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Before World War II Malay nationalism had
scarcely come into being. There was, however, a negative state of fear and
resentment of Chinese economic pressure which provided a favourable soil in
which a national feeling could germinate. Like all primary producers, the
Malays were worse off in the ’thirties than in the ’twenties. In their vaguely
restive and discontented state they looked out and saw the growing nationalist
movement in Indonesia. This had a religious as well as an economic basis, but
the Mohammedanism of the Malays was of too tolerant a character to act as a
driving force. But from the beginning of the twentieth century the increasing
prosperity of the Malay aristocracy under British rule had enabled them to send
their sons to Cairo, Beirut, or Mecca for education, and here they came under
the influences of Pan-Islamism. When these youths returned to Malaya they
formed a small and rather frustrated Malay intelligentsia among whom circulated
magazines in Arabic and Malay dealing with the forbidden topics of nationalism
and the politics of the Middle East. They established literary associations and
small debating societies, which, however, did not attain to the dimensions of
political parties.
The decentralization policy and the building up
of the influence of the Malay aristocracy in the States encouraged the Malay
nationalist intelligentsia to regard itself as the instrument for preserving an
inherited culture not strong enough to stand unaided. Influenced by Arab
Pan-Islamism, by Indonesian attempts to absorb them into Indonesia, and by
Pan-Asianism, they nevertheless saw their own political awakening not as any ‘
brave new world ’ but as a‘ tardy recognition of dangers threatening to convert
their race into an “aboriginal stock” and their culture into a “museum-piece”’.1
1 T. H. Silcock and Ungku Aziz
in ‘Nationalism in Malaya’ in Asian
Nationalism and the West (ed. W. L. Holland (IPR), The Macmillan Company,
New York, 1953), p. 286.
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This hybrid nationalism was coming into being
within a political framework whose guiding fiction was that in spite of British
administrative and British and Chinese economic domination Malaya was still a
‘Malay country’ governed in trust for its people. This fiction was elevated
into a corner-stone of policy by Sir Cecil Clementi (Governor, 1929-34). Thus
it was that, while they were progressively dispossessed, the Malays were
treated like privileged, but incompetent, children. The patronage of this
people by the European ‘ pro-Malay ’ faction probably constitutes the most
highly gilded insult ever offered to a ‘protected’ race. There can be little
doubt that the welcome given at first to the Japanese by a large number of
Malays and, in particular, the existence of the anti-British Malay Fifth
Column, known as the Kesatuan Muda Melayu
(KMM), were the reaction of a proud people to this intolerable attitude.
The principal technique of the Japanese during
the occupation was one of stirring up anti-European feeling and emphasizing
that the Malays, like themselves, were an Asian people. They indoctrinated
young Malays who grew up at this period with a patriotic sentiment on behalf of
a Malaya within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, but in doing this they fostered a
feeling which eventually turned against themselves. There were Malays on both
sides during the war, but, as with Indians and Indonesians, the ‘emotional
experience of fighting seems to have been more important than the side on which
they fought. After the war they retained to a considerable extent the sense of
being of one race and remembered the feeling of self-reliance rather than the
conflict—in some measure a quarrel alien to both sides—which had divided them’.1
We have seen how the agitation against the
Malayan Union after the liberation was a great force uniting the Malays. But,
in spite of this new sense of unity, they felt that they were making no headway
in the post-war battle for communal survival. Economically their position did
not improve in spite of the professed policy of the administration to better
their lot. Their frustration and bewilderment were reflected in the statements
of their leaders and in the Malay vernacular press.
Malay nationalism and the battle for
independence went hand in hand. While it was certain that few Malays and no
Malay party wished the British to withdraw altogether, there was no sharing
1 ibid.
p. 292.
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of
Mr. Lyttelton’s fear that too rapid independence might bring the communities
into collision—the claim was that an independent 'Malay Malaya’ would be able to stand on its own feet. Tungku [Tunku]
Abdul Rahman, the president of UMNO, said that when he had attended the Peace
Conference in Japan the Indonesian representative had at first refused to speak
to him because he represented a ‘subject people’. However, when he told the
others that he represented a Malay organization struggling for independence the
other delegates shook hands with him and offered him a seat at the conference.
