[23]
There could scarcely be a more striking contrast
than that between the international setting of Malaya on the eve of the World
War II and that of 1953. Between 1905 (the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese
War) and 1939 Asian nationalism had come into being and had begun its trial of
strength with Western imperialism, but there was nothing visible on the
political scene on the eve of the World War II to suggest that in a space of
less than a decade India would have thrown off her foreign yoke, seemingly for
ever, and that China would have turned Communist and allied herself to the
USSR, or that the greater part of South-East Asia would have obtained its
independence from colonial rule.
On the outbreak of the war of 1939 Malaya was
shielded by a belief in Britain’s sea power, based on Singapore and Hong Kong,
and by the colonial possessions of France in Indo-China, so that the
strategical plans of Britain visualized a purely economic role for Malaya,
namely as a producer of rubber and tin and as earner of US dollars,
indispensable before the days of Lease-Lend. The garrison was a small one (a
couple of battalions of British troops, a Malay Regiment, and a few companies
of Volunteers), and no attempt was made to train Malayans on any scale for the
defence of their country. To Malaya’s south, the Dutch East Indies (or
Netherlands India, as the Dutch called their dependency) was the possession of
a neutral Holland. The fall of France in 1940 altogether changed the strategical
picture. The Japanese at once seized the opportunity to stretch out their naval
and military tentacles, but while they virtually occupied Indo-China it suited
their purpose to retain the local administration of the Vichy Government, and
the latter served their purposes admirably until March, 1945. Malaya was now
exposed to direct attack should Japan join in the war as an Axis partner, and
the Governments of Malaya began belatedly to prepare the
THE
INTERNATIONAL SETTING | MALAYA : Communist or Free?
[24]
country
for defence as best they might. Even so, no arming of the inhabitants on any
scale was attempted, and it is indeed a moot question whether this might not
have weakened rather than strengthened the defence. As the world knows, neither
land, sea, nor air power were available in sufficient strength, when on 7-8
December, 1941, the Japanese began their simultaneous assault on Pearl Harbour
and Malaya. Within ten weeks the Malayan campaign was over and Singapore had
fallen.
The British returning to Malaya after the
Japanese surrender, in September, 1945, found the situation revolutionized, not
only internally but in respect to Malaya’s neighbours. In Indonesia the
Japanese had in the last months of their occupation placed a nationalist
government under Sukarno in control and thus was resistance ensured against the
resumption of power by Indonesia’s pre-war masters, the Dutch. Their shipping
being dispersed over the four corners of the globe, the Dutch were not able for
some weeks to land their troops and reoccupy their former possessions, and in
the meantime the British troops, which had been confined to the strategical
centres, were ordered not to interfere in internal politics. Thus it was that
resistance to the Dutch (which would have taken place in any case) was given a
flying start. There then ensued a contest between nationalism and colonialism
which lasted for some years. An agreement between the two parties at
Linggadjati in 1946 proved abortive, and following on two ‘ police actions ’ by
the Dutch, which were intended to break the deadlock and re-establish Dutch
control over a wide area, the United Nations intervened as conciliators—or, as
it turned out, as supervisors of the process of handing over power to the
nationalists. Finally, in 1949, an agreement was signed at The Hague whereby
Indonesia became independent, though (for face-saving reasons) a constitutional
structure was adopted in which the Queen of the Netherlands was given the
nominal headship of a federation comprising both Holland, her West Indian
colonies, and Indonesia. New Guinea, however, remained in Dutch hands and was
destined to prove a source of resentment on the part of the Indonesians, who
claimed it as an integral part of Indonesia in spite of the non-Indonesian race
of the majority of its inhabitants.
Thailand (Siam), to Malaya’s immediate north,
had been a collaborator with the Japanese and had declared war on the Allies
(though the United States had refused to declare war on
THE
INTERNATIONAL SETTING | MALAYA : Communist or Free?
[25]
Thailand
in return). The Japanese had returned to Thailand Malaya’s four northern States
(Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu) which had been transferred to British
protection by the Treaty of Bangkok in 1909, but on Thailand’s surrender to the
Allies these resumed their pre-war status as British protectorates. By changing
sides adroitly at the right moment Thailand had escaped the fate of the other
countries of South-East Asia.
Governed by a military oligarchy, and receiving
large sums from the USA, Thailand did not differ essentially in status from the
Philippines. Its position in Western thinking was that of a link in the chain
of Communist containment. However, the existence of some 3-4 million Chinese in
the country made its future usefulness in this respect distinctly
problematical.
Indo-China’s change of status was a curious one.
