CHAPTER 14 - MALAY NATIONALISM AND ECONOMICS | MALAYA : Communist or Free?



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Before World War II Malay nationalism had scarcely come into being. There was, however, a negative state of fear and resentment of Chinese economic pressure which provided a favourable soil in which a national feeling could germinate. Like all primary producers, the Malays were worse off in the ’thirties than in the ’twenties. In their vaguely restive and discontented state they looked out and saw the growing nationalist movement in Indonesia. This had a religious as well as an economic basis, but the Mohammedanism of the Malays was of too tolerant a character to act as a driving force. But from the beginning of the twentieth century the increasing prosperity of the Malay aristocracy under British rule had enabled them to send their sons to Cairo, Beirut, or Mecca for education, and here they came under the influences of Pan-Islamism. When these youths returned to Malaya they formed a small and rather frustrated Malay intelligentsia among whom circulated magazines in Arabic and Malay dealing with the forbidden topics of nationalism and the politics of the Middle East. They established literary associations and small debating societies, which, however, did not attain to the dimensions of political parties.

The decentralization policy and the building up of the influence of the Malay aristocracy in the States encouraged the Malay nationalist intelligentsia to regard itself as the instrument for preserving an inherited culture not strong enough to stand unaided. Influenced by Arab Pan-Islamism, by Indonesian attempts to absorb them into Indonesia, and by Pan-Asianism, they nevertheless saw their own political awakening not as any ‘ brave new world ’ but as a‘ tardy recognition of dangers threatening to convert their race into an “aboriginal stock” and their culture into a “museum-piece”’.1

1 T. H. Silcock and Ungku Aziz in ‘Nationalism in Malaya’ in Asian Nationalism and the West (ed. W. L. Holland (IPR), The Macmillan Company, New York, 1953), p. 286.

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This hybrid nationalism was coming into being within a political framework whose guiding fiction was that in spite of British administrative and British and Chinese economic domination Malaya was still a ‘Malay country’ governed in trust for its people. This fiction was elevated into a corner-stone of policy by Sir Cecil Clementi (Governor, 1929-34). Thus it was that, while they were progressively dispossessed, the Malays were treated like privileged, but incompetent, children. The patronage of this people by the European ‘ pro-Malay ’ faction probably constitutes the most highly gilded insult ever offered to a ‘protected’ race. There can be little doubt that the welcome given at first to the Japanese by a large number of Malays and, in particular, the existence of the anti-British Malay Fifth Column, known as the Kesatuan Muda Melayu (KMM), were the reaction of a proud people to this intolerable attitude.

The principal technique of the Japanese during the occupation was one of stirring up anti-European feeling and emphasizing that the Malays, like themselves, were an Asian people. They indoctrinated young Malays who grew up at this period with a patriotic sentiment on behalf of a Malaya within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, but in doing this they fostered a feeling which eventually turned against themselves. There were Malays on both sides during the war, but, as with Indians and Indonesians, the ‘emotional experience of fighting seems to have been more important than the side on which they fought. After the war they retained to a considerable extent the sense of being of one race and remembered the feeling of self-reliance rather than the conflict—in some measure a quarrel alien to both sides—which had divided them’.1

We have seen how the agitation against the Malayan Union after the liberation was a great force uniting the Malays. But, in spite of this new sense of unity, they felt that they were making no headway in the post-war battle for communal survival. Economically their position did not improve in spite of the professed policy of the administration to better their lot. Their frustration and bewilderment were reflected in the statements of their leaders and in the Malay vernacular press.

Malay nationalism and the battle for independence went hand in hand. While it was certain that few Malays and no Malay party wished the British to withdraw altogether, there was no sharing

1 ibid. p. 292.

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of Mr. Lyttelton’s fear that too rapid independence might bring the communities into collision—the claim was that an independent 'Malay Malaya’ would be able to stand on its own feet. Tungku [Tunku] Abdul Rahman, the president of UMNO, said that when he had attended the Peace Conference in Japan the Indonesian representative had at first refused to speak to him because he represented a ‘subject people’. However, when he told the others that he represented a Malay organization struggling for independence the other delegates shook hands with him and offered him a seat at the conference. He reiterated this position on many occasions. ‘The interim government agreed upon at the last UMNO general assembly must be established within three years.’ ‘Only by obtaining their independence can the Malays cease to be the slaves of imperialists ’ (Warta Negara, 20 February, 1953). On the other hand, PMU (a small splinter organization of right-wing Malays) said that not more than 25 per cent of the people of Malaya claimed independence and of that minority 20 per cent would not let the British go completely (Mingguan Melayu, Singapore, 16 November, 1952).

In the educational field Malay nationalist opinion was generally critical of the idea of the National School. The UMNO Youth League of Kuala Pilah was reported as saying: ‘Considering that the people of this country will determine their own future, it is useless for the Federal Legislative Council to approve a National School with English as the medium of instruction. When the country obtains self-government English may merely be in the position of an additional language in the curriculum.’ ‘The best solution,’ said an editorial in Utusan Melayu (19 November, 1952), ‘is to establish only one type of school, with Malay as the medium of instruction.’

Opposition on the part of the Malay press to the establishment of a Chinese university was general, but Tungku [Tunku] Abdul Rahman, after having opposed it, later said that it was a matter for the Chinese to decide, and later still withdrew his opposition altogether (no doubt under the influence of the UMNO-MCA alliance which was now greatly strengthened) on the understanding that Malays as well as Chinese would be admitted to it and that the medium of instruction would be English.

