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Among the influences that have moulded modern
Malaya that of the British is by far the most important. British interest in
the Malay Peninsula, which had lapsed after the successful Dutch opposition of
the early seventeenth century, revived towards the end of the eighteenth. In
1786 the cession of the island of Penang was obtained by Francis Light from the
Sultan of Kedah as a ‘ careening station ’ for ships disabled in the Bay of
Bengal and as a place in which to grow spices to compete with the Dutch
monopoly. A strip of the mainland (Province Wellesley) was added in 1800.
Penang had a chequered career and was not a financial success, though a sudden
and extravagant belief in its future led to its being promoted to be the Fourth
Presidency of India in 1805. The effective history of the British in Malaya,
however, begins with the foundation of Singapore by Sir Stamford Raffles in
1819. Situated at the narrow entrance to the Straits of Malacca, its strategic
position was ideal, and, being at the conflux of several trade routes, its
commercial possibilities were great. Moreover, Raffles’s free-trade policy
attracted Asian traders, who flocked there in considerable
1The scope of this study does not provide for deep
‘historical roots’, but the following will serve as a pointer.
The aboriginals of the
country (Negritos, Temiar, etc. etc., collectively known as ‘Sakai ’) still
number about 35,000. The Malays proper arrived in Malaya in early times, but
they were reinforced by a series of migrations from Indonesia which are still
continuing. Hindu influences extended to Malaya early in the Christian era, and
it was not until half-way through its career (c. 1400-1511) that the Malay kingdom
of Malacca turned from Hinduism to Islam. The Portuguese occupied Malacca from
1511 to 1641, and the Dutch from 1641 to 1824 (though the control of that
Settlement passed to the British during the wars with France). European
influence extended over wide areas of the hinterland, but certain Malay States
in succession (Johore, Acheen, etc.) extended their sway over their neighbours
to form what have been somewhat grandiosely referred to as ‘empires’.
The history of Malaya,
hitherto the preserve of civil servants and one or two wandering scholars, is
now being systematically studied in the University of Malaya.
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numbers
to enjoy this innovation under the protection of the British flag. Singapore,
Penang and Malacca (obtained finally by the treaty with the Dutch of 1824) were
joined to form the Straits Settlements. In spite of the piracy which was rife
in these waters, the British Colony prospered, even though it remained a
financial burden to the East India Company to the end of the latter’s existence
(1858), since no effective taxation of the trade had been devised. In 1867 the
Straits Settlements, having satisfied the British Government that they could in
future pay their own way, were transferred from the control of the Government
of India to the supervision of the Colonial Office.
Meanwhile the Malay States of the interior had
fallen into a state of decay bordering on anarchy. Their population in the
mid-nineteenth century did not exceed 400,000 (including the four Northern
States) and was confined to the banks of rivers and the coastlines. There were
no roads, no public buildings, schools, or courts of law, and the social system
was strictly feudal. About 1850 the disorder was accentuated when the discovery
of fresh tin deposits in Perak attracted Chinese miners from the tin mines of
Selangor, Sungei Ujong and elsewhere in increasing numbers. These were soon in
conflict with the Malay chiefs and among themselves, divided as they were into
rival factions by their secret societies. The disorders continued for some
years, but in spite of petitions from Chinese merchants in the Straits
Settlements, whose interests were at stake, the British refused to accept any
further territorial responsibilities. Finally, however, under the influence of
the changed attitude of Britain towards colonial expansion (often dated from
Disraeli’s Speech of 1872), this policy was reversed and it was announced, in
1873, that ‘Her Majesty’s Government found it incumbent to employ such
influence as they possess with the native princes to rescue, if possible, these
fertile and productive countries from the ruin which must befall them if the
present disorders continue unchecked ’.
The Governor of the Straits Settlements, acting
under this new policy, intervened in Perak, where there was a dispute in
progress as to the succession to the throne, backing one of the claimants whom
he recognized as Sultan. This Sultan (Abdullah) then signed a treaty whereby he
agreed to accept a British Resident, whose advice ‘ should be asked for and
acted upon in all questions other than those touching Malay religion and
custom’. This formula was adopted in all subsequent treaties with the Rulers of
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the
several Malay States, and is the basis of the Protectorate system which
survives in the Federal Agreement for the constitution of 1948. Selangor was
the next State after Perak to accept (indeed, ask for) a treaty, then Negri
Sembilan (literally ‘Nine States’, which were persuaded to amalgamate under a
common Ruler—a fact emphasizing the fragmentation of the Peninsula), then
Pahang in 1888. These four States agreed to federation as the Federated Malay
States from 1 January, 1896. Johore, the remaining Malay State at the extreme
south, had previously been in treaty relations with Britain, but a definitive
treaty was signed in 1914. The four northern States—Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan,
and Trengganu—had been outside the British sphere and under the suzerainty of
Siam, but in 1909 this suzerainty was transferred to the British Crown and
separate treaties on the model of those previously made with the individual
States of the Federated Malay States were signed between the Rulers and the
Crown.