Seeing that an invasion of the territory she held in South-East Asia was
inevitable, the Japanese in March 1946 displaced the Vichy French, assuming
direct military control of the country. Then, after their surrender in August,
they handed over control to the Annamite nationalists, the Vietminh, who,
reorganized in China, had been engaged in underground activities in association
with Allied commandos. The Japanese did this no doubt with the same motive that
had induced them to hand over control to the Indonesian nationalists in the
Dutch territories, namely to embarrass the Allies on their return, but in the
case of Indo-China there was much less reason to anticipate the return of the
French as a colonial power than there had been in the case of the Dutch in
Indonesia. However, Allied policy decreed the reestablishment of France as a
great power, and the Resumption of her South-East Asian possessions flowed
naturally from this decision. Under the Potsdam agreement the Chinese forces
(under Chiang Kai-shek) accepted the surrender of the Japanese in Indo-China
north of the 16th Parallel, and the South-East Asia Command under Admiral
Mountbatten accepted their surrender to the south of it. Almost at once Lord
Mountbatten began handing over control of his region to the French, but it was
not for some months that the Chinese began to do the same north of the 16th
Parallel (a Sino-Indo-Chinese treaty which had never existed before was
considered by the Chinese as a necessary prerequisite). In the meantime the
Vietminh had consolidated their position to some extent, with Chinese
encouragement, and when
THE
INTERNATIONAL SETTING | MALAYA : Communist or Free?
[26]
the
French arrived to reassume control their warships were fired on by the shore
batteries of Haiphong and many casualties inflicted. Finally, however, the
Chinese carried out their obligations and the French were left to deal with the
obstinate resistance of the Vietminh in all parts of Annam, Tongking, and
Cochin-China. The French motive appeared to be to restore full colonial control
of Indo-China. Indeed, in 1946, when there had been an opportunity for an
understanding with the Vietminh leader, Ho Chi-minh, the negotiations at
Fontainebleau were sabotaged when the French High Commissioner, Admiral Thierry
D’Argen-lieu called a rival conference at Dalat. In consequence of this, civil
war broke out in late 1946 and had been in progress ever since. The French had
subsequently set up Bao Dai, the Emperor of Annam, as the head of a new puppet
state of Vietnam in an attempt to meet the claims of nationalism within the
structure of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union, and to avoid the
recognition of Ho Chi-minh with his Communist connections. While repeated
concessions in the direction of self-government had been made to Bao Dai’s
government, the French had not by 1953 been able to bring the civil war to an
end. In the meantime, Indo-China, from being a pre-war source of riches to
metropolitan France, had turned into a liability with a ruined export trade and
costing France more than she was receiving in aid from the United States. In
1952, the United States took over a large share of the cost of the war in addition
to heavy commitments for development work designed to induce a spirit of
contentment among the people and thus to counteract the propaganda of the
Vietminh. After the assumption of office by President Eisenhower in 1953,
Indo-China’s place in the Cold War strategy became increasingly a matter of
conjecture. The French were said generally to favour the defence of Indo-China
being made a United Nations commitment as if it were part of the same war as in
Korea; the United States, on the other hand (whilst not fully committing
herself on this issue), seemed to desire that both in Korea and in Indo-China
native troops should be trained and used in increasing numbers to take over
from Western troops— though the French declared against the practicability of doing
this on a large scale in Indo-China.
The insurgence in Indo-China was essentially a
national movement (with a Communist colouring) and was supported by a majority
of the 27 million inhabitants. In late 1953 it seemed
THE
INTERNATIONAL SETTING | MALAYA : Communist or Free?
[27]
possible
that a government might come into power in France at any time which would
negotiate with Ho Chi-minh and possibly remove the Indo-China link from the
containment chain.
Malaya’s two remaining near neighbours in
South-East Asia were Burma and the Philippines. Burma had become an independent
republic on 4 January, 1948. After that it was for a long time uncertain
whether the country could maintain its unity in the face of the threats from
within. In 1949 the Central Government of-socialist and trade-union parties
called the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) had to meet successive
rebellions of Red and White Flag Communists, a section of the People’s
Volunteer Organization (originally raised by Aung San, the Prime Minister
assassinated in 1947), and a section of the Karens. Added to this was the
intermittent activity of elements of the Chinese Nationalist Army which had
fled from the Communists into Burma and which were thought to be intended by
Chiang Kai-shek as a spearhead for his invasion of China. In 1953 they were
giving renewed trouble. But in spite of these difficulties Burma had so far
maintained its identity while pursuing a determined neutralism in international
politics—keeping on good terms with Communist China and accepting, though free
of strategic ‘strings’, US financial aid. Left to itself, Burma might well
become politically stable and economically prosperous.
The Philippines calls only for a line or two.
