CHAPTER 14 - MALAY NATIONALISM AND ECONOMICS | MALAYA : Communist or Free?



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Before World War II Malay nationalism had scarcely come into being. There was, however, a negative state of fear and resentment of Chinese economic pressure which provided a favourable soil in which a national feeling could germinate. Like all primary producers, the Malays were worse off in the ’thirties than in the ’twenties. In their vaguely restive and discontented state they looked out and saw the growing nationalist movement in Indonesia. This had a religious as well as an economic basis, but the Mohammedanism of the Malays was of too tolerant a character to act as a driving force. But from the beginning of the twentieth century the increasing prosperity of the Malay aristocracy under British rule had enabled them to send their sons to Cairo, Beirut, or Mecca for education, and here they came under the influences of Pan-Islamism. When these youths returned to Malaya they formed a small and rather frustrated Malay intelligentsia among whom circulated magazines in Arabic and Malay dealing with the forbidden topics of nationalism and the politics of the Middle East. They established literary associations and small debating societies, which, however, did not attain to the dimensions of political parties.

The decentralization policy and the building up of the influence of the Malay aristocracy in the States encouraged the Malay nationalist intelligentsia to regard itself as the instrument for preserving an inherited culture not strong enough to stand unaided. Influenced by Arab Pan-Islamism, by Indonesian attempts to absorb them into Indonesia, and by Pan-Asianism, they nevertheless saw their own political awakening not as any ‘ brave new world ’ but as a‘ tardy recognition of dangers threatening to convert their race into an “aboriginal stock” and their culture into a “museum-piece”’.1

1 T. H. Silcock and Ungku Aziz in ‘Nationalism in Malaya’ in Asian Nationalism and the West (ed. W. L. Holland (IPR), The Macmillan Company, New York, 1953), p. 286.

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This hybrid nationalism was coming into being within a political framework whose guiding fiction was that in spite of British administrative and British and Chinese economic domination Malaya was still a ‘Malay country’ governed in trust for its people. This fiction was elevated into a corner-stone of policy by Sir Cecil Clementi (Governor, 1929-34). Thus it was that, while they were progressively dispossessed, the Malays were treated like privileged, but incompetent, children. The patronage of this people by the European ‘ pro-Malay ’ faction probably constitutes the most highly gilded insult ever offered to a ‘protected’ race. There can be little doubt that the welcome given at first to the Japanese by a large number of Malays and, in particular, the existence of the anti-British Malay Fifth Column, known as the Kesatuan Muda Melayu (KMM), were the reaction of a proud people to this intolerable attitude.

The principal technique of the Japanese during the occupation was one of stirring up anti-European feeling and emphasizing that the Malays, like themselves, were an Asian people. They indoctrinated young Malays who grew up at this period with a patriotic sentiment on behalf of a Malaya within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, but in doing this they fostered a feeling which eventually turned against themselves. There were Malays on both sides during the war, but, as with Indians and Indonesians, the ‘emotional experience of fighting seems to have been more important than the side on which they fought. After the war they retained to a considerable extent the sense of being of one race and remembered the feeling of self-reliance rather than the conflict—in some measure a quarrel alien to both sides—which had divided them’.1

We have seen how the agitation against the Malayan Union after the liberation was a great force uniting the Malays. But, in spite of this new sense of unity, they felt that they were making no headway in the post-war battle for communal survival. Economically their position did not improve in spite of the professed policy of the administration to better their lot. Their frustration and bewilderment were reflected in the statements of their leaders and in the Malay vernacular press.

Malay nationalism and the battle for independence went hand in hand. While it was certain that few Malays and no Malay party wished the British to withdraw altogether, there was no sharing

1 ibid. p. 292.

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of Mr. Lyttelton’s fear that too rapid independence might bring the communities into collision—the claim was that an independent 'Malay Malaya’ would be able to stand on its own feet. Tungku [Tunku] Abdul Rahman, the president of UMNO, said that when he had attended the Peace Conference in Japan the Indonesian representative had at first refused to speak to him because he represented a ‘subject people’. However, when he told the others that he represented a Malay organization struggling for independence the other delegates shook hands with him and offered him a seat at the conference. He reiterated this position on many occasions. ‘The interim government agreed upon at the last UMNO general assembly must be established within three years.’ ‘Only by obtaining their independence can the Malays cease to be the slaves of imperialists ’ (Warta Negara, 20 February, 1953). On the other hand, PMU (a small splinter organization of right-wing Malays) said that not more than 25 per cent of the people of Malaya claimed independence and of that minority 20 per cent would not let the British go completely (Mingguan Melayu, Singapore, 16 November, 1952).