He reiterated this position on many occasions. ‘The interim government agreed
upon at the last UMNO general assembly must be established within three years.’
‘Only by obtaining their independence can the Malays cease to be the slaves of
imperialists ’ (Warta Negara, 20
February, 1953). On the other hand, PMU (a small splinter organization of
right-wing Malays) said that not more than 25 per cent of the people of Malaya
claimed independence and of that minority 20 per cent would not let the British
go completely (Mingguan Melayu,
Singapore, 16 November, 1952).
In the educational field Malay nationalist
opinion was generally critical of the idea of the National School. The UMNO
Youth League of Kuala Pilah was reported as saying: ‘Considering that the
people of this country will determine their own future, it is useless for the
Federal Legislative Council to approve a National School with English as the
medium of instruction. When the country obtains self-government English may
merely be in the position of an additional language in the curriculum.’ ‘The
best solution,’ said an editorial in Utusan
Melayu (19 November, 1952), ‘is to establish only one type of school, with
Malay as the medium of instruction.’
Opposition on the part of the Malay press to the
establishment of a Chinese university was general, but Tungku [Tunku] Abdul
Rahman, after having opposed it, later said that it was a matter for the
Chinese to decide, and later still withdrew his opposition altogether (no doubt
under the influence of the UMNO-MCA alliance which was now greatly
strengthened) on the understanding that Malays as well as Chinese would be
admitted to it and that the medium of instruction would be English.
Suspicion of the Chinese actions was repeatedly
evidenced in the Malay press up to the time when in April, 1953, the MCA-UMNO
alliance called a truce in this matter. For example,
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Warta Negara (7
November, 1952) remarked that, since Mr. Aw Boon-haw had said that the Chinese
university was purely a matter for the Chinese to decide, the Malays should
demand that the Civil Service should again be closed to non-Malays, the new
citizenship law should be repealed, and Malaya’s doors should be entirely shut
to immigrants.
Malay criticism of the preferential treatment
accorded to the Chinese new villages established during the Emergency was
continuous, at least up to the time when the influential UMNO-MCA alliance
(with its control of most of the Malay and Chinese vernacular press) called at
least a temporary halt to it. A typical complaint was that of deploring the
neglect of the ‘ old villages ’ in favour of the new villages (Warta Negara, 22 November 1952). The new
villages were provided with electricity, water, and good roads, whereas the
Malays in the kampongs were being neglected and forced to put up with oil
lamps, old wells, and muddy roads.
Yet on the face of things the Malays were in a
very strong position. They commanded an overwhelming majority on the Federal
Legislative Council, and they had a monopoly of the responsible posts in the
State Governments. There had been, since 1913, a policy of reserving the best
rice lands for Malays. The special position of the Malays was recognized in the
Federal Agreement. It is true that they had been induced to make considerable
concessions in the matter of Federal Citizenship, but even should elections on
the Legislative Council level take place in the near future, the Malays would
still have a large majority among the electors. But, in spite of their
favourable balance of political power, the Malays were, at most, holding their
own in an unfavourable economic situation.
The Report
of the Rice Production Committee (1953) (issued after this chapter was
originally written) revealed a far worse state of affairs than had been
suspected, even in informed circles in Malaya. In an editorial of July the Manchester Guardian termed the report a
‘startling document’, and went on:
For
many years Malayan Government officials have asserted that the problem of a
peasant population in the grip of extortionate landlords, so common in most of
Asia, was virtually non-existent in Malaya. Now it appears that for the past
ten years a steady process of evicting rice cultivators unable to pay increased
rents for their land has been going
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on in
many areas. Still worse, the extortion of large sums in ‘ tea money ’ by
landlords as a condition of renewing land leases to cultivators has apparently
become widespread. All this— apart from its social effects—has been preventing
an increase in rice production. . . . Peasants without security of tenure and a
fair share of what they produce naturally enough do not bother to improve their
land. The abuses now revealed have been growing up almost unknown to the
Malayan authorities, largely because of insufficient staff in State Land
Offices to gather information and formulate safeguards. The report . . . points
out that the same sort of shortage of personnel in the Department of
Agriculture is making impossible a rapid enough spreading of improved technical
methods.
