CHAPTER 11 - COMMUNIST POLICY AND PROPAGANDA (1) | MALAYA : Communist or Free?



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An article in Ta Kung Pao, Shanghai, of 28 January, 1950, was taken as adumbrating the future policy of the Central People’s Government of China towards Overseas Chinese and the Governments of South-East Asia. It began by saying: ‘Now that the People’s Republic of China has been established and diplomatic relations have been opened between the Central People’s Government and a number of countries, the more than ten million Overseas Chinese shall and must not be subjected to further abuse.’ The article pointed out that it was clearly stipulated in Article 58 of the Communist Programme that the People’s Government ‘shall do its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad’. In pursuance of this principle the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged strong protests with the French and Thai authorities against the abuse of Chinese nationals. The same statement referred to the ‘persecution of Chinese nationals in Thailand, Indo-China, and Malaya’ and to ‘the imperialist plot for both direct and indirect attack against the Chinese people’. Peking Radio thereafter systematically attacked the South-East Asian Governments for their alleged ill-treatment of the Overseas Chinese, but in the case of Malaya it was noticeable that the terrorist campaign was ignored for some months, and when later it was mentioned it was as a national uprising against the imperialists and not as a virtually Chinese insurrection.1

It is interesting, though scarcely surprising, to note that Communist propaganda asserted that the Emergency was provoked by the British and that the ‘ people ’ were merely protecting themselves against aggression. It is admitted in some of their

1 I was engaged in controversy on this issue with Mr. Harry Pollitt, Secretary of the British Communist Party, in The Times in August, 1948. Mr. Pollitt contended that the war in Malaya was a national movement and I contended that it was not.

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literature that a series of strikes were timed for May, but an intention to start a shooting war is denied.1

It seemed on the face of it as if Malayan Communist Party policy was shaped in Malaya with freedom from direct external direction but following CCP models. There is ample evidence, however, of the central planning and direction of propaganda by a Central Bureau in close touch with the Central Executive Committee. From this group, directives and lines of treatment were disseminated to regional and branch agencies for use by them. The propaganda sections of the regional or branch organizations throughout the peninsula produced a continuous flow of leaflets, news-sheets, slogans, and booklets for the public. In addition there were political or propaganda officers at all levels of the bandit organizations, and each operational section had a propagandist attached. His responsibilities included lecturing, the holding of study groups and ‘quizzes’, the conduct of examinations on political theory, and the general indoctrination of party members which fell under the title of ‘ Political Education ’. These functions were frequently allied to the teaching of illiterate recruits, the establishment of ‘Reading Rooms’ and ‘ Information Centres’, and with general educational activities. The editorials in the underground newspaper Vanguard frequently formed the foundation of the propaganda issued in other forms.

In addition to the distribution of written material, bandit propaganda was disseminated by means of ‘whispering campaigns’, by agents who were deputed to educate the local population in Communist aims and principles, and by public addresses given in areas where circumstances permitted. In the earlier

1 G. L. Bondarevsky, Crisis of the Colonial System, National Liberation Struggle of the Peoples of East Asia, Reports presented in 1949 to the Pacific Institute of the Academy of Sciences, USSR (Bombay, People’s Publishing House, 1951), traces the beginning of the Malayan War to the decision of the Joint Council of Chiefs of Staff at Washington in 1948. It goes on to say that ‘After much careful preparation, the British Colonial Power thought that in June, 1948, a most appropriate moment had been reached for dealing a blow to the Communist Party of Malaya and to the progressive trade-unions. At a signal from London, all over the country raids began upon Communists accompanied by arrests and the murder of democratic leaders’. The book quotes Ian Morrison (of The Times) in Far Eastern Survey as saying, ‘An incontestable conviction is being developed that the Malayan Communists were compelled to launch military operations much earlier than they were prepared for them, i.e. it turns out (seems) as though they were drawn into the revolution.’
The evidence on the subject is summarized in Chapter VII (by Joseph Frankel) in Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-1951 (Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1953).