Suspicion of the Chinese actions was repeatedly evidenced in the Malay press up to the time when in April, 1953, the MCA-UMNO alliance called a truce in this matter. For example,

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Warta Negara (7 November, 1952) remarked that, since Mr. Aw Boon-haw had said that the Chinese university was purely a matter for the Chinese to decide, the Malays should demand that the Civil Service should again be closed to non-Malays, the new citizenship law should be repealed, and Malaya’s doors should be entirely shut to immigrants.

Malay criticism of the preferential treatment accorded to the Chinese new villages established during the Emergency was continuous, at least up to the time when the influential UMNO-MCA alliance (with its control of most of the Malay and Chinese vernacular press) called at least a temporary halt to it. A typical complaint was that of deploring the neglect of the ‘ old villages ’ in favour of the new villages (Warta Negara, 22 November 1952). The new villages were provided with electricity, water, and good roads, whereas the Malays in the kampongs were being neglected and forced to put up with oil lamps, old wells, and muddy roads.

Yet on the face of things the Malays were in a very strong position. They commanded an overwhelming majority on the Federal Legislative Council, and they had a monopoly of the responsible posts in the State Governments. There had been, since 1913, a policy of reserving the best rice lands for Malays. The special position of the Malays was recognized in the Federal Agreement. It is true that they had been induced to make considerable concessions in the matter of Federal Citizenship, but even should elections on the Legislative Council level take place in the near future, the Malays would still have a large majority among the electors. But, in spite of their favourable balance of political power, the Malays were, at most, holding their own in an unfavourable economic situation.

The Report of the Rice Production Committee (1953) (issued after this chapter was originally written) revealed a far worse state of affairs than had been suspected, even in informed circles in Malaya. In an editorial of July the Manchester Guardian termed the report a ‘startling document’, and went on:

For many years Malayan Government officials have asserted that the problem of a peasant population in the grip of extortionate landlords, so common in most of Asia, was virtually non-existent in Malaya. Now it appears that for the past ten years a steady process of evicting rice cultivators unable to pay increased rents for their land has been going

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on in many areas. Still worse, the extortion of large sums in ‘ tea money ’ by landlords as a condition of renewing land leases to cultivators has apparently become widespread. All this— apart from its social effects—has been preventing an increase in rice production. . . . Peasants without security of tenure and a fair share of what they produce naturally enough do not bother to improve their land. The abuses now revealed have been growing up almost unknown to the Malayan authorities, largely because of insufficient staff in State Land Offices to gather information and formulate safeguards. The report . . . points out that the same sort of shortage of personnel in the Department of Agriculture is making impossible a rapid enough spreading of improved technical methods.

The authors of Nationalism in Malaya1 point out that the possession by the Chinese of the most productive property of the country, about nine-tenths of the best educated people, and all the important economic contacts, was not an advantage that could be offset by a grant of, say, ten million Straits dollars from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and double that sum from general Malayan revenue, to be spent in rural development over a period of ten years (figures arbitrarily chosen but which would be regarded by the Chinese as generous), and would make no difference to the situation.

Statistics do not at present exist by which this can be demonstrated without a good deal of guesswork. Preliminary estimates of national income make it unlikely that more than five hundred million Straits dollars a year go to Malays, or less than a thousand million go to Chinese. The Malays are rather more numerous, and the annual difference gives some idea of the enormous material and human capital in Chinese hands. It is fairly clear that the order of magnitude involved to get the Malays economically on a par with the Chinese would be a sum equal to the whole present Federal revenue (about five hundred million Straits dollars) levied every year from the Chinese and devoted to Malay welfare (education, rural development, housing, and the like) for ten or fifteen years. Smaller sums, if spent appropriately and with maximum effect, might mitigate the differences to some extent; but at

1 p. 328.

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present the politicians are obviously thinking in wholly unrealistic terms about the cost of setting the Malays on a par, economically, with the Chinese. The change could not be brought about without a major economic operation, comparable in scale with a long, arduous, all-out war.

Whilst I do not contest these general conclusions, I have some comments of my own to offer on this. The assumption made is that the problem is merely one of transferring economic power from the Chinese to the Malays, whereas only a small proportion of the Chinese (say, less than 50,000) possess this economic power and the majority are as poor—or nearly as poor—as the Malays. It also ignores the fact that the British share in Malaya’s wealth is still probably twice that of the Chinese. (In 1938 European (i.e. mostly British) entrepreneur investment in Malaya was estimated at US $454.5 million as compared with US $200 million Chinese investment.)1

The net national product (i.e. net value of the goods and services produced in Malaya) in 1949 was estimated at $3,069.2 million. The net income paid abroad in interest, profits and dividends amounted to about $47 million, leaving a national income of $3,022 million. The mid-year population of Malaya was about 6,066,000, giving a national income per head of $498 (£58). (For 1950 the net national product was estimated at $4,968.8 million.) In the United Kingdom the national income per head for the same year was £227. But although the United Kingdom had food subsidies, these were far outweighed by its taxes on commodities which were much greater than in Malaya. The cost of living was apparently higher in Malaya, but the people of the United Kingdom needed to spend more on substantial houses, warm clothing and fuel than the people of a land of eternal summer. Moreover, they were spending some 10 per cent of their national income on defence including some $20 million a year, plus the cost of imported arms and explosives, in Malaya. Hence, although standards of living for the bulk of the people (notably manual workers) were higher in the United

1 K. E. Mackenzie, United Kingdom Trade Commissioner in Malaya, Economic and Commercial Conditions in Malaya (Overseas Economic Surveys, 1952), quotes figures giving the total capitalization of companies incorporated outside the Federation with rubber, tin and commercial interests in the Federation at M$ 1,323.4 million and that of local companies incorporated in the Federation at M$149.8—but much of the former capital was not employed in Malaya.