The authors of Nationalism in Malaya1 point out that the possession by
the Chinese of the most productive property of the country, about nine-tenths
of the best educated people, and all the important economic contacts, was not
an advantage that could be offset by a grant of, say, ten million Straits
dollars from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and double that sum from
general Malayan revenue, to be spent in rural development over a period of ten
years (figures arbitrarily chosen but which would be regarded by the Chinese as
generous), and would make no difference to the situation.
Statistics
do not at present exist by which this can be demonstrated without a good deal
of guesswork. Preliminary estimates of national income make it unlikely that
more than five hundred million Straits dollars a year go to Malays, or less
than a thousand million go to Chinese. The Malays are rather more numerous, and
the annual difference gives some idea of the enormous material and human
capital in Chinese hands. It is fairly clear that the order of magnitude
involved to get the Malays economically on a par with the Chinese would be a
sum equal to the whole present Federal revenue (about five hundred million
Straits dollars) levied every year from the Chinese and devoted to Malay
welfare (education, rural development, housing, and the like) for ten or
fifteen years. Smaller sums, if spent appropriately and with maximum effect,
might mitigate the differences to some extent; but at
1 p. 328.
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present
the politicians are obviously thinking in wholly unrealistic terms about the
cost of setting the Malays on a par, economically, with the Chinese. The change
could not be brought about without a major economic operation, comparable in
scale with a long, arduous, all-out war.
Whilst I do not contest these general
conclusions, I have some comments of my own to offer on this. The assumption
made is that the problem is merely one of transferring economic power from the
Chinese to the Malays, whereas only a small proportion of the Chinese (say,
less than 50,000) possess this economic power and the majority are as poor—or
nearly as poor—as the Malays. It also ignores the fact that the British share
in Malaya’s wealth is still probably twice that of the Chinese. (In 1938
European (i.e. mostly British) entrepreneur investment in Malaya was estimated
at US $454.5 million as compared with US $200 million Chinese investment.)1
The net national product (i.e. net value of the
goods and services produced in Malaya) in 1949 was estimated at $3,069.2
million. The net income paid abroad in interest, profits and dividends amounted
to about $47 million, leaving a national income of $3,022 million. The mid-year
population of Malaya was about 6,066,000, giving a national income per head of
$498 (£58). (For 1950 the net national product was estimated at $4,968.8
million.) In the United Kingdom the national income per head for the same year
was £227. But although the United Kingdom had food subsidies, these were far
outweighed by its taxes on commodities which were much greater than in Malaya.
The cost of living was apparently higher in Malaya, but the people of the
United Kingdom needed to spend more on substantial houses, warm clothing and
fuel than the people of a land of eternal summer. Moreover, they were spending
some 10 per cent of their national income on defence including some $20 million
a year, plus the cost of imported arms and explosives, in Malaya. Hence,
although standards of living for the bulk of the people (notably manual
workers) were higher in the United
1 K. E. Mackenzie, United
Kingdom Trade Commissioner in Malaya, Economic
and Commercial Conditions in Malaya (Overseas Economic Surveys, 1952),
quotes figures giving the total capitalization
of companies incorporated outside the Federation with rubber, tin and
commercial interests in the Federation at M$ 1,323.4 million and that of local
companies incorporated in the Federation at M$149.8—but much of the former capital
was not employed in Malaya.
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Kingdom,
the difference was less than national-income figures indicated.
The national income per head of Malaya was much
higher, however, than in most neighbouring countries. For example, for India in
1949 the gross national product was estimated at only £23 per head. But the
cost of living was higher in Malaya than in India. Although the standard of
living in Malaya was higher than in most neighbouring countries, the difference
was less than indicated by a mere arithmetical comparison of national income
per head.1
1 Frederic Benham, Economic
Adviser to the Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia, The National Income of Malaya, 1947-49 (with
a note on 1950), Singapore, 1951.
