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An article in Ta Kung Pao, Shanghai, of 28 January, 1950, was taken as
adumbrating the future policy of the Central People’s Government of China
towards Overseas Chinese and the Governments of South-East Asia. It began by
saying: ‘Now that the People’s Republic of China has been established and
diplomatic relations have been opened between the Central People’s Government
and a number of countries, the more than ten million Overseas Chinese shall and
must not be subjected to further abuse.’ The article pointed out that it was
clearly stipulated in Article 58 of the Communist Programme that the People’s
Government ‘shall do its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests
of Chinese residing abroad’. In pursuance of this principle the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged strong protests with the French and Thai
authorities against the abuse of Chinese nationals. The same statement referred
to the ‘persecution of Chinese nationals in Thailand, Indo-China, and Malaya’
and to ‘the imperialist plot for both direct and indirect attack against the
Chinese people’. Peking Radio thereafter systematically attacked the South-East
Asian Governments for their alleged ill-treatment of the Overseas Chinese, but
in the case of Malaya it was noticeable that the terrorist campaign was ignored
for some months, and when later it was mentioned it was as a national uprising
against the imperialists and not as a virtually Chinese insurrection.1
It is interesting, though scarcely surprising,
to note that Communist propaganda asserted that the Emergency was provoked by
the British and that the ‘ people ’ were merely protecting themselves against
aggression. It is admitted in some of their
1 I was engaged in controversy
on this issue with Mr. Harry Pollitt, Secretary of the British Communist Party,
in The Times in August, 1948. Mr.
Pollitt contended that the war in Malaya was a national movement and I
contended that it was not.
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literature
that a series of strikes were timed for May, but an intention to start a
shooting war is denied.1
It seemed on the face of it as if Malayan
Communist Party policy was shaped in Malaya with freedom from direct external
direction but following CCP models. There is ample evidence, however, of the
central planning and direction of propaganda by a Central Bureau in close touch
with the Central Executive Committee. From this group, directives and lines of
treatment were disseminated to regional and branch agencies for use by them.
The propaganda sections of the regional or branch organizations throughout the
peninsula produced a continuous flow of leaflets, news-sheets, slogans, and
booklets for the public. In addition there were political or propaganda
officers at all levels of the bandit organizations, and each operational
section had a propagandist attached. His responsibilities included lecturing,
the holding of study groups and ‘quizzes’, the conduct of examinations on
political theory, and the general indoctrination of party members which fell
under the title of ‘ Political Education ’. These functions were frequently
allied to the teaching of illiterate recruits, the establishment of ‘Reading
Rooms’ and ‘ Information Centres’, and with general educational activities. The
editorials in the underground newspaper Vanguard
frequently formed the foundation of the propaganda issued in other forms.
In addition to the distribution of written
material, bandit propaganda was disseminated by means of ‘whispering
campaigns’, by agents who were deputed to educate the local population in
Communist aims and principles, and by public addresses given in areas where
circumstances permitted. In the earlier
1 G. L. Bondarevsky, Crisis of the Colonial System, National Liberation Struggle of the Peoples
of East Asia, Reports presented in 1949 to the Pacific Institute of the Academy
of Sciences, USSR (Bombay, People’s Publishing House, 1951), traces the
beginning of the Malayan War to the decision of the Joint Council of Chiefs of
Staff at Washington in 1948. It goes on to say that ‘After much careful
preparation, the British Colonial Power thought that in June, 1948, a most
appropriate moment had been reached for dealing a blow to the Communist Party
of Malaya and to the progressive trade-unions. At a signal from London, all
over the country raids began upon Communists accompanied by arrests and the
murder of democratic leaders’. The book quotes Ian Morrison (of The Times) in Far Eastern Survey as saying, ‘An incontestable conviction is being
developed that the Malayan Communists were compelled to launch military
operations much earlier than they were prepared for them, i.e. it turns out
(seems) as though they were drawn into the revolution.’
The evidence on the subject is summarized in
Chapter VII (by Joseph Frankel) in Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-1951 (Oxford University Press for RIIA,
1953).
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cases
it was usual to select a suitable anniversary and to utilize community singing
or a play as a part of the proceedings. The Min Yuen (fifth column) and
intelligence agents were responsible for the organization of such gatherings,
and to them fell the task of disseminating leaflets and propaganda to the public,
with the exception of propaganda related to specific operations when the killer
squad, or Liu Tong Tai, scattered leaflets at the scene of the incident.