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Kingdom, the difference was less than national-income figures indicated.

The national income per head of Malaya was much higher, however, than in most neighbouring countries. For example, for India in 1949 the gross national product was estimated at only £23 per head. But the cost of living was higher in Malaya than in India. Although the standard of living in Malaya was higher than in most neighbouring countries, the difference was less than indicated by a mere arithmetical comparison of national income per head.1



1 Frederic Benham, Economic Adviser to the Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia, The National Income of Malaya, 1947-49 (with a note on 1950), Singapore, 1951.
2 From Income Tax Department: Statistical Abstracts, Kuala Lumpur, 1952.


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Malaya's Dollar Earnings

The dollar earnings of the colonies were in 1950 and 1951 about two-thirds as large as the dollar earnings of the independent oversea sterling countries. Of these colonial dollar earnings about two-thirds came from Malaya’s exports—to some extent from tin but mainly from rubber. The remaining dollar earnings of the colonies were made up mostly from receipts from cocoa exports from West Africa; the only other important dollar earners were Northern Rhodesian copper and West Indian sugar, and these almost insignificant as compared with rubber and cocoa.1 In 1951 Malaya’s U.S. dollar earnings exceeded her expenditure by £114 million. Malaya earned US$400 million, of which she spent only 17 per cent and paid 83 per cent into the sterling pool

1 J. O. N. Perkins, ‘Balance of Payments in the Oversea Sterling Countries’, in The Times Review of Industry, J une, 1953.

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in London. ‘Without Malaya, the sterling system as we know it could not exist. Britain would have to halve her imports from the U.S.A. . . . Malaya is, in fact, financing Britain heavily in the present crisis, not by way of dividends, but by way of building up sterling balances in London. Malaya owes much to Britain and realizes it, but in a cold monetary sense it is Britain who is in debt to Malaya.’1

As an offset to what Britain receives from Malaya, Colonial Development and Welfare Funds should be mentioned. By November 1950 the cost of the approved Ten-Year Plan for the Colonies totalled £195 million—£65 million from the Colonial Development and Welfare Funds and the rest from the Colonies themselves. The Colombo Plan for six-year development of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei was estimated to cost £107 million, some £46 million of which would come from the Colonies’ own resources.2

The income-tax figures have the disadvantage that they do not indicate the distribution of income by economic class or by community, but they do provide examples of the kind of things that were exercising the minds of young Malayan politicians, especially Malays who regard themselves as belonging to the dispossessed community.

Closely tied up also with the question of self-government was also that of rubber smallholdings. The economy of Malaya was still dependent on rubber, which usually represented three-quarters or more of the agricultural output. The great bulk of the estate acreage was European-owned, about one-quarter being under Asian, largely Chinese, ownership, but the Malay smallholders were the more numerous. The prosperity of the rubber industry largely depended on American economic activity and the fortunes of the motor industry in particular. To meet the fluctuating market some sort of organized restriction was in force for at least part of every year between the end of the World War

1 The British Survey, June, 1952.
In the first six months of 1950 rubber and tin exports to the U.S.A. were US$121 million (£43.2 million) and, after allowing for exports from the U.S.A. (estimated at $21 million—£7.5 million), the net dollar earnings were about $100 million (£35.7 million), as compared with earnings for the whole of 1949 of $190 million (£67.8 million) (Keesing's Contemporary Archives). In 1952, the sterling assets of the Malayan area (including British Borneo) were £283 million (Memorandum on the Sterling Assets of the British Colonies, 1953).
2 The British Colonial Territories in 1951.

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I (when the industry had only just been established) until the end of 1928. From 1929 to 1933 was a period of free competition, but after that until the Japanese occupation of Malaya restriction was again in force.

Restriction of the rubber industry was introduced on the recommendation of a committee representing the estates.1 The smallholders’ voice was purely nominal. Restriction raised prices by restricting output and prohibiting planting; by eliminating competition it maintained the status quo and served the high-cost producers. The exclusion of newcomers through the prohibition of new planting barred entry into an industry particularly suitable to the smallholder, whether European, Chinese, or Malay. This was tantamount, says Mr. Bauer, to the freezing of the industry, which was virtually in its infancy, with costs on an unstable basis and with most questions of technique and organization still undecided. The immaturity of the industry not only made restriction particularly undesirable but also emphasized its inherent arbitrariness. By the completeness of control over supplies (the scheme embraced some 97 per cent of the world exports), and by the notorious inelasticity of the short-period demand for rubber, the power of the International Rubber Regulation Committee was formidable. For considerable periods Malayan smallholders did indeed enjoy higher incomes, but this did not alter the fact that the benefits of restriction were unevenly divided between estates and smallholdings to the disadvantage of the latter.

The destruction of the plantations as a result of the Japanese occupation was very small—between 3 to 5 per cent of the smallholding area and about 7 to 8 per cent of the estate area was felled, and although the labour force was seriously depleted, production quickly recovered. However, said Mr. Bauer, writing in January, 1947, the official policies still being pursued threatened not only the future of the smallholding industry as against that of Indonesia, they also jeopardized the social stability of Malaya. More important than anything else was that the provisions of planting restriction were still in force and were being enforced. In other words, the low-cost producers were still being prevented from expanding their planting. This was tantamount to unilateral

1 P. T. Bauer, The Rubber Industry: a study in competition and monopoly (London School of Economics and Political Science, Longmans Green, 1948), p. 211.