The British had hoped that the States outside
the Federation would eventually join it, but for several reasons this did not
come to pass. For one thing the unfederated States saw that the Federation had
entailed a considerable loss of sovereignty to the four States composing it,
and for another the Federation had had to bear the capital cost of undertakings
such as the railways. Finally a decentralization scheme was put into operation
in 1935 on the initiation of Sir Cecil Clementi (Governor from 1929 to 1934).
By this, much of the previous autonomy was restored to the individual States of
the Federation though the federal machinery was retained for reasons of
convenience. Sir Cecil Clementi’s intention was that co-ordination should be
brought about by the centralizing of advisory powers in Kuala Lumpur. But
things did not turn out quite in this way, and the main effect of
decentralization was to confirm the fragmentation of the Peninsula, an area the
size of England without Wales, but with ten separate governments. Local patriotism
was thus encouraged which was obstructive to the growth of a Malayan sentiment.
Before the British intervened in the affairs of
the Peninsula the Malay States had been very fluid and uncertain in their
extent. Except where there was a river or a coastline, the boundaries of the
States were not demarcated and were vaguely indicated by a natural feature such
as a range of hills. Now they were accurately surveyed, delimited and mapped.
From this time henceforth
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there
would be no ebb and flow of dynastic ambition. The existing situation was
crystallized for ever by treaty and the crude correctives for discontent in a
feudal society (court intrigue and assassination) were abolished. By the very
nature of the agreements the Malay Sultanates became the instruments of British
purpose even though the appearance of independent sovereignty was carefully
preserved. When it suited the protecting power the succession was changed (as
in the case of Johore and Selangor). However, the wealth of these weak and
unstable principalities was vastly increased, and with it the pomp and
circumstance attaching to the Rulers. The loss in their real power was
compensated for by a kind of royal mystique, based no doubt on tradition but
reinforced and adorned by British statecraft and research.
The feudal system of the Malay States was taken
over as it stood. The adat
(customary) law was preserved and codified, and the hereditary chiefs,
sub-chiefs and penghulus (village headmen) were retained. But the real power
was vested in the British Resident and his staff of civil servants. These in
the first decades were Britons who started their careers as Junior Officers at
the age of eighteen or nineteen, and later, when the Civil Service system was
extended to the Malay States from the Straits Settlements, young men of
twenty-three to twenty-four with a university background replaced them. Then in
the ’twenties a policy was introduced of replacing European District Officers
by Malays, and by the eve of World War II this process was practically
complete. The Malay recruits to the Civil Service were all from the
aristocracy, most of whom were trained at the Malay College at Kuala Kangsar,
which thus became a sort of ‘ Eton of Malaya’. However, the Malay element
accounted for no more than a tenth of the entire Malayan Civil Service (a small
corps d'ilite of the ‘Heaven Born’
which never numbered more than 250), and was confined to the Malay States. The
British Resident (or British Adviser, as he was termed in the unfederated
States except Johore, where he was a General Adviser) reigned supreme over the
local oligarchy, and finance and land were entirely in his hands. The Resident
or Adviser was subject, of course, to the Ruler in Council and above that to
his superiors, the Chief Secretary (until this post was abolished in 1935), and
the High Commissioner, which appointment was held ex officio by the Governor of the Straits Settlements. The entire
administration was in 1939
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virtually
in the hands of the British acting through their Residents or Advisers. The
powers reverted to the Ruler had mainly a prestige value, though Sultans of
strong character could assert themselves within well-defined limits. The system
undoubtedly had much to recommend it, for, while the obstruction to the will of
the British was small, the self-respect of the Malays was maintained. Its
weakness was the ossification of native institutions which inevitably set in
and the erection within the country of artificial barricades.