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cases it was usual to select a suitable anniversary and to utilize community singing or a play as a part of the proceedings. The Min Yuen (fifth column) and intelligence agents were responsible for the organization of such gatherings, and to them fell the task of disseminating leaflets and propaganda to the public, with the exception of propaganda related to specific operations when the killer squad, or Liu Tong Tai, scattered leaflets at the scene of the incident.

The anniversaries selected for celebration (and for the dissemination of propaganda) included the October Revolution or Red Army Day and the Paris Commune or May Day, on the World Communist level, and 1 September, 1943, when the Japanese at Batu Caves surrounded and killed a number of the leaders of the MPAJA, on the Malayan level.

Early manifestoes issued at the outbreak of hostilities in 1948 were signed on behalf of a variety of organizations—the Malayan Communist Party, the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army, the Malayan Communist Party’s People’s Liberation Army, the National Liberation Alliance, and the Malayan National Emancipation Army. By the end of 1949, however, the title National Liberation Army (no doubt chosen to accord with the Communist Army’s title in China) was generally adopted and material was issued in its name, but the greater part of the propaganda to members of the party continued to originate from the Central Bureau of the Central Executive Committee.

The foundations of the MCP’s creed were solidly laid in international Communism and Marxism-Leninism, though Maoist ‘deviation’ could be detected. After the outbreak of the insurrection in 1948 the international aspect of Communism was stressed even though the immediate enemy was Britain. The action in Malaya was represented as part of a world-liberation movement. The objective in Malaya was the liberation of the people and the establishment of a ‘Democratic People’s Republic’. This could be achieved only through the annihilation of the ‘British imperialist’.

When the Communist Revolution in China succeeded and the People’s Republic was established, the Malayan Communists were naturally jubilant and many of them undoubtedly expected substantial material aid from that quarter. Broadcasts over Peking Radio by a deported Chinese member of the Malayan Communist Party which were reproduced in the Malayan press

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encouraged the view that the New China would exert considerable influence on the situation in Malaya, even if it did not promise practical assistance. But the Political Bureau of the MCP very soon issued a warning to party members against over optimism and over-reliance on help from China. This folly (said the Bureau) had been encouraged by ‘Overseas Chinese intellectuals’, but the correct solution was neither to return to China nor to rely on help from China to carry the revolution through. ‘The way out is along one path only: the overthrow of British imperialism.’ Any other action would interfere with the local revolution.

But in order that the MCP aims should not appear merely destructive or vague regarding the future, their propagandists in 1949 produced a plan for the People’s Democratic Republic. This plan included franchise for all persons over eighteen who were to have the right to vote in a People’s State ‘controlled by the united revolutions of all races ’, complete equality of status for all workers who would be the ‘armies of state-controlled industries ’, a comprehensive scheme of national and social insurance, and the free education of all children and adults. Land, with security of tenure, was to be granted to the landless and assistance given to the farmers in the form of loans from Land Banks and the supply by the State of seed, implements, and fertilisers. (It is interesting to compare these promises with some actual assistance given by the Federal Government in the shape of seed, pedigree pigs, etc., in this competition for the ‘hearts of the people’.)

The establishment of the Malayan Chinese Association in February, 1949, was regarded by the Communists with especial hostility, since its success would inevitably weaken the hold of the MCP on the squatter population. A tirade of abuse against the ‘running dog’ leaders of the Association was soon begun. The officials of the Association were mentioned by name and accused of all manner of crimes against the people during the Japanese occupation and afterwards. The new organization (the propaganda said) would never be able to protect the farmers (i.e. squatters), and its funds would be squandered by the leaders. The MCA was ‘ nothing but a big iron chain and a mouse trap’ and would attempt to massacre the people and cripple their resistance. The bomb incident at Ipoh in which Mr. Tan Cheng-lock was wounded and other attacks upon members of the MCA and officials were given widespread publicity in the

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underground newspapers as part of the campaign against the Association.

Most of the Communist propaganda was directed to the workers. In the early days of the Emergency it was apparently expected that in response to the flood of manifestoes and appeals the workers would leave their employment on estates and mines and withdraw to what were expected to become ‘liberated areas’. But such areas never eventualized except in theory. The Pan-Malayan Federation of Trades Unions (a Communist body which had disappeared at the time of the Emergency) was represented as operating underground, and appeals were issued in its name.