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restriction for Malaya. This in the end must prove disastrous for the country. If these restrictions were continued the smallholdings would be eliminated in about twenty years.1

The question of the replanting of the rubber smallholdings was still outstanding at the end of 1951. In 1950 a special committee which had been appointed to consider the matter reported that the vast majority of the smallholdings consisted of old rubber trees which were nearing the end of their natural life and unless replanting on a broad scale were undertaken many of the smallholders would soon go out of production. A plan was later put forward by which the Agricultural Department would assist smallholders in replanting, and a programme was drawn up providing for the replanting of 50,000 acres over the next six years. The smallholders, however, attracted by the high prices following the Korean War and rearmament, did not respond to this offer to any great extent, and the first year only 7,000 acres were dealt with. Meanwhile, Sir John Hay, a leading director of rubber companies, denounced large-scale replanting

1 The restrictions were raised soon after.
A spokesman of the rubber industry to whom I referred Mr. Bauer’s report for comment, stated as follows. Under the Regulation Scheme which ran from 1934 to the early years of the war, there was allotted to each producing territory a quota, and exports were regulated on a permitted percentage of each quota. The quota was based on the past performance of each territory. As to how the quota was divided internally was a purely domestic matter over which the international body had no control, but the general principle underlying the determination of territorial quotas, i.e. past performances, was generally observed in the domestic distribution. In Malaya there was, first of all, a division between estate owners and smallholders and then from that stage the distribution was made individually. The ultimate responsibility for the internal distribution of the quota rested on Government. The part of the rubber interests in London briefly amounted to this—that they recommended Government to distribute their quota on the same principle as the national quota had been computed, namely, past performance; but where there was any doubt as between estate and smallholder, then the doubt should be resolved in favour of the latter.

As regards the contention of Mr. Bauer, continued the same spokesman, that the Malayan smallholders had been given a ‘raw deal’, the date of his visit was 1946, when it would have been impossible for anyone to determine with any accuracy what was the productive capacity of different classes of rubber production in Malaya in 1934 (the year when the internal distribution was determined). In other words, the position in 1946 had no relevance to what was the position in 1934. Moreover, that he formed an exaggerated estimate of smallholders’ productive capacity could be demonstrated by a comparison between his estimate for the post-war period and the actual performance of smallholders when they were free from all restrictions and when the very high price for rubber which prevailed in 1951-2 gave them the incentive to fullest production.

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schemes as premature while the Emergency remained. In 1951 only 3,778 acres were replanted. In 1952 General Templer stated that substantial progress had been made. An interim scheme had brought forth applications from 6,071 smallholders involving 31,281 acres. The general scheme for smallholders’ replanting, which would become operative in 1953, had also been published. The Replanting Board aimed at a target of 500,000 acres replanting of smallholdings by i960.

Discussing the project, the Straits Times said: ‘It would seem unlikely that any part of the new fund will be wanted for replanting purposes for many a long day.... Its million-dollar replanting scheme for smallholders, which has been going on since 1949, is 80 per cent a failure.’

Turning now to food. Malaya produced only 40 per cent of its rice needs. Under the Six Years’ Development Programme 34,000   hectares of new rice land were to be brought under production by 1953 and 116,000 hectares of paddy land improved. A further 92,000 hectares were noted for possible development and 5,000 hectares for possible improvement. Even so, the fact was that Malaya would have to continue to pay for its rice food imports by the sale of rubber, tin, copra, etc., and this will be the case even when Malaya is self-governing. But it was also most certain that if Malaya were independent it would tend to copy the economic policies being pursued in other independent Asian countries. In Indonesia and Burma, for example, the emphasis was on co-operatives. The farmers’ co-operatives considered eligible included rice-growers as well as growers of tobacco, sugar, kapok, copra and other produce. Remember, too, that these newly independent countries were committed to nationalize industry. In Burma, the teak leases to the British-controlled Bombay-Burma Company had not been renewed, the Irrawaddy Flotilla had been nationalized, and the constitution provided that all timber, mineral lands, forests, water, fisheries, minerals, coal and sources of natural energy should be reserved for exploitation by Burmese nationals. The Sukiman Government in Indonesia in May, 1951, announced a programme of nationalization to include all enterprises of national interest, the Java Bank being the first. Neither UMNO, MCA nor IMP had as yet included nationalization in their programmes, but it was very probable that they would have to do so to a greater or lesser degree if they hoped to win at the polls. The equally important question of the

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availability of Malaya’s sterling balances for capital development in Malaya would also become a political issue in due time.

The economics referred to in this chapter are not of the sort of immediate interest to investors, but the examples chosen fairly indicate the economic issues of Malayan politics of the future— certainly those that will be to the fore when more popular parties than the present middle-class ones are competing for the votes of an enfranchised Malaya.1

1 A specimen of the kind of news item that does not find its way into the British Press is the following:
In reply to a cable of Christmas greetings from Mr. Lyttelton, the Malay Seaman’s Union said, ‘ Your Christmas greetings do not ring true to the Malayan Merchant Seamen whose daily pay amounts to about the price of a tin of cigarettes. Why do you not take up the challenge of Mr. Stanley Awbery, M.P., to send a commission to investigate the seafarer’s complaints of racial discrimination, slave labour, and starvation wages in Singapore?’ Singapore Standard, 29 December, 1953.

MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Raffles’s ambition was to make Singapore something like Alexandria in the first centuries of the Christian era—a sort of clearing-house for Eastern and Western culture, a centre of synthesis in which the best elements of the two were combined. To this end he planned the Singapore Institution as a college with ‘literary and moral departments’ for Chinese, Malay and Siamese, and with a scientific department attached to the English sections but common to all. But his plan was never put into execution. Education in Malaya grew up in a haphazard fashion, with a purely practical aim.