The effect of the treaties was that Malaya was
soon pacified and open for development in what was to be the age of colonial
expansion and imperialism. Nevertheless progress in that direction was slow at
first. Roads and railways were built, but the capital needed for development
was not immediately forthcoming owing to the absence of an adequate labour
force. The Malays were peasant cultivators who worked hard on their holdings
planted with padi, coconuts, and fruit, but were not available in any large
numbers for estate cultivation. The problem of labour supply was eventually
solved by obtaining Tamils from South India for the estates while Chinese came
in sufficient numbers to work the tin mines and also supplied the higher-paid
labour for the opening up of new estates. To begin with, cultivation was of
sugar and coffee, but the rubber industry was destined to supersede the
existing cultivation to a great extent and to provide Malaya with its greatest
single source of revenue. This industry was purely a British creation. Rubber
seeds were brought from Brazil in the eighteen-seventies and the first trees
reached Malaya via Kew and Ceylon. The industry first became profitable about
1906. There were successive booms and slumps (rubber fetched 12s. 9d. a pound
in 1910 and only a trifle over 2d. a pound in 1931), and Malaya suffered from
undue dependency on one main crop, but at the same time the revenues for the
development of Malaya would not have been available without the income from
this source and from tin mining, which was greatly expanded in the present
century.1
The effect of this development was entirely to
change the face of Malaya and to increase its population several-fold, and
incidentally to create a political problem of the first order through the
rivalry of numerically equal communities, the Malays
1 ‘The Malayan soil and climate are on an average inferior to
those of surrounding countries except possibly Borneo. Its soil is rapidly exhausted
and quickly erodes; its climate is on the damp and cloudy side, operating
against high yields and seasonal crops.’ E. H. G. Dobby. Agricultural Questions of Malaya (Oxford University Press, 1949),
p. 38.
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and
the Chinese. A road system comparing favourably with that in any part of the
world was built; railways were opened up along the west coast from Singapore to
Siam, with branches to the ports and later an east coast-line was added. The
revenue was applied to public works, irrigation schemes, and education and
welfare (though critics of the system have argued that undertakings in aid of
capital enterprise came first and education and welfare last).
Immigrants, especially from China, flocked in to
share the growing prosperity, and, by their labours, to add to it. The total
population of British Malaya (less the four northern States and Johore at that
time) was in 1891 only 831,000 (409,000 in the Straits Settlements and 422,000
in the Federated Malay States. In 1911 (after the four northern States had been
added in 1909 and including Johore) the total was 2,654,000; in 1921,3,327,000;
in 1931, 4,348,000; in 1947, 5,849,000; and mid-1951, 6,379,000 (Federation,
5,337,000; Singapore, 1,042,000). But more striking even than the increase in
the population had been the change in its racial composition. In 1921 the
Malays had accounted for 48.8 per cent of the total, the Chinese 35.2 per cent,
and the Indians 14.2 per cent; in 1931 37.8 per cent were Malays and 6.6 Other
Malaysians (the immigrants of Malay race being separately enumerated for the
first time), 39.2 Chinese, and 14.3 Indians; in 1947, 38.2 per cent Malays and
5.29 per cent Other Malaysians, 44.7 per
cent Chinese, and 10.25 per cent Indians. This meant that the Chinese were
by 1947 the most numerous single group in the Federation of Malaya and
Singapore together, but in the Federation the Malays were still in a
majority—Malays, 2,162,000; Other Malaysians, 266,000; total, 2,428,000; together
49.46 per cent of the total, while the Chinese numbered 1,885,000 or 38.4 per
cent of the total. In Singapore in 1947 the Chinese accounted for 77.61 per
cent of the total population (i.e. 730,000 out of 941,000).
This very rapid increase in the Chinese population
was bound to be significant to the politics of Malaya. These immigrants were
more active and enterprising than the natives of the country, and in addition
to supplying most of the artisans, they largely monopolized the petty trading,
though the Indians, too, had a share of this. In entrepreneur undertakings,
however, they remained second to the Europeans.1 The economic
pressure of the
1 After 1921 the increased use of modem equipment (dredges)
meant that the Europeans changed places with the Chinese in the tin industry,
owning
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Chinese
on the agrarian Malays was recognized from 1913 onwards by the creation of
large Malay land reservations in which the land could not be alienated to
non-Malays. But increasing suspicion of Chinese economic encroachment sometimes
amounted to open resentment. However, the outward relationship between the
communities was good and there were no communal disturbances before the
Japanese occupation. The Indians played a more passive role in Malayan affairs,
being composed mainly of rubber estate workers recruited from the Madras
Presidency (though the recruiting system was frowned upon by the Government of
India, and eventually in 1938 the emigration of Indian labour was stopped).