During 1949 propaganda directed at the student class was intensified since, with the disappearance of the KMT and the setting up of the Communist Government in China, the students offered a promising field for exploitation. Youth generally was also appealed to. The World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Youth Day Celebrations in Budapest, and the relation of Democratic Youth to youth movements in other countries were prominently publicized. Appeals to nationalism and to Chinese patriotic sentiment were made, and it was claimed that the KMT abuses in China had been abolished. Students were encouraged to record the habits and characteristics of their teachers and to assist in formulating grievances to provide focal points for agitation.

When National Registration was introduced the Communists did their best to make it ineffectual. They instigated the murder of photographers and others concerned with its organization. When this registration was successfully completed, they alleged that the National Registration cards were ‘dead cards’. Later on they raided new villages and destroyed these cards (this was one of the activities forbidden by the Directive of 1 October, 1951, see pp. 69 ff.)

The strength of the Communists lay in their appeal to the Overseas Chinese—especially the China-born; they were handicapped in addressing the Malays. The Communist organization among the Malays was poor, except in Pahang, where local factors unconnected with Communism (e.g. traditional feuds) had enabled the Communists to enlist some support. A small outpost of propaganda literature in Tamil was directed towards the Tamil rubber estate workers.

A basic thesis of Communist propaganda was that the armed revolt of 1948 onwards was a spontaneous movement on the part

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of the people of Malaya. The MCP as the party of the ‘powerful labouring class ’ was represented as having worked and sacrificed itself on behalf of the people of Malaya for twenty-five years and having actively waged war against the Japanese for three and a half years. The period from September, 1946, to June, 1948, was termed the Peace Period United Front and was condemned as having been based on ‘incorrect policy’ (though by the Directive of 1 October, 1951, that policy was, in part, readopted). It seems that it was decided early in 1948 that it was impossible to defeat the Government without a strongly equipped army and that conflict was to be preferred to ‘ revolution by constitutional means’. Thus the Central Committee said, ‘Under these circumstances we Communists have not only eliminated past errors but at the same time are determined to carry out a new policy and definitely to choose a new direction for our struggle.’ The British were the immediate target, and persons not assisting the British would not be harmed.

Since the enemies were the British imperialists and their ‘running-dogs’, the Communists (said their propaganda) would respect the freedom of all political views and religious faith and would not interfere with the activities of the KMT of China unless their propaganda assisted the British imperialists. (With the success of the Communists in China, references to the KMT disappeared and the KMT itself ceased to function actively towards the end of 1949.)

Considering the largely illiterate and semi-literate condition of the bulk of the persons to whom Communist propaganda was directed, it was somewhat surprising that such pains should have been taken to disseminate and explain the basic ideological theory. But Lenin’s saying that ‘without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement’ was accepted by the intellectuals of the party as dogma. Lenin had also said, ‘The attempt of practical workers to brush aside theory runs counter to the whole spirit of Leninism and is fraught with serious danger to the cause.’ This resulted in an attempt to interpret the basic theory of Marxism-Leninism to workers who were not in a position to understand its terms. Nevertheless the Communists persevered in their endeavour.

It has been found that some of our comrades have become confused and possess only a vague understanding of these

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principles and in consequence lean towards ‘liberal’ and capitalistic ideas. These are signs that they cannot fulfil their duty and are opposed to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore it is essential to make renewed efforts to fulfil the Marxist-Leninist principles. Comrade Stalin has said, ‘ Organization is the only weapon for the proletariat during the struggle for political rights.’ Our party is established on the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. The systematic organization is based on the individual obeying the organization, the minority obeying the majority. Lower ranks must obey the higher, and the whole party must obey the principles of the Central Committee. This is the highest form of the organization of the proletariat.

The ‘British enemy’ was unveiled in uncompromising terms. An early manifesto said:

The war waged by the British imperialists today is a war suppressing the colonial people. It is a retrogressive, reactionary, criminal war. Their object is to destroy the revolutionary strength of the people and suppress the resistance of the people in order to stabilize their colonial domination over Malaya, thus providing themselves with an opportunity to exploit Malayan resources and manpower indefinitely. ... It is a national, revolutionary, progressive, and sacred war to oppose them. If in this war the British were to triumph, Malaya would in the future be everlastingly the colony of the British imperialists. We, the Malayan people, would remain hungry slaves leaving all we earned at the disposal of the British imperialists and allowing them to make use of Malayan resources and manpower to save their homeland in its economic crisis. Hence this life-and-death struggle of the Malayan people.