Up to the nineteen-twenties Government support was forthcoming only for the English or Malay vernacular schools. In the nineteen-thirties, education in English was provided in a number of Government schools and schools conducted by missionary bodies which received grants-in-aid from the Government. The curriculum led through secondary education for those who could afford it to the Cambridge examinations and usually to clerical employment in Government service or in private firms. The lucky few were able to proceed to the professions, either through the College of Medicine or Raffles College in Singapore, or through some university outside Malaya. In the Malay States primary education in Malay was free to all Malay boys and girls, and compulsory for all boys living within a mile and a half of a Malay vernacular school. Estates employing over a certain number of Tamil labourers had to maintain a school and give free primary education in the Tamil language to the children of Indian labourers working on the estate. There were no such facilities for the Chinese.

The Chinese had always done their best to educate their children, but facilities were few and teachers hard to come by.

1 Part of this chapter is reproduced, with permission, from an article by me in Pacific Affairs, March, 1953.

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The schools were originally of the Old Style, in which the children learnt to write in Chinese characters and the Four Books were learnt by rote. It was in Malaya that the Chinese Revolution of 1911 found some of its principal supporters, and it was natural, therefore, that the zeal for education in Chinese which was born of that revolution should be shared by those Malayan Chinese who had not received an education in English—that is to say, the great majority. After 1917, when the National Language movement started in China, Kuo Yu (National Language) was adopted as the medium of instruction in all ‘public’ schools (i.e. those run by committees and supported by the public). It was only in the private schools that the Old System was retained.

While the Malayan Governments were preoccupied with education in English or Malay, the Chinese schools were left for some time to their own devices, but from 1920 onwards they were brought under Government supervision and inspection. The main object of this control was admittedly political, but it brought with it some very definite educational responsibilities. A Government system of grants-in-aid was introduced. In 1938 $341,000 was paid in grants to Chinese schools in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States. The Unfederated Malay States had no system of grants-in-aid to Chinese schools, since the State Government recognized no responsibility in this regard. Thus Chinese who wished their children to be educated in their own language (or could not afford the fees in English schools) had to maintain their own schools entirely (in Johore alone in 1938 there were 245 Chinese schools with 14,423 pupils).

By the beginning of the ’thirties the Malayan Governments were fully aware that the Chinese vernacular schools were claiming the greater proportion of Chinese boys and girls who went to school at all, and that unless something was done to provide a counter-attraction the Chinese population of Malaya would inevitably be drawn within the sphere of Chinese nationalism and would tend to look, not upon Malaya, but on China as their country. There was already a cultural gulf between those Chinese educated in English and those educated in Chinese schools. It was then proposed by a number of Government officials (of whom, as Assistant Director of Education in charge of Chinese schools, I was one) that a scheme for universal free education in English should be introduced, but the then Governor, Sir Cecil Clementi, would recognize Malay only as the medium

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for instruction in Government-run vernacular schools. Since education in Malay offered no means to a livelihood, the result was that the Chinese community was virtually surrendered to Chinese nationalism. The more poorly paid Chinese schoolteachers, moreover Communists almost to a man, passed on their doctrine to their pupils in spite of all the precautions taken.

In 1938 there was a total of 268,007 pupils of all races attending educational institutions of all kinds in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States alone. Of these 204,040 were in institutions maintained or aided by Government funds. Of the latter, 18,522 Chinese boys and 8,452 Chinese girls (total 26,974) were in Government and aided English schools. The total number in all Chinese schools in the same territories was 91,534 (66,645 boys and 24,889 girls). That is to say, that the number of Chinese children attending Chinese schools was nearly three and a half times that of Chinese children attending English schools.

After the liberation there was an astonishing growth in school population throughout Malaya. In 1951, out of 81,000 pupils attending aided English schools 41,000 were of Chinese race; and out of 30,000 attending private English schools 15,000 were of Chinese race—a total of 56,000 Chinese pupils in such schools as against 206,000 (almost all of Chinese race) who attended Chinese schools of all kinds.1 That is to say, the proportion of Chinese-educated to English-educated Chinese was about four to one. The Malays and Indians were similarly divided according to whether they attended English schools on the one hand or Malay or Tamil vernacular schools on the other. Since the war British policy had been to intensify measures for encouraging a spirit of common nationality among the communities on the basis of a common language, namely, English. The drive to build English schools in order to achieve this aim and reduce illiteracy, together with the re-formulation of educational policy, had given rise to apprehension among teachers in Chinese schools that the existence of their schools was seriously threatened, and they had reacted strongly in the hope of persuading the Government to change or modify its policy.

In 1951 there were 674,000 children in all schools in the

1 It is worthy of note that only 19,000 Malay children attended English schools.
These figures are taken from the Annual Report of the Director of Education, Federation of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1951.