In the educational field Malay nationalist opinion was generally critical of the idea of the National School. The UMNO Youth League of Kuala Pilah was reported as saying: ‘Considering that the people of this country will determine their own future, it is useless for the Federal Legislative Council to approve a National School with English as the medium of instruction. When the country obtains self-government English may merely be in the position of an additional language in the curriculum.’ ‘The best solution,’ said an editorial in Utusan Melayu (19 November, 1952), ‘is to establish only one type of school, with Malay as the medium of instruction.’

Opposition on the part of the Malay press to the establishment of a Chinese university was general, but Tungku [Tunku] Abdul Rahman, after having opposed it, later said that it was a matter for the Chinese to decide, and later still withdrew his opposition altogether (no doubt under the influence of the UMNO-MCA alliance which was now greatly strengthened) on the understanding that Malays as well as Chinese would be admitted to it and that the medium of instruction would be English.

Suspicion of the Chinese actions was repeatedly evidenced in the Malay press up to the time when in April, 1953, the MCA-UMNO alliance called a truce in this matter. For example,

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Warta Negara (7 November, 1952) remarked that, since Mr. Aw Boon-haw had said that the Chinese university was purely a matter for the Chinese to decide, the Malays should demand that the Civil Service should again be closed to non-Malays, the new citizenship law should be repealed, and Malaya’s doors should be entirely shut to immigrants.

Malay criticism of the preferential treatment accorded to the Chinese new villages established during the Emergency was continuous, at least up to the time when the influential UMNO-MCA alliance (with its control of most of the Malay and Chinese vernacular press) called at least a temporary halt to it. A typical complaint was that of deploring the neglect of the ‘ old villages ’ in favour of the new villages (Warta Negara, 22 November 1952). The new villages were provided with electricity, water, and good roads, whereas the Malays in the kampongs were being neglected and forced to put up with oil lamps, old wells, and muddy roads.

Yet on the face of things the Malays were in a very strong position. They commanded an overwhelming majority on the Federal Legislative Council, and they had a monopoly of the responsible posts in the State Governments. There had been, since 1913, a policy of reserving the best rice lands for Malays. The special position of the Malays was recognized in the Federal Agreement. It is true that they had been induced to make considerable concessions in the matter of Federal Citizenship, but even should elections on the Legislative Council level take place in the near future, the Malays would still have a large majority among the electors. But, in spite of their favourable balance of political power, the Malays were, at most, holding their own in an unfavourable economic situation.

The Report of the Rice Production Committee (1953) (issued after this chapter was originally written) revealed a far worse state of affairs than had been suspected, even in informed circles in Malaya. In an editorial of July the Manchester Guardian termed the report a ‘startling document’, and went on:

For many years Malayan Government officials have asserted that the problem of a peasant population in the grip of extortionate landlords, so common in most of Asia, was virtually non-existent in Malaya. Now it appears that for the past ten years a steady process of evicting rice cultivators unable to pay increased rents for their land has been going

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on in many areas. Still worse, the extortion of large sums in ‘ tea money ’ by landlords as a condition of renewing land leases to cultivators has apparently become widespread. All this— apart from its social effects—has been preventing an increase in rice production. . . . Peasants without security of tenure and a fair share of what they produce naturally enough do not bother to improve their land. The abuses now revealed have been growing up almost unknown to the Malayan authorities, largely because of insufficient staff in State Land Offices to gather information and formulate safeguards. The report . . . points out that the same sort of shortage of personnel in the Department of Agriculture is making impossible a rapid enough spreading of improved technical methods.

The authors of Nationalism in Malaya1 point out that the possession by the Chinese of the most productive property of the country, about nine-tenths of the best educated people, and all the important economic contacts, was not an advantage that could be offset by a grant of, say, ten million Straits dollars from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and double that sum from general Malayan revenue, to be spent in rural development over a period of ten years (figures arbitrarily chosen but which would be regarded by the Chinese as generous), and would make no difference to the situation.