The anniversaries selected for celebration (and for
the dissemination of propaganda) included the October Revolution or Red Army
Day and the Paris Commune or May Day, on the World Communist level, and 1
September, 1943, when the Japanese at Batu Caves surrounded and killed a number
of the leaders of the MPAJA, on the Malayan level.
Early manifestoes issued at the outbreak of
hostilities in 1948 were signed on behalf of a variety of organizations—the
Malayan Communist Party, the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army, the Malayan
Communist Party’s People’s Liberation Army, the National Liberation Alliance,
and the Malayan National Emancipation Army. By the end of 1949, however, the
title National Liberation Army (no doubt chosen to accord with the Communist
Army’s title in China) was generally adopted and material was issued in its
name, but the greater part of the propaganda to members of the party continued
to originate from the Central Bureau of the Central Executive Committee.
The foundations of the MCP’s creed were solidly
laid in international Communism and Marxism-Leninism, though Maoist ‘deviation’
could be detected. After the outbreak of the insurrection in 1948 the
international aspect of Communism was stressed even though the immediate enemy
was Britain. The action in Malaya was represented as part of a world-liberation
movement. The objective in Malaya was the liberation of the people and the
establishment of a ‘Democratic People’s Republic’. This could be achieved only
through the annihilation of the ‘British imperialist’.
When the Communist Revolution in China succeeded
and the People’s Republic was established, the Malayan Communists were
naturally jubilant and many of them undoubtedly expected substantial material
aid from that quarter. Broadcasts over Peking Radio by a deported Chinese
member of the Malayan Communist Party which were reproduced in the Malayan
press
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encouraged
the view that the New China would exert considerable influence on the situation
in Malaya, even if it did not promise practical assistance. But the Political
Bureau of the MCP very soon issued a warning to party members against over
optimism and over-reliance on help from China. This folly (said the Bureau) had
been encouraged by ‘Overseas Chinese intellectuals’, but the correct solution
was neither to return to China nor to rely on help from China to carry the
revolution through. ‘The way out is along one path only: the overthrow of
British imperialism.’ Any other action would interfere with the local revolution.
But in order that the MCP aims should not appear
merely destructive or vague regarding the future, their propagandists in 1949
produced a plan for the People’s Democratic Republic. This plan included
franchise for all persons over eighteen who were to have the right to vote in a
People’s State ‘controlled by the united revolutions of all races ’, complete
equality of status for all workers who would be the ‘armies of state-controlled
industries ’, a comprehensive scheme of national and social insurance, and the
free education of all children and adults. Land, with security of tenure, was
to be granted to the landless and assistance given to the farmers in the form
of loans from Land Banks and the supply by the State of seed, implements, and
fertilisers. (It is interesting to compare these promises with some actual
assistance given by the Federal Government in the shape of seed, pedigree pigs,
etc., in this competition for the ‘hearts of the people’.)
The establishment of the Malayan Chinese
Association in February, 1949, was regarded by the Communists with especial
hostility, since its success would inevitably weaken the hold of the MCP on the
squatter population. A tirade of abuse against the ‘running dog’ leaders of the
Association was soon begun. The officials of the Association were mentioned by
name and accused of all manner of crimes against the people during the Japanese
occupation and afterwards. The new organization (the propaganda said) would
never be able to protect the farmers (i.e. squatters), and its funds would be
squandered by the leaders. The MCA was ‘ nothing but a big iron chain and a
mouse trap’ and would attempt to massacre the people and cripple their
resistance. The bomb incident at Ipoh in which Mr. Tan Cheng-lock was wounded
and other attacks upon members of the MCA and officials were given widespread
publicity in the
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underground
newspapers as part of the campaign against the Association.
Most of the Communist propaganda was directed to
the workers. In the early days of the Emergency it was apparently expected that
in response to the flood of manifestoes and appeals the workers would leave
their employment on estates and mines and withdraw to what were expected to
become ‘liberated areas’. But such areas never eventualized except in theory.
The Pan-Malayan Federation of Trades Unions (a Communist body which had
disappeared at the time of the Emergency) was represented as operating
underground, and appeals were issued in its name.