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Federation, and in January, 1952, 720,000. Of this last number 287.000 attended Malay schools, 206,000 Chinese schools, 111,000 English schools, and 37,000 Indian schools; the rest were in other registered institutions.1 In the colony of Singapore in 1951, of a total of 149,000 schoolchildren 55,000 were attending English schools, 76,000 Chinese schools, 9,000 Malay schools, and 1,272 Tamil schools; the rest were in other registered institutions.2

The event which brought the controversy to a head was the appointment in 1950 by the High Commissioner of a Committee on Malay Education under the chairmanship of Mr. L. J. Barnes, Director of Social Training in the University of Oxford, ‘to inquire into the adequacy or otherwise of the educational facilities available for Malays’. That the body of the report of the Barnes Committee3 was saturated with Malay nationalism and resentment of the Chinese is perhaps not surprising in view of the fact that, in addition to the chairman, the committee comprised nine Malays and five Europeans but no Chinese or Indian member. The ‘Malay views’ presented included such statements as the following:

The immigrant races, taking full advantage of the improvidence of the simple Malay, tempted him with a system of forward selling of crop and catch for ready cash. . . . They began the economic slavery of the Malay in full view of the protecting power . . . Malaya had now become the ‘ nineteenth province’ [of China] in everything except government; for as yet the Chinese had not turned their eyes towards administration. . . . Then came the Liberation—but only to blast Malay hopes and to begin the saddest chapter in Malaya’s history. The Americans had atom-bombed Japan only to enable MacMichaelism to transform Malaya into a British Crown Colony. A long-protected people was now to be completely eliminated as a nation. . . .

1 Annual Report of the Federation of Malaya, 1952, Kuala Lumpur, 1952, p. 136.
2 Colony of Singapore Annual Report, 1951, Singapore, 1952, p. 68. It will be noted that the proportion of English-educated to Chinese-educated Chinese is far higher in Singapore than in the Federation.
3 Report of the Committee on Malay Education, Federation of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1951.

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The strong pro-Malay, anti-Chinese bias of the Barnes Report and the failure to include a Chinese in the committee membership would not have been of so much importance if the committee had confined itself to its terms of reference. It chose, however, to make recommendations applying to all races—sound enough, perhaps, in principle, but in an unfortunate context. Under the heading of Primary Education it declared:

We believe that primary schooling should be purposely used to build up a common Malayan nationality, and we urge that it should be reorganized on a new inter-racial basis. . . . Our proposed inter-racial primary school we call the National School. Its main features are that (a) it would provide a six-year course for pupils between the ages of six plus and twelve plus; (b) it would not charge fees; (c) it would produce pupils who were bilingual (i.e. effectively literate in Malay and English) by the end of the course, and the best of whom would then be fitted to proceed direct to an English-medium post primary school. ... In principle we recommend the end of separate vernacular schools and their replacement by a single type of primary school common to all. We recognize, of course, that since this end can come only gradually, vernacular schools will continue for some years concurrently with the development of the National School.

Our scheme would be seriously weakened if any large proportion of the Chinese, Indian and other non-Malay communities were to choose to provide their own primary classes independently of the National School. We have, therefore, sought to make it as easy as possible for all non-Malays to associate themselves with the scheme. Thus the National School will give, in point of staffing, premises and equipment, the best primary education available anywhere in Malaya. It will not charge fees. It will teach English to all from Standard I onwards, and it will form the broad highway of admission to all standard post-primary reaches of education.

Many other matters were touched on in this Report, but, in the light of the controversy aroused, the foregoing were the most important.

Impressed, no doubt, by criticism appearing in the Chinese press to the effect that the Barnes Report had been written from

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an exclusively Anglo-Malay point of view, the High Commissioner early in January 1951 invited two experts on Chinese education, Dr. William P. Fenn, an American, Associate Executive Secretary of the board of trustees of a dozen institutions of higher learning in China, and Dr. Wu Teh-yao, a United Nations official, to visit Malaya in order to study Chinese schools in the Federation. The resultant report of these gentlemen was published in June 1951.1
The Fenn-Wu Report referred in its Introduction to the official Secretariat announcement made regarding the nature and objects of the mission before its arrival. It was ‘to make a preliminary survey of the whole field of Chinese education . . . with particular reference to (i) bridging the gap between the present communal system of school and the time when education will be on a non-communal basis, with English and Malay as the medium of instruction and other languages an optional subject, and (ii) the preparation of textbooks for present use with a Malayan as distinct from a Chinese background and content’. This pronouncement, the Report continued, ‘ brought forth from the Chinese press a surprising number of articles and editorials expressing in no uncertain terms Chinese concern regarding its implications which seemed to them to be anti-Chinese’. Appealed to by Drs. Fenn and Wu, the High Commissioner agreed to reinterpret the terms of reference so as to allow the mission to survey the whole field of Chinese education in Malaya with a view to making what evaluations and recommendations it deemed necessary.

Selected extracts from the body of the Fenn-Wu Report will sufficiently indicate the lines of thought pursued by the mission:

There can be no justification for turning Malaya into a a cockpit of aggressive cultures. The people of Malaya will have to learn to understand and appreciate their cultural differences. They should be proud of their mutual tolerance. ... To most Chinese in Malaya, Malayanization is anathema, in view of the absence of a culture, or even a society, which can as yet be called Malayan. The first point in the Secretariat’s announcement (see above) appeared to envisage the elimination of Chinese schools and the relegating of the Chinese

1 Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malayans. The Report of a Mission Invited by the Federation Government to Study the Problem of Education of Chinese in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1951.

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language to an inferior status, with the ultimate result, if not the present purpose, of the extinction of Chinese culture in Malaya.... No element of the population can be ‘ Malayanized’ for the simple reason that there is no ‘Malayan’ pattern to which to mould it and because such moulding is not produced by fiat. A new culture can come only from the natural mingling of diverse cultural elements for generations. In the process, elements which do not command appreciation disappear, while those which do need no political or external support. . . . Yet the term must be used, for it expresses a desirable goal. . . . What can come to pass in Switzerland or Canada may or may not come to pass in Malaya.