While immigration was causing a change amounting
to a silent revolution, Malaya still remained theoretically a ‘Malay country’.
The paternalistic British administration gave the Malays preference for
Government appointments (even so, the Chinese filled most of the clerkships and
the Jaffna Tamils practically monopolized the lower administration of the
railways) and provided them with free primary education. While an acquaintance
with the Malay language was considered as an indispensable requirement for a
European civil servant, the study of the Chinese and the Indian languages was
relegated to specialists who together accounted for less than 20 per cent of
the total Malayan Civil Service. The royal road to advancement was by the way
of the ‘Ulu’ (the ‘interior’, where the ‘real Malaya’ was supposed to exist as
distinguished from the modern excrescences of immigration and industry).
There was Chinese and Indian
representation on the various councils, though its influence was very
restricted. In the Federal and Legislative (Straits Settlements) Councils there
was an official majority at the disposal of the Governor if emergency required.
But British power was exercised with discretion and in a spirit of compromise,
and members of the Councils were canvassed before a measure was introduced into
the legislature. If the opposition was very strong the measure was usually
dropped (only on rare occasions was the official majority used—notably for the
introduction of a Textile Quotas Bill in the ’thirties to check dumping by
Japan, and after World War II for the reintroduction of income-tax, which was
opposed by Europeans
about two-thirds of it
to the Chinese one-third, whereas earlier in the century their positions were
reversed.
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as
well as Malayan unofficials). Since Malaya at this period was a glorified
commercial undertaking rather than a ‘State’, the commercial interests of
Mincing Lane and Leadenhall Street exercised continuous pressure on the Secretary
of State for the Colonies (more often than not one of themselves), but, on the
other hand, the Colonial Office was often able to exercise a restraining
influence on the power of the unofficials in Malaya itself. There were as yet
no signs of any democratic movement, though the germ of self-government might
perhaps be detected in the municipalities of Singapore, Penang and Malacca,
which had Asian majorities and whose decisions were subject only to the
Governor’s veto.
It was commonly said that up to 1942 Malaya ‘had
no politics’. This was largely true in the domestic sense, but it would be
wrong to imagine that Malaya had remained immune from the ferment of
nationalism and Communism which was going on in the rest of Asia. The Chinese
of Malaya had early come under the influence of Chinese nationalism (Sun
Yat-sen had been financed mainly by the Overseas Chinese, and in 1911 he had
been warned by the Government to leave Penang, since the imperial China he was
plotting against was a power in friendly relations with Britain). The rise of
the spirit of nationalism was manifested by an outburst of zeal for education,
and in the years succeeding World War I the China-born Malayan Chinese had
opened schools by the score in which the doctrines of the Revolution were
disseminated through the medium of Mandarin, the new ‘National Language’. The
coming into power of the Kuomintang in 1926-7 and its successful drive to the
north encouraged the growth of the Kuomintang in South-East Asia, and the
Nationalist Government was not slow to exploit the situation by sending
educational and other missions to Malaya and collecting funds there for the
prosecution of their war against the Japanese. ‘China-born’ morale ebbed and
flowed with the advances or setbacks of the Kuomintang in China and was very
little affected by what was happening in Malaya itself. The aggression of the
Japanese from 1931 onwards provoked outbursts of feeling among them which found
an outlet in attempts to boycott Japanese goods.
Communism had appeared in Malaya first of all in
the ’twenties, but was organized separately from the Kuomintang only after the
latter had carried out its left-wing purge in 1927. To begin with, European
agents were used, but this was soon
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recognized
to be bad policy, and henceforth Asians, mostly Chinese, were employed. They
worked through the Communist-controlled General Labour Union, through the
Chinese schools, and latterly through the youth organizations such as the
Anti-Enemy Backing-Up League. The appeal of Communism, however, was at that
time limited and was off-set by the Kuomintang, and the latter probably caused
more embarrassment to the Malayan authorities than the former up to the
outbreak of the Japanese War.
These signs of political activity among the
Chinese were bound to increase the apprehension the Malays felt regarding
Chinese expansionist motives. And this apprehension was shared by a section
among the Chinese themselves, broadly speaking the Malayan-born, or, more
accurately, the English-educated, who, while remaining Chinese in sentiment,
were yet unwilling that the Chinese community should become an imperium in imperio under the control of
the Government of China. It seems probable that in the early ’thirties at least
this feeling might have been exploited by a government policy encouraging the
Malayan-born Chinese to associate themselves more closely with Malaya itself,
by granting them privileges on an equality with the Malays, and by the rapid extension
of free education in English. In this way they might have been decisively
detached from the China-minded Kuomintang supporters. But the Governor of that
time, Sir Cecil Clementi, was more concerned to check the power of the Chinese
as a community than he was to attempt any fusing of the Malayan-born Chinese
interests with those of the Malays, and he adhered strictly to the letter of
the treaties. He refused, moreover, to recognize any free education except
through the medium of Malay. It is, of course, debatable whether a scheme of
National Schools could have succeeded even at that time in welding Malaya into
a nation, but it is certain that the early ’thirties were more propitious for
such an experiment than was the postwar period, when the attempt was made to
force such a policy through under the Templer regime.
Malay reaction to Chinese political activity did
not take the form of creating their own parties; they relied even more heavily
on British protection to keep the Chinese at bay. There was indeed in the
pre-war years a growth of the Pan-Islamic movement, stimulated by kathis from the Hadramaut, and there was
some small response to the Egyptian bid to be the leader of Islam. But the
movement did not have any noticeable effect on the
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Malays,
who were inclined to be tolerant in their beliefs. It can be said that on the
eve of the Japanese War the Malays were in a kind of moody apathy. Until the
slump of 1930-2, the administration had taken no steps to control Chinese
immigration and had done nothing effective to arrest the economic retreat of
the Malays. It was therefore not altogether surprising if a considerable
section of the Malays regarded the imminence of a Japanese invasion with no great
disfavour. When the Japanese did come this feeling was accentuated. Here, at
least, was a people who would adopt no laissez-faire attitude towards the
Chinese but would keep them severely in their place. It was only when the
Malays found that the Japanese had no aim except to sacrifice all non-Japanese
(whom they regarded as their inferiors) to their war effort that Malay opinion
swung against them.
The Japanese invasion changed the picture
overnight. As has been explained in Chapter I, the fall of France left Malaya
exposed to direct Japanese attack, and on 8 December, 1941, they landed at Kota
Bharu. The history of the ten-weeks campaign in which they advanced five
hundred miles over country that had been believed largely impassable and
occupied Singapore has yet to be written, and much more than is at present
known will be required to explain the rapidity of the Japanese advance and the
ineffectiveness of the British opposition.
For over three and a half years Malaya was under
the Japanese yoke, its trade ruined, its population reduced to semi-starvation,
and submitted to the savage rule of the Kempeitai
(Gestapo).
Directly after the fall of Singapore (15
February, 1942) the Japanese proceeded to round up all the Chinese Communists
they could lay their hands on and to execute them without trial. Those who
escaped joined their comrades in the interior and took refuge in the jungle of
the highlands, where they formed a guerilla organization to resist the Japanese
(the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, as it was later called) and (even
more importantly) to fight for the establishment of a People’s Republic of
Malaya. In May, 1943 two British officers from the South-East Asia Command
landed from a submarine near Pangkor Island, and, making for the Cameron Highlands,
they made contact with the MPAJA. Eventually in 1945 an agreement was made
between the guerillas and Lord Mountbatten, whereby the former were to assist
in the intended invasion of Malaya in return for arms, money and supplies (the
objective of the Republic
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for
Malaya was then temporarily dropped from the objectives of the Communists). In
the event, the surrender of the Japanese in August, 1945, made the invasion
unnecessary, and British troops landed in September to take the Japanese
surrender and to liberate the country. In the meantime the MPAJA had emerged
from the jungle and had assumed control of the countryside and the towns, and
when the British Military Administration arrived to take over they yielded to
them with very ill grace. However, the agreement between them and the Supreme
Allied Commander was precariously maintained, and in December the MPAJA was
disbanded, 5,800 arms being handed in and each man receiving $350 for his services.
The Communists, working through the General Labour Union, now concentrated on
the subversion of labour and initially with great success. On 27-30 January
they were able to bring about an almost complete standstill in southern Malaya
and Singapore. However, on 15 February, 1946, when they attempted to foment a
general stoppage of work to celebrate the surrender of the British in February,
1942, they overreached themselves and their plan was a complete failure. After
that they confined themselves to underground activity until they declared open
war on the British in June, 1948, and the Emergency began.
Retrospect
Looking back, the pre-war years were a halcyon
period. Malaya was virtually ruled by the Malayan Civil Service, a body of
disinterested officials whose only aim and inducement was to do the best they
could in their several offices. There were none of the checks or impediments of
democratic government; there was no need to play up to the prejudice or
ignorance of an electorate nor to sacrifice the public benefit to political
expediency. This situation in some respects so nearly approached the ideal that
the British might be pardoned for wishing to perpetuate it; they cannot,
however, receive the same pardon for believing (if they did) that it would last
forever. When the change began to come a number of the more conservative-minded
officials refused to believe that the new forces were not temporary
manifestations of evil and sedition, whereas to a more open-minded observer the
developments might seem obvious and inevitable.
Long before the war with Japan Malayan society,
politically speaking, was like a chemical solution approaching saturation.
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The surface was normally smooth and untroubled,
though now and then an eddy might betray the working of forces unseen. The
police and the Chinese Protectorate were fully occupied in keeping a check on
the efforts of the Kuomintang to create an imperium
in imperio, of the Communists to stir up labour trouble, and of youths
organized into ‘Anti-Japanese-Backing-Up Societies’ to enforce a boycott
against the Japanese by direct methods of violence and intimidation. The fear
of Chinese economic encroachment felt by the Malays was manifested only at long
intervals (as, for example, when it was suggested that Chinese should be
encouraged to plant rice in the Malay States); otherwise it was scarcely
perceptible. Race relations were outwardly harmonious. It needed the catalyst
of the Japanese invasion to cause the solution to precipitate.
Such processes were in the nature of Asian
history and quite beyond the control of the British in Malaya. However, if the
destiny of the country was to become a self-governing State within the British
Commonwealth, able to take its place with confidence in the new world, it is
not difficult to see the respects in which British policy could be subjected to
criticism. Two obvious faults were: first, the almost complete failure to teach
the people to govern themselves; and, second, the turning of Malaya into a
‘plural society’.
The neglect of representative institutions arose
from the snug convenience of the ‘protectorate system’, by which Malay society
was in theory preserved while European enterprise had completely unrestricted
play. Thus a feudal society was perpetuated and petrified at the same time
through desuetude. Since in theory the Malay authoritarian institutions
governed the country under British guidance, there was no need for any elective
system. Thus popularly elected councils, federal, state, or local, were
unknown, and Western local government was not introduced in the rural districts
until 1953—sixty-eight years behind India and twenty or so behind the so-called
‘backward’ African colonies. Thus was Malaya deprived of the evolutionary steps
towards democratic government.
The turning of Malaya into a plural society was
in the interests of economic development, and without immigration on a large
scale it is almost certain that Malaya would never have become the rich country
she did, with revenues available for public works, education and social
services. It is pointed out by critics, however, that the standard of living of
the Malay ryat was not
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raised
during the British period, but such criticism disregards the improvement in the
conditions of life and labour by anti-malarial works, hospitals, irrigation,
communications, etc., and, one might even add, by permitting the introduction
of cheap Japanese bicycles, which revolutionized Malayan life (and,
incidentally, assisted the growth of nationalism and sedition). The neglect
lay, it seems, in not facilitating the absorption of the immigrants who had
made Malaya their home for generations by treating them on the same level as
the Malays, which might have been done without injury to the latter. But
admittedly this statement raises arguments of a more controversial kind.
Colonial regimes are by their nature
transitional. The measure of the success of a colonial power is surely the
degree to which it prepares its colony or protectorate to pass into the next
phase of existence with the minimum of friction and dislocation. The object of
such peaceful succession would be to ensure that what was valuable in the
colonial regime was retained and not lost or destroyed in the civil tumult. But
it seems that, however carefully the colonial power may prepare the way for the
future, the only way in which a nation may develop in the place of the colony
is in opposition to the colonial power. Statesmanship lies in arresting that
process at a point before it entails a complete breaking off into a hostile
republic (the classic example is the United States) and ensuring that it
retains a close relationship in equality with the colonial or metropolitan
power when the breach finally comes (the classic examples are India and
Ceylon).
If the history of the British colonial regime in
Malaya should be written by Marxists it will undoubtedly be condemned (as the
Dutch colonial system was condemned by Marx himself in Capital) as the heartless exploitation of a country and a people;
if it is written by anti-imperialists of the Hobson School it will likewise be
condemned as wrong ab initio and per se. Should a true national movement
arise in Malaya it is bound to be in opposition to colonial rule, and Malayan
history books used in the schools of an independent ‘ nationalist ’ Malaya will
concentrate, no doubt, on the last stages of military dictatorship and rule by
emergency regulation and will say nothing of the mild and beneficent Government
of before World War II. It is only when in the distant future an Asian Gibbon
arises that the world will see colonial Malaya in just perspective as an
indispensable phase in the development of human resources.
MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
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