Membership of the People’s Liberation Army did not in itself qualify a person to be a member of the MCP. To become a party member called for a long period of apprenticeship and training in which the candidate underwent tests of endurance and was purged of the remnants of all bourgeois ideas.

Developments in Government policy are reflected in Communist counter-proposals. Thus the Federation and Singapore were to be replaced by a Malayan People’s Democratic Republic

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uniting the two regions and in which citizenship would be synonymous with nationality. The national constitution (said MCP propaganda) was to be determined democratically by Malayan citizens who would enjoy equal rights and would have the right to vote and be elected on attaining the age of eighteen. There was to be complete freedom of association, assembly, speech, publication, correspondence, religious creed, strikes, demonstration, etc. The administrative body would be the Central People’s Council, the formation of which would be in accordance with the principle of racial equality with safeguards for the backward sections of the community. The National Constitution of the Malayan People’s Republic would neither be a Soviet republic of proletarian despotism nor a republic of bourgeois dictatorship; it would be a combined autocracy of the various revolutionary classes.

In the new dispensation, when the revolution had finally succeeded, all British capital was to be confiscated. Farmers would then own their own land and the peasants would be given sufficient land to support them. The economy of the agricultural co-operative society would be developed systematically and methodically. The People’s Republic would establish National Enterprises, but at the same time privately financed trade and industry and agricultural industry carried on by capitalism would be protected. The National Enterprises would be financed by the State under the management of deputies of the People’s Government, Labour Unions, and of workers in all the Departments. These National Enterprises were not intended as a blow against private enterprise or to eliminate private capital. On the contrary, under the principle of public and private mutual regard, and in accordance with the national economic division of labour, private enterprises (especially small enterprises) would secure protection, support, and development. Within the national economy private capital and economy were an indispensable part; the latter was not in opposition to the former but the two were complementary.

Land policy included the improvement of drainage and irrigation, improved methods of agricultural production, close attention to the co-operative movement, and mechanisation. ‘The ownership of land by peasants in Malaya is the only correct land policy for the liberation of the peasants and the improvement of their standard of living.’ Only on the foundation of this policy could Malaya’s economy be developed and industry and commerce prosper.

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Not a single one of the social and economic matters which had for years figured in the annual reports of the Government failed to receive attention in the voluminous propaganda of the MCP. There was to be a new fiscal policy in which ‘ extortionate taxes ’ were to be replaced by ‘reasonable and light taxes’. Malayan industry was to be protected from foreign exploitation, the difficulties of peasants, food hawkers (a perennial ‘problem’ in Malaya owing to their unhygienic practices) and small businessmen were particularly to be borne in mind. The latter were to be exempted from paying taxes in the early stages of the Republic. Among the provisions for raising the standard of living, minimum wages, scales of increment, the elimination of the colour bar, and sex equality were listed. The contract system (the bane of the old labour system and the most fruitful sources of disputes) together with apprenticeship was to be abolished. Rural banks were to be established which would grant loans to the peasants at low interest, and the State would supply agricultural implements and tools, manure, and seeds at low prices and guarantee rights of free purchase and sale of agricultural produce. Social welfare and education also received detailed attention. Free elementary education was to be provided in the several languages; colonial culture and education must be eradicated. A National Defence Army was to be created.

All this propaganda (of which the above summary accounts for only a tithe) belongs to the earlier part of the Emergency, though subsequent items have been published in the press. The news-sheets included those in Chinese, with names such as Humanity News, Vanguard, Lenin News, Worker-Peasant News, etc., and in Malay Seruan Raayat (Call of the People) and Suara Pembrontak (Voice of the Revolutionary). There does not appear to have been any regular Tamil bandit newspaper but only occasional manifestos and pamphlets in that language.

Comparisons with Communist China

Communist propaganda and strategy were interlocked. Such documents as Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War (Ma-lai-ya ko-ming chan-cheng ti chan-luch wen-ti), published first by the Assault Press in 1948 and reissued in November, 1950, were not much different from Mao Tse-tung’s own Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War, first written in 1936. The MCP’s revised views were set out in Supplementary Views of the

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Central Political Bureau of the MCP on 'Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War' (Chung-yang cheng-chih-chu tui Ma-lai-ya ko-ming chan-cheng chan-liieh wen-ti pu-ch’ung kuan-chien), first issued by the Assault Press on 12 November, 1949, and reissued on 15 December, 1950.1

A study of the documents issued by the Chinese Communist Party reveals a number of sources of MCP policy and propaganda (which was actually Maoist rather than Marxist-Leninist) and also a number of points of contrast, since MCP policy was not Maoist by definition but orthodox Marxist-Leninist.

At the Seventh CCP Congress, held in Yenan between 23 April and 11 June, 1945, a main item on the agenda was Mao Tse-tung’s report On Coalition Government,2 Negotiations between the CCP and the Nationalist Government at Chungking concerning a solution of the Communist problem by ‘political means ’ and eventually by the incorporation of the CCP in a coalition regime had been proceeding since 1944. Mao’s report of April, 1945, summed up the theoretical basis on which the CCP approached the coming post-war problem of its relationship to the recognized National Government of the KMT. The theme of Mao’s report, one of the key documents of the CCP history, was that since China was still ‘ in the stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution’ it needed ‘a new democratic government of a coalition nature, embracing all parties and non-partisan representatives’. This announcement of the MCP’s willingness to share political power with other parties and groups had a great effect on the various political elements in KMT China which were opposed to KMT tutelage and had become increasingly conscious of its undesirable effects. After the defeat of the KMT in 1949 and the fact that nearly all effective power now lay in the hands of the CCP, the ‘people's democratic dictatorship’ could still be interpreted as a coalition made up of an alliance of four classes—workers, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and national capitalist under the leadership of the working classes, while the Central People's Government set up at Peking was also in form controlled by a coalition of CCP and other parties or groups. ‘ Coalition ’ had been a potent and persuasive slogan.

1 Translations of these documents are contained in Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Strategy and Tactics of Communism in Malaya, shortly to be published by the Institute of Pacific Relations. This latter work throws a great deal of new light on the history and policy of the MCP.
2 Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (London, Allen and Unwin, 1952), pp. 285-7.

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Another salient feature of the report, Coalition Government, was the great importance attached to the peasantry. Thus Mao says, ‘The CCP, which has a resolute agrarian policy, fights for the interests of the peasants, and looks upon them as their allies, naturally becomes the leader of the peasants.’ Such statements (say Conrad Brandt and his co-authors) try to reconcile the orthodox Marxist role of the CCP as the leader of the proletariat with the practical necessity of leading the Chinese peasantry. The central feature of the agrarian policy advocated by Mao, that ‘the tiller of the land should own the land’, is a phrase borrowed or inherited from Sun Yat-sen, and in 1950 still remained in essence the immediate goal of the CCP land programme.

Other basic points outlined in Coalition Government were to call for a ‘ new democratic economy which is managed partly by the State, partly by private capital, and partly by co-operation’, and the statement that ‘ all religions are allowed to exist in Communist areas’. How long the admittedly transitional period represented by these policies would last before being supplanted by the next, socialist, stage has not been specifically stated. But Mao Tse-tung in his report on The Present Situation and our Tasks made to the Central Committee on 25 December, 1947, stated that ‘the capitalist economy, which is an integral part of the national economy, must be allowed to exist for a long time, even after the revolutionary victory on a national scale is achieved’. The length of this ‘ long time ’ still remained a question for the future in 1953.

The above description reveals the main features of MCP policy which the Federation Government was called upon to counter by action and by propaganda of its own. The change in Communist strategy and the dying down of the shooting war made no difference to the real nature of its task; they merely increased its urgency.1

1 Some examples of the Communist books in my possession are not only evidence of the crude jungle conditions under which they were printed but also of the resourcefulness of the MCP.

MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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