After granting the necessity for the inclusion of Malay and English in the curriculum of all schools in Malaya, the mission added:

In the third place, we must remember that Chinese is one of the great languages of the world, key to one of the world’s great cultures. Its beauty and richness are unquestioned. Nothing is to be gained by trying to deprive any section of the population of what a knowledge of Chinese has to give. . . . And finally this means trilingualism for most Chinese Malayans, and bilingualism for all. We believe that they are not only prepared to accept this heavy load but actually welcome the advantages that the necessity of a command of several languages will give them. They are more likely to resent any effort to restrict them to one or two languages than the necessity which requires them to study three.

Far from performing the function allotted it by the official pronouncement preceding its arrival, the Fenn-Wu mission tended rather to give support to the opponents of the National School. It observed that Chinese schools would persist in Malaya for a long time to come and that any attempt to crush them would result, as it had already done, in greater determination to preserve them. Chinese schools operating openly were greatly to be preferred to Chinese schools operating underground. ‘They cannot be eliminated,’ the Fenn-Wu Report held, ‘until the Chinese themselves decide that they are not needed, which will happen only when there is a satisfactory alternative. That day

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may never come, for it is quite possible that Chinese schools form an integral part of any educational programme of the future Malaya.’ The answer was rather to recognize the need for existence of Chinese schools and to strengthen them and find a proper place for them in the educational system.

At the same time, the Fenn-Wu mission supported the aim of a Malayan Nation and recommended that the Chinese school system be reformed with that aim in view. The Malayan Chinese, it suggested, should set their own house in order. There was no real advantage for Chinese culture in maintaining the forms or indeed the methods and content of schools in China. Foreign politics in any form should be eliminated from Chinese schools, and textbooks suitable for Malayan use should be produced. While impressed by the degree to which Chinese Malayans not only accepted the need for English but actively insisted on learning it, the mission admitted that the teaching of English in Chinese schools was, with the exception of the textbooks employed, wholly inadequate.

The official reaction to the Barnes and Fenn-Wu Reports was indicated by a Report of the Central Advisory Committee on Education (consisting of twenty members, including four Chinese).1 In general, it agreed with the Barnes Report and disagreed with the findings of the Fenn-Wu mission, but it urged moderation. Thus:

The last racially segregated vernacular primary school will cease to exist when the parents of the children attending it believe that a local National School would provide a more acceptable education. The Fenn-Wu Report suggests that that day may never come. We believe it will come. We also believe that its advent may be hastened by persuasion and inducement and delayed by dictation and compulsion.

Finally, notice must be taken of a Report on the subject by a Special Committee appointed by the Legislative Council of the Federation.2 This committee comprised eleven Members of

1  Federation of Malaya, Central Advisory Committee on Education. Report on the Bames Report on Malay Education and the Fenn- Wu Report on Chinese Education, Kuala Lumpur, 1951.
2 Report of the Special Committee appointed on the soth Day of September 1951 to Recommend Legislation to cover all Aspects of Educational Policy for the Federation of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1952.

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Council, two of whom were Chinese. Its Report, which discussed every aspect of Malayan education, came down decidedly on the side of the Barnes Report:

After full consideration of the Reports included in the terms of reference (i.e. the Barnes, Fenn-Wu and Advisory Committee Reports) and of the representations which have been put before us by the public and otherwise, we are convinced that the objects of education which we have accepted can be best achieved by the institution of multi-racial schools of a national character, and we have provided for the establishment of a National School in the draft education ordinance. We conceive the function of a National School to be the provision of a six-year course of free primary education with a Malayan orientation for pupils of all races. We consider that the language of instruction should be the official language of the Federation and that facilities should also be provided for the teaching of Kuo Yu (Chinese) and Tamil to those children who so desire when there are at least fifteen pupils in any standard who wish to take advantage of the facilities.

Throughout the controversy, the English and Malay-language press has on the whole favoured the Barnes Report, the Chinese press has unanimously supported the Fenn-Wu Report, and the Indian press has in the main been neutral. One exception of the attitude of the English-language press was the Chinese-owned Singapore Standard, which, in an editorial of October 10, 1952, inquired, ‘who is to pay for the ambitious scheme of universal compulsory education?’ and remarked that the most controversial part of the Special Committee’s Report was that dealing with the problem of language. ‘ Is it possible, ’ it asked, ‘ that the committee hopes to discourage these languages out of classrooms by underlining their second-class status? This subtle attempt to displace other cultures may well result in almost pathological loyalty to those cultures.1 Still, there is no better way of learning the truth than by bitter experience.’

One pertinent question which might have been put to Drs. Fenn and Wu and to the editor of the Singapore Standard was

1 Nor is it safe to assume that English, Chinese and Malay will ever become interchangeable like French, German and Italian in Switzerland, or English and French in Canada, since English and Chinese are likely to compete for domination.

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whether they agreed that the only living literature to which an education in Chinese could lead was that of Communist China, and that in the long run a Chinese education was bound to lead to a Communist outlook. The Government of the Federation obviously regarded Chinese schools as forcing-houses of Communism. In his Annual Report for 1951 the Director of Education remarked: ‘There are those who say that all Chinese schools are bad. That is nonsense, but even the most robust champion of the Chinese schools must admit that in their present form many of them are a most serious danger to the country.’ This statement caused considerable resentment among Chinese schoolteachers, although even the Fenn-Wu Report admitted the existence of a number of shortcomings on the part of the Chinese schools— among other things, that ‘they are academically weak and pedagogically backward’ and ‘China-conscious to a degree that is not required by the present situation and that limits their consciousness of being a part of Malaya’. ‘But,’ the Fenn-Wu Report continued, ‘the schools have accepted the need for revision of textbooks, the necessity for teaching Malay, and they are voluntarily increasing the teaching of English.’ Moreover, as its authors rightly asserted, the existence of Chinese schools was largely the result of an insufficiency of Government schools.