Independent from 4 July, 1946, the Islands were yet dependent on trade with the
United States, and their chronic inability to balance their budget entailed a
continuous drain on the United States Treasury. But so long as the United
States continued to regard the Philippines as a key base in her Far Eastern
strategy, the Philippines would be kept going with American money, and US air,
sea and land forces would be stationed there in large numbers. The Hukbalahap
insurrection, in Luzon, etc., was agrarian in origin, but had now become a
permanent Communist ‘cell’ within Philippine territory.
While not a close neighbour of Malaya, China
bulked so large in the politics of the Far East generally and the situation was
influenced so weightily by the presence in South-East Asia of over 10 million
Chinese (nearly 3 million of them being in Malaya itself and another 3-4
million in Thailand) in a total population of 160 million, that the future of
Malaya seemed to turn on developments in China rather than in any other part of
the world.
THE
INTERNATIONAL SETTING | MALAYA : Communist or Free?
[28]
Malaya’s whole future security seemed to depend
on the outcome of the negotiations in Korea and the war in Indo-China; the
attitude of the overseas Chinese in South-East Asia was a matter of day-to-day
concern on the part of the governments of the countries where they formed a
large percentage of the population, namely in Thailand and, above all, in
Malaya, where the Communist terrorists were largely Chinese, but where,
paradoxically enough, the Chinese merchants, squatters, etc., formed the rock
on which resistance to Communism was founded. The Governments of Burma and
Indonesia looked favourably on China as a great and successful Asian nation,
but at the same time regarded her with suspicion as the possible fomenter of Communist
risings against themselves. Both Burma and Indonesia had recognized Communist
China and had exchanged ambassadors with her; Britain had recognized Communist
China but had not yet entered into diplomatic relationships with her; whilst
the United States and France (which included Indo-China), Thailand and the
Philippines did not recognize the Chinese People’s Government. This diplomatic
tangle involved also the People’s Republic of Vietnam (the Vietminh Government)
which was recognized by Russia and China but not by America or Britain.
The assumption of British foreign policy is that
the mother country and the colonies are in external affairs one and
indivisible. That this does not necessarily reflect Malayan opinion was
indicated before the war when the textiles quotas legislation directed against
Japan in the interests of Lancashire had to be passed by the use of the
official vote in face of the united opposition of the unofficial members of the
Straits Settlements Legislative Council, and the question again arose in July,
1953, when the Straits Times defended
Malaya’s right to direct its own trade policy as a constitutional issue.1
This arose out of the embargo on the export of rubber to China imposed in
deference to the wishes of the United States. But much would depend also on how
far Britain and the United States were able to maintain a common policy in Far
Eastern affairs.
Considering South-East Asia as a wall containing
the advance of Communism, it had some obvious weaknesses. Burma, it seems,
could have been overrun with ease from Yunnan in case China-USSR strategy
required it; Thailand’s safety depended on the continued presence of the French
in Indo-China, plus the financial
1 Straits Times, 1 July, 1953. See p. 278, footnote 1.
THE
INTERNATIONAL SETTING | MALAYA : Communist or Free?
[29]
backing
of the USA; Malaya’s position would be extremely precarious with Thailand
occupied by an enemy (quite apart from the effect of a Chinese advance on the
local population). Indonesia had in spite of great internal weakness survived
Communist aggression fairly well. The Communist rebellion in September, 1948,
had been a failure, though subsequently the Communists- had gained ground both
as a party and by infiltration of the army. (Here a process was going on which
was typical of societies throwing off colonialism. Most of the officers of the
Indonesian army, although revolutionaries, had been Dutch-educated. Thus in the
next stage of the revolution, continuing the revulsion from all signs of the
colonial regime, these officers were threatened with displacement by their own
NCOs, who were not Dutch-educated but who were many of them Communists.)
The attitude of the Malayan Chinese towards the
internal politics of Malaya will be discussed at length in the course of this
book, but it will be well to say something here of their attitude towards China
herself.
The Kuomintang had obtained a large following
among the China-born Malayan Chinese, especially after 1927, and nationalist
feeling had been reinforced when the war between China and Japan broke out. The
KMT, being primarily a middle-class party, made its greatest appeal to the
better-off Chinese of Malaya. When the People’s Government drove out the
Nationalists, the reaction of the Malayan bourgeois Chinese, even including
strong KMT supporters, was not altogether unfavourable to the former, for it
seemed that China would once again be a great power. Later on most of them were
disillusioned owing to the treatment their families and friends in China
received from the Communists, and they realized for the first time that
capitalists of their particular kind had no place in the new China and that
they would retain their wealth and position in Hong Kong, Malaya, etc., only
under a colonial regime. They now tended to regard themselves as an emigre community. They did not take
kindly to the idea of Malayan nationalism, and still clung to Chinese education
for their children and opposed the extension of National Schools. In Singapore
a group of influential Chinese who dominated the Chinese Chamber of Commerce
agitated for full citizenship rights in Malaya without complying with the
existing provisions of the law even when they might be
THE
INTERNATIONAL SETTING | MALAYA : Communist or Free?
[30]
qualified
to apply for naturalization. Many of the China-born middle-class Chinese
inclined to favour the trends in American policy supporting Chiang Kai-shek,
but when the extension of the embargo against Chinese trade cut across their
material interests their enthusiasm for Chiang was somewhat abated.
Malaya was not unique only in its system of
government, it was unique also in its economy. Whereas Thailand and Burma were
great rice-exporting countries, and Indonesia had something approaching a
sufficiency, Malaya produced only about 50 per cent of its rice needs. It
relied largely, therefore, on its purchasing power in the external food markets
to feed most of its population. Signs had, already appeared towards the end of
1952 that the ‘inventory cycle’ which was started off by the Korean War had
worked itself out. Malaya, being dependent on the price of rubber and tin, was
more sensitive than these other countries to the international trade situation.
A decrease of one cent in the average price of rubber meant a loss of some two
million Straits dollars in export duty, and in 1953 the Federal Government was
already working on a deficit budget. In 1951 receipts from rubber export duty
amounted to $214 million; in 1952 they fell to $110 million, and for 1953 they
were estimated at less than $60 million. Above all, the price of rubber
depended on the American market, and the end of American stock-piling in
mid-1952 had already threatened Malaya with the trade recession which appeared
to have started in earnest in April, 1953. The political implications of this
recession are discussed in a later chapter, but what I have said here will be
sufficient to place Malaya in its international economic setting. And although
Burma and Indonesia, being independent, had subordinated the interests of exporters
to cooperative enterprises based on the village, Malaya, whatever it might do
in this respect, would be subject to the vicissitudes of world trade in a very
special way so long as it relied on a single crop.
In May, 1953, the Financial Secretary of the
Federation caused a sensation by announcing (what was later confirmed by the
Government) that if the price of rubber and tin continued to fall at the
present rate, within six months Malaya would be facing a grave financial
crisis, and in July the Deputy High Commissioner flew to London to solicit
British aid.1
1 The Economist (6 August, 1953), however, insisted that
‘bankruptcy’ was too strong a word to use to describe the threat to Malaya. In
1952 expendi-
THE
INTERNATIONAL SETTING | MALAYA : Communist or Free?
[31]
This was written when the outcome of the
Panmunjom negotiations was uncertain and when the Vietminh forces were still
operating in Laos, but unless there was a Far Eastern or worldwide settlement,
the war in Malaya was not likely to be brought to a decisive end, yet would
remain distinct in essential respects from that in Indo-China. General Templer,
however, stated in May that the ‘struggle in Malaya was not a national one and
that it was against international Communism’. It was clear that he regarded the
war in Indo-China and Malaya as one and the same—a part of the struggle against
international Communism.1 Though this view was widely supported, especially in
the United States, expert opinion was that in Indo-China a genuine ‘national’ movement
was in progress which could not be arrested by any victory or even by an
international agreement. It would, in any case, go on until independence was
achieved. The only justification for Britain’s continued presence in Malaya was
that the Communist rising there is not a ‘national’ movement. The kind of
thinking which General Templer expressed was convenient enough for a perpetual
‘cold war’, but if persevered in would prevent any international settlement in
which Malaya might be regarded (tacitly) by Russia and China as a ‘special
case’ which might be allowed to remain (at least temporarily) within the
Western sphere of influence.
In short, the whole of Western
policy in South-East Asia was centred on the ‘strategical containment of
Communism’. This conception, while widely accepted in Britain and America, had
no corresponding meaning in Asia, where the growing sense of ‘Asianism’ (i.e.
opposition to the physical presence of the West) was far more powerful than the
fear of Communism. As The Times remarked in a notable leading article on 2
December, 1953: ‘The proofs of the existence of a common Asian point of view
are overwhelming. ’ If this were so, the whole of British policy in South-East
Asia was based on a misconception.
ture
had almost equalled revenue and a surplus from previous prosperous years of
$322 million was carried forward into 1953. The public debt was only $220
million and it would be legitimate to increase it. The Financial Secretary had
stated that the Federation would probably have a deficiency of $208 million at
the end of the year (instead of the $97 million estimated) and would begin 1954
with a reduced surplus.
1 ‘ For a long time responsible people in Malaya had been
saying that the fighting in Indo-China and the resistance there to Communist
pressure was all part of the same problem, and certainly recent developments
seemed to bear this out.’ General Templer, reported in The Times of 19 May,
1953.
MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
No comments:
Post a Comment