Statistics do not at present exist by which this can be demonstrated without a good deal of guesswork. Preliminary estimates of national income make it unlikely that more than five hundred million Straits dollars a year go to Malays, or less than a thousand million go to Chinese. The Malays are rather more numerous, and the annual difference gives some idea of the enormous material and human capital in Chinese hands. It is fairly clear that the order of magnitude involved to get the Malays economically on a par with the Chinese would be a sum equal to the whole present Federal revenue (about five hundred million Straits dollars) levied every year from the Chinese and devoted to Malay welfare (education, rural development, housing, and the like) for ten or fifteen years. Smaller sums, if spent appropriately and with maximum effect, might mitigate the differences to some extent; but at

1 p. 328.

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present the politicians are obviously thinking in wholly unrealistic terms about the cost of setting the Malays on a par, economically, with the Chinese. The change could not be brought about without a major economic operation, comparable in scale with a long, arduous, all-out war.

Whilst I do not contest these general conclusions, I have some comments of my own to offer on this. The assumption made is that the problem is merely one of transferring economic power from the Chinese to the Malays, whereas only a small proportion of the Chinese (say, less than 50,000) possess this economic power and the majority are as poor—or nearly as poor—as the Malays. It also ignores the fact that the British share in Malaya’s wealth is still probably twice that of the Chinese. (In 1938 European (i.e. mostly British) entrepreneur investment in Malaya was estimated at US $454.5 million as compared with US $200 million Chinese investment.)1

The net national product (i.e. net value of the goods and services produced in Malaya) in 1949 was estimated at $3,069.2 million. The net income paid abroad in interest, profits and dividends amounted to about $47 million, leaving a national income of $3,022 million. The mid-year population of Malaya was about 6,066,000, giving a national income per head of $498 (£58). (For 1950 the net national product was estimated at $4,968.8 million.) In the United Kingdom the national income per head for the same year was £227. But although the United Kingdom had food subsidies, these were far outweighed by its taxes on commodities which were much greater than in Malaya. The cost of living was apparently higher in Malaya, but the people of the United Kingdom needed to spend more on substantial houses, warm clothing and fuel than the people of a land of eternal summer. Moreover, they were spending some 10 per cent of their national income on defence including some $20 million a year, plus the cost of imported arms and explosives, in Malaya. Hence, although standards of living for the bulk of the people (notably manual workers) were higher in the United

1 K. E. Mackenzie, United Kingdom Trade Commissioner in Malaya, Economic and Commercial Conditions in Malaya (Overseas Economic Surveys, 1952), quotes figures giving the total capitalization of companies incorporated outside the Federation with rubber, tin and commercial interests in the Federation at M$ 1,323.4 million and that of local companies incorporated in the Federation at M$149.8—but much of the former capital was not employed in Malaya.

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Kingdom, the difference was less than national-income figures indicated.

The national income per head of Malaya was much higher, however, than in most neighbouring countries. For example, for India in 1949 the gross national product was estimated at only £23 per head. But the cost of living was higher in Malaya than in India. Although the standard of living in Malaya was higher than in most neighbouring countries, the difference was less than indicated by a mere arithmetical comparison of national income per head.1



1 Frederic Benham, Economic Adviser to the Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia, The National Income of Malaya, 1947-49 (with a note on 1950), Singapore, 1951.
2 From Income Tax Department: Statistical Abstracts, Kuala Lumpur, 1952.


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Malaya's Dollar Earnings

The dollar earnings of the colonies were in 1950 and 1951 about two-thirds as large as the dollar earnings of the independent oversea sterling countries. Of these colonial dollar earnings about two-thirds came from Malaya’s exports—to some extent from tin but mainly from rubber. The remaining dollar earnings of the colonies were made up mostly from receipts from cocoa exports from West Africa; the only other important dollar earners were Northern Rhodesian copper and West Indian sugar, and these almost insignificant as compared with rubber and cocoa.1 In 1951 Malaya’s U.S. dollar earnings exceeded her expenditure by £114 million. Malaya earned US$400 million, of which she spent only 17 per cent and paid 83 per cent into the sterling pool

1 J. O. N. Perkins, ‘Balance of Payments in the Oversea Sterling Countries’, in The Times Review of Industry, J une, 1953.

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in London. ‘Without Malaya, the sterling system as we know it could not exist. Britain would have to halve her imports from the U.S.A. . . . Malaya is, in fact, financing Britain heavily in the present crisis, not by way of dividends, but by way of building up sterling balances in London. Malaya owes much to Britain and realizes it, but in a cold monetary sense it is Britain who is in debt to Malaya.’1

As an offset to what Britain receives from Malaya, Colonial Development and Welfare Funds should be mentioned. By November 1950 the cost of the approved Ten-Year Plan for the Colonies totalled £195 million—£65 million from the Colonial Development and Welfare Funds and the rest from the Colonies themselves. The Colombo Plan for six-year development of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei was estimated to cost £107 million, some £46 million of which would come from the Colonies’ own resources.2

The income-tax figures have the disadvantage that they do not indicate the distribution of income by economic class or by community, but they do provide examples of the kind of things that were exercising the minds of young Malayan politicians, especially Malays who regard themselves as belonging to the dispossessed community.

Closely tied up also with the question of self-government was also that of rubber smallholdings. The economy of Malaya was still dependent on rubber, which usually represented three-quarters or more of the agricultural output. The great bulk of the estate acreage was European-owned, about one-quarter being under Asian, largely Chinese, ownership, but the Malay smallholders were the more numerous. The prosperity of the rubber industry largely depended on American economic activity and the fortunes of the motor industry in particular. To meet the fluctuating market some sort of organized restriction was in force for at least part of every year between the end of the World War

1 The British Survey, June, 1952.
In the first six months of 1950 rubber and tin exports to the U.S.A. were US$121 million (£43.2 million) and, after allowing for exports from the U.S.A. (estimated at $21 million—£7.5 million), the net dollar earnings were about $100 million (£35.7 million), as compared with earnings for the whole of 1949 of $190 million (£67.8 million) (Keesing's Contemporary Archives). In 1952, the sterling assets of the Malayan area (including British Borneo) were £283 million (Memorandum on the Sterling Assets of the British Colonies, 1953).
2 The British Colonial Territories in 1951.

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I (when the industry had only just been established) until the end of 1928. From 1929 to 1933 was a period of free competition, but after that until the Japanese occupation of Malaya restriction was again in force.

Restriction of the rubber industry was introduced on the recommendation of a committee representing the estates.1 The smallholders’ voice was purely nominal. Restriction raised prices by restricting output and prohibiting planting; by eliminating competition it maintained the status quo and served the high-cost producers. The exclusion of newcomers through the prohibition of new planting barred entry into an industry particularly suitable to the smallholder, whether European, Chinese, or Malay. This was tantamount, says Mr. Bauer, to the freezing of the industry, which was virtually in its infancy, with costs on an unstable basis and with most questions of technique and organization still undecided. The immaturity of the industry not only made restriction particularly undesirable but also emphasized its inherent arbitrariness. By the completeness of control over supplies (the scheme embraced some 97 per cent of the world exports), and by the notorious inelasticity of the short-period demand for rubber, the power of the International Rubber Regulation Committee was formidable. For considerable periods Malayan smallholders did indeed enjoy higher incomes, but this did not alter the fact that the benefits of restriction were unevenly divided between estates and smallholdings to the disadvantage of the latter.

The destruction of the plantations as a result of the Japanese occupation was very small—between 3 to 5 per cent of the smallholding area and about 7 to 8 per cent of the estate area was felled, and although the labour force was seriously depleted, production quickly recovered. However, said Mr. Bauer, writing in January, 1947, the official policies still being pursued threatened not only the future of the smallholding industry as against that of Indonesia, they also jeopardized the social stability of Malaya. More important than anything else was that the provisions of planting restriction were still in force and were being enforced. In other words, the low-cost producers were still being prevented from expanding their planting. This was tantamount to unilateral

1 P. T. Bauer, The Rubber Industry: a study in competition and monopoly (London School of Economics and Political Science, Longmans Green, 1948), p. 211.

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restriction for Malaya. This in the end must prove disastrous for the country. If these restrictions were continued the smallholdings would be eliminated in about twenty years.1

The question of the replanting of the rubber smallholdings was still outstanding at the end of 1951. In 1950 a special committee which had been appointed to consider the matter reported that the vast majority of the smallholdings consisted of old rubber trees which were nearing the end of their natural life and unless replanting on a broad scale were undertaken many of the smallholders would soon go out of production. A plan was later put forward by which the Agricultural Department would assist smallholders in replanting, and a programme was drawn up providing for the replanting of 50,000 acres over the next six years. The smallholders, however, attracted by the high prices following the Korean War and rearmament, did not respond to this offer to any great extent, and the first year only 7,000 acres were dealt with. Meanwhile, Sir John Hay, a leading director of rubber companies, denounced large-scale replanting

1 The restrictions were raised soon after.
A spokesman of the rubber industry to whom I referred Mr. Bauer’s report for comment, stated as follows. Under the Regulation Scheme which ran from 1934 to the early years of the war, there was allotted to each producing territory a quota, and exports were regulated on a permitted percentage of each quota. The quota was based on the past performance of each territory. As to how the quota was divided internally was a purely domestic matter over which the international body had no control, but the general principle underlying the determination of territorial quotas, i.e. past performances, was generally observed in the domestic distribution. In Malaya there was, first of all, a division between estate owners and smallholders and then from that stage the distribution was made individually. The ultimate responsibility for the internal distribution of the quota rested on Government. The part of the rubber interests in London briefly amounted to this—that they recommended Government to distribute their quota on the same principle as the national quota had been computed, namely, past performance; but where there was any doubt as between estate and smallholder, then the doubt should be resolved in favour of the latter.

As regards the contention of Mr. Bauer, continued the same spokesman, that the Malayan smallholders had been given a ‘raw deal’, the date of his visit was 1946, when it would have been impossible for anyone to determine with any accuracy what was the productive capacity of different classes of rubber production in Malaya in 1934 (the year when the internal distribution was determined). In other words, the position in 1946 had no relevance to what was the position in 1934. Moreover, that he formed an exaggerated estimate of smallholders’ productive capacity could be demonstrated by a comparison between his estimate for the post-war period and the actual performance of smallholders when they were free from all restrictions and when the very high price for rubber which prevailed in 1951-2 gave them the incentive to fullest production.

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schemes as premature while the Emergency remained. In 1951 only 3,778 acres were replanted. In 1952 General Templer stated that substantial progress had been made. An interim scheme had brought forth applications from 6,071 smallholders involving 31,281 acres. The general scheme for smallholders’ replanting, which would become operative in 1953, had also been published. The Replanting Board aimed at a target of 500,000 acres replanting of smallholdings by i960.

Discussing the project, the Straits Times said: ‘It would seem unlikely that any part of the new fund will be wanted for replanting purposes for many a long day.... Its million-dollar replanting scheme for smallholders, which has been going on since 1949, is 80 per cent a failure.’

Turning now to food. Malaya produced only 40 per cent of its rice needs. Under the Six Years’ Development Programme 34,000   hectares of new rice land were to be brought under production by 1953 and 116,000 hectares of paddy land improved. A further 92,000 hectares were noted for possible development and 5,000 hectares for possible improvement. Even so, the fact was that Malaya would have to continue to pay for its rice food imports by the sale of rubber, tin, copra, etc., and this will be the case even when Malaya is self-governing. But it was also most certain that if Malaya were independent it would tend to copy the economic policies being pursued in other independent Asian countries. In Indonesia and Burma, for example, the emphasis was on co-operatives. The farmers’ co-operatives considered eligible included rice-growers as well as growers of tobacco, sugar, kapok, copra and other produce. Remember, too, that these newly independent countries were committed to nationalize industry. In Burma, the teak leases to the British-controlled Bombay-Burma Company had not been renewed, the Irrawaddy Flotilla had been nationalized, and the constitution provided that all timber, mineral lands, forests, water, fisheries, minerals, coal and sources of natural energy should be reserved for exploitation by Burmese nationals. The Sukiman Government in Indonesia in May, 1951, announced a programme of nationalization to include all enterprises of national interest, the Java Bank being the first. Neither UMNO, MCA nor IMP had as yet included nationalization in their programmes, but it was very probable that they would have to do so to a greater or lesser degree if they hoped to win at the polls. The equally important question of the

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availability of Malaya’s sterling balances for capital development in Malaya would also become a political issue in due time.

The economics referred to in this chapter are not of the sort of immediate interest to investors, but the examples chosen fairly indicate the economic issues of Malayan politics of the future— certainly those that will be to the fore when more popular parties than the present middle-class ones are competing for the votes of an enfranchised Malaya.1

1 A specimen of the kind of news item that does not find its way into the British Press is the following:
In reply to a cable of Christmas greetings from Mr. Lyttelton, the Malay Seaman’s Union said, ‘ Your Christmas greetings do not ring true to the Malayan Merchant Seamen whose daily pay amounts to about the price of a tin of cigarettes. Why do you not take up the challenge of Mr. Stanley Awbery, M.P., to send a commission to investigate the seafarer’s complaints of racial discrimination, slave labour, and starvation wages in Singapore?’ Singapore Standard, 29 December, 1953.

MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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