In my view, the establishment of a National School would have been far easier twenty years ago. Since the war, the intensification of racial nationalism has made the problem much more delicate. The matter should, therefore, be approached by both parties— the Government and the Chinese schools—in a spirit of compromise. If the Chinese schools could prove that they were capable of self-reform and were also able to teach English as well as Chinese up to the standard of the School Certificate, they would have gone far towards making a case for their survival. And until there was room in English schools for all Chinese children, and until provision was made in such schools for the effective teaching of Chinese as an extra subject, there would continue to be a need for Chinese schools as well. If this fact were recognized and an attempt were made to raise the salaries of teachers in Chinese schools to the levels prevailing in English schools,1 the Chinese schools would probably accept the competition of the English schools in a better spirit.

1 The Government has already made a move in this direction.

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Finance, of course, was the limiting factor, and the possibility of raising the salaries of Chinese teachers would depend upon the continuing and expanding prosperity of Malaya. It was likely, however, that if democratic government based on equality of citizenship were extended to the Federation—a development which did not appear likely at the moment—the proponents of the Fenn-Wu Report would use their power as voters to bring pressure on the Government to meet their wishes and to allot money to the Chinese schools in proportion to the taxes paid by their supporters. The attempt on the part of the Government to raise money by taxing the Chinese business community for providing National Schools provoked strong opposition from the Chinese Chambers of Commerce (sec p. 117.) In the meantime the rigid framework of the Emergency controls tended to perpetuate communal differences and to accentuate the racial nationalism that was retarding Malaya’s advance towards nationhood.1

A Chinese University for Malaya

In 1952 the Malayan Governments had been very concerned by the opposition to the Barnes Report, but in 1953 an almost equally controversial issue was raised when it was proposed to found a Chinese University.

The case for the establishment of such a university appeared to amount to this. There were two secondary-school systems in Malaya—the English and the Chinese. There was no Malay and no Tamil secondary school; the Malays, after completing their primary-school education, were immediately absorbed into the English school system. There was no such scheme for the absorption of pupils of the Chinese schools. There was said to be nearly 400,0002 Chinese students of both sexes in the Federation and Singapore who, unless a Chinese university were established, would have no chance of receiving higher education for the simple reason that the existing University of Malaya could not admit them because of their lack of knowledge of English—at any rate to the required standard (thus Sir Cheng-lock Tan argued). The sponsors of a Chinese university were actuated by the motive of keeping the torch of Chinese learning alight in Malaya,

1 The drive to provide teachers for the National Schools was intensified during 1953, when there were about 300 Malayan student-teachers in training at the Malayan Teacher’s Training College at Kirkby, Liverpool.
•But see pp. 153-4.

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since it was threatened with extinction in Communist China itself (sic). In the past, Malayan Chinese who wished to receive higher education in Chinese could go to China; now they could not and did not wish to do so.

The Vice-Chancellor of the university, Sir Sydney Cane, replying to Sir Cheng-lock Tan, said that he would be delighted if the cream of the 400,000 pupils mentioned by Sir Cheng-lock Tan could find their way to the University of Malaya. He felt that the university was much too small at the moment, and he hoped that it would continue to grow. The Chinese schools might be a possible reservoir of students. He admitted that while the University of Malaya had, on paper, a department of Chinese Language and Literature, there had been a regrettable delay in bringing that department into operation. But he asked that no final decision be taken regarding the Chinese university until after discussion between the Chancellor of the University of Malaya, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, and those principally interested in founding a Chinese university.

While the Chinese press welcomed the establishment of a Chinese university, the English and the Malay newspapers were generally opposed to it. The latter said that such a university would perpetuate a sense of insularity among the Chinese in relation to the other races of Malaya and argued that any such a cultural institution, if set up at all, should be within the framework of the Malayan nation. Mr. Fred Arulandam, Secretary of the Kuala Lumpur Branch of the IMP, said, ‘The more we allow little Pekings and Nankings in Malaya, the longer will the racial rifts continue and slower will be the growth of a Malayan outlook and way of life.’ The Kuala Lumpur Chinese leaders, however, refused to comment on the proposal.

So far as the MCA-UMNO alliance was concerned they seemed at a later stage to have reached an agreement or a compromise in the matter on the basis of an understanding that if a Chinese university were established it would be open equally to all communities in Malaya and that the medium of instruction should be English. Tungku [Tunku] Abdul Rahman, the president of UMNO, said that he felt that it would be a good thing for the country if they were to have more universities, but if the Chinese university were to become more than a proposal the Malays would also press for the formation of a Malay university, for which the endowment would have to be principally from Government funds.

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In mid-1953 the scheme was still being discussed, but it looked as if it might well founder on the rocks of finance. Although several million dollars had been promised by a prominent Singapore industrialist, Mr. Tan Lark Sye, the sponsors of the scheme did not seem to realize the huge sum needed for endowment ($60-100 million) even if the university were to be State-supported—which, in the existing state of affairs, was very unlikely.

The sponsors of the ‘Nanyang University’ (as it was to be called—Nanyang, or ‘Southern Ocean’, being the Chinese name for Southeast Asia) were pressing on with the undertaking, and in February 1954 it was announced that Mr. Lin Yu-tang, the well-known author, had been appointed its first Chancellor. A building site had also been obtained.

MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS