothing to stop them carrying on their underground activities as before without resorting to arms. In their new directive of 1 October, 1951, the Communists themselves admitted their error and ordered what was partially a reversion to the old underground warfare. Many things in MCP propaganda also confirm that they had mistaken the nature of Malayan society. They were unable to create any of the ‘ liberated areas’ provided for in their original plan, and the bulk of the working population remained at their places of employment and did not desert to the hills. Malayan industry continued almost normally, and, although the cost of the Emergency was, and is, great, the US dollars continued to flow into the sterling pool.

If it is held proven that the war in Malaya was not a national rising, the main plank on the Communist platform was destroyed. But it did not follow that everything else the Communists said

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was false or implausible. Indeed, much of their propaganda was also included in the nationalist and socialist propaganda of the independent countries of South-East Asia, e.g.:

British capital investments in Malaya have been estimated at about £100 million. . . . Dividends of 60 per cent and 65 per cent have been common, reaching even 100 per cent. . . . Workers’ wages in the rubber plantations in 1947-8, according to official figures, reached 86.4d. to 116.8d monthly, plus allowances in kind valued at 15s. a month. Whereas prices had risen five times since pre-war, wages had only doubled, thus representing a heavy fall in real wages on the low pre-war colonial rates. . . .*

Reports in the British financial press seemed to support at least part of this propaganda. One tin company declared a dividend of 222 per cent for 1952, having placed $1 1/2 million to reserve, another tin company declared a 100 per cent dividend, and certain rubber companies dividends of 60 and 50 per cent, apart from amounts placed to reserve.

As against this, a spokesman of the rubber industry to whom I referred this propaganda commented as follows. First of all, as regards the earnings of rubber companies, an examination of a cross-section of Malayan companies for the twenty years 1933-52 showed that the average gross dividend paid was 7 per cent, or, allowing for tax current at the time, the net return to stockholders would be 4 per cent. Another significant feature was that an examination of the current (1953) quotations for rubber shares showed that the vast majority stood at heavy discounts on the price at which they were issued despite the fact that all such companies had ploughed back quite substantial sums into the business. Consequently it would be impossible to raise the capital for the betterment or extension of the rubber-producing in Malaya. These facts (said the spokesman) pointed clearly to the

1 On field-workers’ wages, which exclude variable bonus and other payments, the Statistics Department of the Federation of Malaya drew up the following figures:
 Wages of Field Workers, Rubber Industry, Federation of Malaya (percentages).



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conclusion that despite the occasional and temporary profits due to particular causes, such as in 1951-2, the rubber-producing industry had in the long term been far from prosperous.

As regards the mining industry, the Malayan Chamber of Mines, to whom I referred the matter, replied to the following effect. Little useful purpose, said the Chamber, is served by picking on one particular year; the proper approach is to see what dividends have been paid continuously over a reasonably representative period. The dividends paid by the tin-mining companies in the year 1952 reflect the exceptionally high prices for the metal due to panic-buying by consumers owing to the war in Korea. As the issued capital upon which the rate of dividends is calculated is, in the case of the majority of tin mines owned by Malayan companies, vastly less than the actual capital employed in the business, the published rate of dividend is most misleading—the real dividend on capital employed in the business being a very much lower figure. Tin mining in Malaya, as elsewhere, is essentially a high-risk investment and individuals risking their money sometimes lose it altogether. A mine is a wasting asset with a limited and, in most cases, comparatively short life. Dividends paid to shareholders contain an appreciable element of return on capital, and every dividend paid (including the portion which is really a return on capital) is subject to extremely heavy taxation. The Japanese extracted a very large quantity of tin from Malayan properties (for which the owners received no compensation) and the life of a large number of properties was considerably reduced thereby and the return-of-capital element in dividends received by shareholders correspondingly increased. A very large number of tin-mining concerns in Malaya are marginal producers. Their owners, whether Chinese or companies, have received over the years a most inadequate return on capital. Today they are facing financial ruin. Good returns in times of exceptional demand and high tin prices are essential if the necessary capital is to be made available to Malaya for such a high-risk operation as mining.

On my visits to Burma, Indonesia and India in 1950, and to Burma and India in 1952 (though I did not hear it often in the Philippines, Malaya, Hong Kong, or Siam), the ‘socialist’ argument cited above was the stock-in-trade of the politician and the intellectual. I am not concerned here with the validity of the propaganda—merely with its existence—for it deals with matters

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of the first appeal to the socialist politician and his electorates in the newly independent countries. A politician in these countries who was not also a ‘socialist’ could not survive.

The grave weakness of Government propaganda in Malaya was that apart from (largely nominal) protection from intimidation (‘negative’, because this is the minimum that would be offered by any stable government) it had nothing to offer except the dubious gifts of General Templer’s reform programme. The one great strength of the British position was that Malaya was weak and divided in the absence of a genuine national movement and therefore needed Britain to defend it. It was apparent also that the democratic or capitalist West would not rapidly succumb to Communist conquest or revolution. In an isolated peninsula like Malaya, where superiority of naval and air forces counted for so much, Britain and the West could assure protection that would not be available from any other source. It was for this reason among others that none of the Malayan political parties except the Communists had any wish to cut the tie with Britain. On the contrary, the fear of a possible British withdrawal, leaving another power to fill the vacuum, was at the back of the minds of a large majority of the members of the communal and other parties. So long, therefore, as Britain felt that her imperial strategy, economics and communications made the retention of Malaya desirable, and so long as she could afford the cost in money and armament, so long would she be able to retain Malaya —provided, always, that it became a stable, self-governing dominion.

MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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