2 From Income Tax Department: Statistical Abstracts, Kuala Lumpur, 1952.
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Malaya's
Dollar Earnings
The dollar earnings of the colonies were in 1950
and 1951 about two-thirds as large as the dollar earnings of the independent
oversea sterling countries. Of these colonial dollar earnings about two-thirds
came from Malaya’s exports—to some extent from tin but mainly from rubber. The
remaining dollar earnings of the colonies were made up mostly from receipts
from cocoa exports from West Africa; the only other important dollar earners
were Northern Rhodesian copper and West Indian sugar, and these almost
insignificant as compared with rubber and cocoa.1 In 1951 Malaya’s
U.S. dollar earnings exceeded her expenditure by £114 million. Malaya earned
US$400 million, of which she spent only 17 per cent and paid 83 per cent into
the sterling pool
1 J. O. N. Perkins, ‘Balance of
Payments in the Oversea Sterling Countries’, in The Times Review of Industry, J une, 1953.
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in
London. ‘Without Malaya, the sterling system as we know it could not exist.
Britain would have to halve her imports from the U.S.A. . . . Malaya is, in
fact, financing Britain heavily in the present crisis, not by way of dividends,
but by way of building up sterling balances in London. Malaya owes much to
Britain and realizes it, but in a cold monetary sense it is Britain who is in
debt to Malaya.’1
As an offset to what Britain receives from
Malaya, Colonial Development and Welfare Funds should be mentioned. By November
1950 the cost of the approved Ten-Year Plan for the Colonies totalled £195
million—£65 million from the Colonial Development and Welfare Funds and the
rest from the Colonies themselves. The Colombo Plan for six-year development of
Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei was estimated to cost £107
million, some £46 million of which would come from the Colonies’ own resources.2
The income-tax figures have the disadvantage
that they do not indicate the distribution of income by economic class or by
community, but they do provide examples of the kind of things that were
exercising the minds of young Malayan politicians, especially Malays who regard
themselves as belonging to the dispossessed community.
Closely tied up also with the question of
self-government was also that of rubber smallholdings. The economy of Malaya
was still dependent on rubber, which usually represented three-quarters or more
of the agricultural output. The great bulk of the estate acreage was
European-owned, about one-quarter being under Asian, largely Chinese,
ownership, but the Malay smallholders were the more numerous. The prosperity of
the rubber industry largely depended on American economic activity and the
fortunes of the motor industry in particular. To meet the fluctuating market
some sort of organized restriction was in force for at least part of every year
between the end of the World War
1 The British Survey, June, 1952.
In the first six months of 1950 rubber and tin
exports to the U.S.A. were US$121 million (£43.2 million) and, after allowing
for exports from the U.S.A. (estimated at $21 million—£7.5 million), the net
dollar earnings were about $100 million (£35.7 million), as compared with
earnings for the whole of 1949 of $190 million (£67.8 million) (Keesing's Contemporary Archives). In
1952, the sterling assets of the Malayan area (including British Borneo) were
£283 million (Memorandum on the Sterling
Assets of the British Colonies, 1953).
2 The
British Colonial Territories in 1951.
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I
(when the industry had only just been established) until the end of 1928. From
1929 to 1933 was a period of free competition, but after that until the
Japanese occupation of Malaya restriction was again in force.
Restriction of the rubber industry was
introduced on the recommendation of a committee representing the estates.1
The smallholders’ voice was purely nominal. Restriction raised prices by
restricting output and prohibiting planting; by eliminating competition it
maintained the status quo and served
the high-cost producers. The exclusion of newcomers through the prohibition of
new planting barred entry into an industry particularly suitable to the
smallholder, whether European, Chinese, or Malay. This was tantamount, says Mr.
Bauer, to the freezing of the industry, which was virtually in its infancy,
with costs on an unstable basis and with most questions of technique and
organization still undecided. The immaturity of the industry not only made
restriction particularly undesirable but also emphasized its inherent
arbitrariness. By the completeness of control over supplies (the scheme
embraced some 97 per cent of the world exports), and by the notorious
inelasticity of the short-period demand for rubber, the power of the
International Rubber Regulation Committee was formidable. For considerable
periods Malayan smallholders did indeed enjoy higher incomes, but this did not
alter the fact that the benefits of restriction were unevenly divided between
estates and smallholdings to the disadvantage of the latter.
The destruction of the plantations as a result
of the Japanese occupation was very small—between 3 to 5 per cent of the
smallholding area and about 7 to 8 per cent of the estate area was felled, and
although the labour force was seriously depleted, production quickly recovered.