During 1949 propaganda directed at the student
class was intensified since, with the disappearance of the KMT and the setting
up of the Communist Government in China, the students offered a promising field
for exploitation. Youth generally was also appealed to. The World Federation of
Democratic Youth, the World Youth Day Celebrations in Budapest, and the
relation of Democratic Youth to youth movements in other countries were
prominently publicized. Appeals to nationalism and to Chinese patriotic
sentiment were made, and it was claimed that the KMT abuses in China had been
abolished. Students were encouraged to record the habits and characteristics of
their teachers and to assist in formulating grievances to provide focal points
for agitation.
When National Registration was introduced the
Communists did their best to make it ineffectual. They instigated the murder of
photographers and others concerned with its organization. When this
registration was successfully completed, they alleged that the National
Registration cards were ‘dead cards’. Later on they raided new villages and
destroyed these cards (this was one of the activities forbidden by the
Directive of 1 October, 1951, see pp. 69 ff.)
The strength of the Communists lay in their appeal
to the Overseas Chinese—especially the China-born; they were handicapped in
addressing the Malays. The Communist organization among the Malays was poor,
except in Pahang, where local factors unconnected with Communism (e.g.
traditional feuds) had enabled the Communists to enlist some support. A small
outpost of propaganda literature in Tamil was directed towards the Tamil rubber
estate workers.
A basic thesis of Communist propaganda was that
the armed revolt of 1948 onwards was a spontaneous movement on the part
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of
the people of Malaya. The MCP as the party of the ‘powerful labouring class ’
was represented as having worked and sacrificed itself on behalf of the people
of Malaya for twenty-five years and having actively waged war against the
Japanese for three and a half years. The period from September, 1946, to June,
1948, was termed the Peace Period United Front and was condemned as having been
based on ‘incorrect policy’ (though by the Directive of 1 October, 1951, that
policy was, in part, readopted). It seems that it was decided early in 1948
that it was impossible to defeat the Government without a strongly equipped
army and that conflict was to be preferred to ‘ revolution by constitutional
means’. Thus the Central Committee said, ‘Under these circumstances we
Communists have not only eliminated past errors but at the same time are
determined to carry out a new policy and definitely to choose a new direction
for our struggle.’ The British were the immediate target, and persons not
assisting the British would not be harmed.
Since the enemies were the British imperialists
and their ‘running-dogs’, the Communists (said their propaganda) would respect
the freedom of all political views and religious faith and would not interfere
with the activities of the KMT of China unless their propaganda assisted the
British imperialists. (With the success of the Communists in China, references
to the KMT disappeared and the KMT itself ceased to function actively towards
the end of 1949.)
Considering the largely illiterate and
semi-literate condition of the bulk of the persons to whom Communist propaganda
was directed, it was somewhat surprising that such pains should have been taken
to disseminate and explain the basic ideological theory. But Lenin’s saying
that ‘without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement’
was accepted by the intellectuals of the party as dogma. Lenin had also said,
‘The attempt of practical workers to brush aside theory runs counter to the
whole spirit of Leninism and is fraught with serious danger to the cause.’ This
resulted in an attempt to interpret the basic theory of Marxism-Leninism to
workers who were not in a position to understand its terms. Nevertheless the
Communists persevered in their endeavour.
It has
been found that some of our comrades have become confused and possess only a
vague understanding of these
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principles
and in consequence lean towards ‘liberal’ and capitalistic ideas. These are
signs that they cannot fulfil their duty and are opposed to the principles of
Marxism-Leninism. Therefore it is essential to make renewed efforts to fulfil
the Marxist-Leninist principles. Comrade Stalin has said, ‘ Organization is the
only weapon for the proletariat during the struggle for political rights.’ Our
party is established on the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. The
systematic organization is based on the individual obeying the organization,
the minority obeying the majority. Lower ranks must obey the higher, and the
whole party must obey the principles of the Central Committee. This is the
highest form of the organization of the proletariat.
The ‘British enemy’ was unveiled in
uncompromising terms. An early manifesto said:
The war
waged by the British imperialists today is a war suppressing the colonial
people. It is a retrogressive, reactionary, criminal war. Their object is to
destroy the revolutionary strength of the people and suppress the resistance of
the people in order to stabilize their colonial domination over Malaya, thus
providing themselves with an opportunity to exploit Malayan resources and
manpower indefinitely. ... It is a national, revolutionary, progressive, and
sacred war to oppose them. If in this war the British were to triumph, Malaya
would in the future be everlastingly the colony of the British imperialists.
We, the Malayan people, would remain hungry slaves leaving all we earned at the
disposal of the British imperialists and allowing them to make use of Malayan
resources and manpower to save their homeland in its economic crisis. Hence
this life-and-death struggle of the Malayan people.
Membership of the People’s Liberation Army did
not in itself qualify a person to be a member of the MCP. To become a party
member called for a long period of apprenticeship and training in which the
candidate underwent tests of endurance and was purged of the remnants of all
bourgeois ideas.
Developments in Government policy are reflected
in Communist counter-proposals. Thus the Federation and Singapore were to be
replaced by a Malayan People’s Democratic Republic
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uniting
the two regions and in which citizenship would be synonymous with nationality.
The national constitution (said MCP propaganda) was to be determined
democratically by Malayan citizens who would enjoy equal rights and would have
the right to vote and be elected on attaining the age of eighteen. There was to
be complete freedom of association, assembly, speech, publication,
correspondence, religious creed, strikes, demonstration, etc. The
administrative body would be the Central People’s Council, the formation of
which would be in accordance with the principle of racial equality with
safeguards for the backward sections of the community. The National
Constitution of the Malayan People’s Republic would neither be a Soviet
republic of proletarian despotism nor a republic of bourgeois dictatorship; it
would be a combined autocracy of the various revolutionary classes.
In the new dispensation, when the revolution had
finally succeeded, all British capital was to be confiscated. Farmers would
then own their own land and the peasants would be given sufficient land to
support them. The economy of the agricultural co-operative society would be
developed systematically and methodically. The People’s Republic would
establish National Enterprises, but at the same time privately financed trade
and industry and agricultural industry carried on by capitalism would be
protected. The National Enterprises would be financed by the State under the
management of deputies of the People’s Government, Labour Unions, and of
workers in all the Departments. These National Enterprises were not intended as
a blow against private enterprise or to eliminate private capital. On the
contrary, under the principle of public and private mutual regard, and in
accordance with the national economic division of labour, private enterprises
(especially small enterprises) would secure protection, support, and
development. Within the national economy private capital and economy were an
indispensable part; the latter was not in opposition to the former but the two
were complementary.
Land policy included the improvement of drainage
and irrigation, improved methods of agricultural production, close attention to
the co-operative movement, and mechanisation. ‘The ownership of land by
peasants in Malaya is the only correct land policy for the liberation of the
peasants and the improvement of their standard of living.’ Only on the
foundation of this policy could Malaya’s economy be developed and industry and
commerce prosper.
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Not a single one of the social and economic
matters which had for years figured in the annual reports of the Government
failed to receive attention in the voluminous propaganda of the MCP. There was
to be a new fiscal policy in which ‘ extortionate taxes ’ were to be replaced
by ‘reasonable and light taxes’. Malayan industry was to be protected from
foreign exploitation, the difficulties of peasants, food hawkers (a perennial
‘problem’ in Malaya owing to their unhygienic practices) and small businessmen
were particularly to be borne in mind. The latter were to be exempted from
paying taxes in the early stages of the Republic. Among the provisions for
raising the standard of living, minimum wages, scales of increment, the
elimination of the colour bar, and sex equality were listed. The contract
system (the bane of the old labour system and the most fruitful sources of
disputes) together with apprenticeship was to be abolished. Rural banks were to
be established which would grant loans to the peasants at low interest, and the
State would supply agricultural implements and tools, manure, and seeds at low
prices and guarantee rights of free purchase and sale of agricultural produce.
Social welfare and education also received detailed attention. Free elementary
education was to be provided in the several languages; colonial culture and
education must be eradicated. A National Defence Army was to be created.
All this propaganda (of which the above summary
accounts for only a tithe) belongs to the earlier part of the Emergency, though
subsequent items have been published in the press. The news-sheets included
those in Chinese, with names such as Humanity
News, Vanguard, Lenin News, Worker-Peasant News, etc., and in Malay Seruan Raayat (Call of the People) and Suara Pembrontak (Voice of the
Revolutionary). There does not appear to have been any regular Tamil bandit
newspaper but only occasional manifestos and pamphlets in that language.
Comparisons
with Communist China
Communist propaganda and strategy were
interlocked. Such documents as Strategic
Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War (Ma-lai-ya ko-ming chan-cheng ti
chan-luch wen-ti), published first by the Assault Press in 1948 and reissued in
November, 1950, were not much different from Mao Tse-tung’s own Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary
War, first written in 1936. The MCP’s revised views were set out in Supplementary Views of the
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Central Political Bureau of the
MCP on 'Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War'
(Chung-yang cheng-chih-chu tui Ma-lai-ya ko-ming chan-cheng chan-liieh wen-ti
pu-ch’ung kuan-chien), first issued by the Assault Press on 12 November, 1949,
and reissued on 15 December, 1950.1
A study of the documents issued by the Chinese
Communist Party reveals a number of sources of MCP policy and propaganda (which
was actually Maoist rather than Marxist-Leninist) and also a number of points
of contrast, since MCP policy was not Maoist by definition but orthodox
Marxist-Leninist.
At the Seventh CCP Congress, held in Yenan
between 23 April and 11 June, 1945, a main item on the agenda was Mao
Tse-tung’s report On Coalition Government,2
Negotiations between the CCP and the Nationalist Government at Chungking
concerning a solution of the Communist problem by ‘political means ’ and
eventually by the incorporation of the CCP in a coalition regime had been
proceeding since 1944. Mao’s report of April, 1945, summed up the theoretical
basis on which the CCP approached the coming post-war problem of its
relationship to the recognized National Government of the KMT. The theme of
Mao’s report, one of the key documents of the CCP history, was that since China
was still ‘ in the stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution’ it needed ‘a new
democratic government of a coalition nature, embracing all parties and
non-partisan representatives’. This announcement of the MCP’s willingness to
share political power with other parties and groups had a great effect on the various
political elements in KMT China which were opposed to KMT tutelage and had
become increasingly conscious of its undesirable effects. After the defeat of the KMT in 1949 and the fact that nearly all
effective power now lay in the hands of the CCP, the ‘people's democratic
dictatorship’ could still be interpreted as a coalition made up of an alliance
of four classes—workers, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and national capitalist
under the leadership of the working classes, while the Central People's Government
set up at Peking was also in form controlled by a coalition of CCP and other
parties or groups. ‘ Coalition ’ had been a potent and persuasive slogan.
1 Translations of these documents
are contained in Gene Z. Hanrahan, The
Strategy and Tactics of Communism in Malaya, shortly to be published by the
Institute of Pacific Relations. This latter work throws a great deal of new
light on the history and policy of the MCP.
2 Conrad Brandt, Benjamin
Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, A
Documentary History of Chinese Communism (London, Allen and Unwin, 1952),
pp. 285-7.
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Another salient feature of the report, Coalition Government, was the great
importance attached to the peasantry. Thus Mao says, ‘The CCP, which has a
resolute agrarian policy, fights for the interests of the peasants, and looks
upon them as their allies, naturally becomes the leader of the peasants.’ Such
statements (say Conrad Brandt and his co-authors) try to reconcile the orthodox
Marxist role of the CCP as the leader of the proletariat with the practical
necessity of leading the Chinese peasantry. The central feature of the agrarian
policy advocated by Mao, that ‘the tiller of the land should own the land’, is
a phrase borrowed or inherited from Sun Yat-sen, and in 1950 still remained in
essence the immediate goal of the CCP land programme.
Other basic points outlined in Coalition Government were to call for a
‘ new democratic economy which is managed partly by the State, partly by
private capital, and partly by co-operation’, and the statement that ‘ all
religions are allowed to exist in Communist areas’. How long the admittedly
transitional period represented by these policies would last before being
supplanted by the next, socialist, stage has not been specifically stated. But
Mao Tse-tung in his report on The Present
Situation and our Tasks made to the Central Committee on 25 December, 1947,
stated that ‘the capitalist economy, which is an integral part of the national
economy, must be allowed to exist for a long time, even after the revolutionary
victory on a national scale is achieved’. The length of this ‘ long time ’
still remained a question for the future in 1953.
The above description reveals the main features
of MCP policy which the Federation Government was called upon to counter by
action and by propaganda of its own. The change in Communist strategy and the
dying down of the shooting war made no difference to the real nature of its
task; they merely increased its urgency.1
1 Some examples of the Communist
books in my possession are not only evidence of the crude jungle conditions
under which they were printed but also of the resourcefulness of the MCP.
MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
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