However, said Mr. Bauer, writing in January, 1947, the official policies still
being pursued threatened not only the future of the smallholding industry as
against that of Indonesia, they also jeopardized the social stability of
Malaya. More important than anything else was that the provisions of planting
restriction were still in force and were being enforced. In other words, the
low-cost producers were still being prevented from expanding their planting.
This was tantamount to unilateral
1 P. T. Bauer, The Rubber Industry: a study
in competition and monopoly (London School of Economics and Political Science,
Longmans Green, 1948), p. 211.
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restriction
for Malaya. This in the end must prove disastrous for the country. If these
restrictions were continued the smallholdings would be eliminated in about
twenty years.1
The question of the replanting of the rubber
smallholdings was still outstanding at the end of 1951. In 1950 a special
committee which had been appointed to consider the matter reported that the
vast majority of the smallholdings consisted of old rubber trees which were
nearing the end of their natural life and unless replanting on a broad scale
were undertaken many of the smallholders would soon go out of production. A
plan was later put forward by which the Agricultural Department would assist
smallholders in replanting, and a programme was drawn up providing for the
replanting of 50,000 acres over the next six years. The smallholders, however,
attracted by the high prices following the Korean War and rearmament, did not
respond to this offer to any great extent, and the first year only 7,000 acres
were dealt with. Meanwhile, Sir John Hay, a leading director of rubber
companies, denounced large-scale replanting
1 The restrictions were raised
soon after.
A spokesman of the rubber industry to whom I
referred Mr. Bauer’s report for comment, stated as follows. Under the
Regulation Scheme which ran from 1934 to the early years of the war, there was
allotted to each producing territory a quota, and exports were regulated on a
permitted percentage of each quota. The quota was based on the past performance
of each territory. As to how the quota was divided internally was a purely
domestic matter over which the international body had no control, but the
general principle underlying the determination of territorial quotas, i.e. past
performances, was generally observed in the domestic distribution. In Malaya
there was, first of all, a division between estate owners and smallholders and
then from that stage the distribution was made individually. The ultimate
responsibility for the internal distribution of the quota rested on Government.
The part of the rubber interests in London briefly amounted to this—that they
recommended Government to distribute their quota on the same principle as the
national quota had been computed, namely, past performance; but where there was
any doubt as between estate and smallholder, then the doubt should be resolved
in favour of the latter.
As regards the contention of Mr. Bauer,
continued the same spokesman, that the Malayan smallholders had been given a
‘raw deal’, the date of his visit was 1946, when it would have been impossible
for anyone to determine with any accuracy what was the productive capacity of
different classes of rubber production in Malaya in 1934 (the year when the
internal distribution was determined). In other words, the position in 1946 had
no relevance to what was the position in 1934. Moreover, that he formed an exaggerated
estimate of smallholders’ productive capacity could be demonstrated by a
comparison between his estimate for the post-war period and the actual
performance of smallholders when they were free from all restrictions and when
the very high price for rubber which prevailed in 1951-2 gave them the
incentive to fullest production.
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schemes
as premature while the Emergency remained. In 1951 only 3,778 acres were
replanted. In 1952 General Templer stated that substantial progress had been
made. An interim scheme had brought forth applications from 6,071 smallholders
involving 31,281 acres. The general scheme for smallholders’ replanting, which
would become operative in 1953, had also been published. The Replanting Board
aimed at a target of 500,000 acres replanting of smallholdings by i960.
Discussing the project, the Straits Times said: ‘It would seem unlikely that any part of the
new fund will be wanted for replanting purposes for many a long day.... Its
million-dollar replanting scheme for smallholders, which has been going on
since 1949, is 80 per cent a failure.’
Turning now to food. Malaya produced only 40 per
cent of its rice needs. Under the Six Years’ Development Programme 34,000 hectares of new rice land were to be brought
under production by 1953 and 116,000 hectares of paddy land improved. A further
92,000 hectares were noted for possible development and 5,000 hectares for
possible improvement. Even so, the fact was that Malaya would have to continue
to pay for its rice food imports by the sale of rubber, tin, copra, etc., and
this will be the case even when Malaya is self-governing. But it was also most
certain that if Malaya were independent it would tend to copy the economic policies
being pursued in other independent Asian countries. In Indonesia and Burma, for
example, the emphasis was on co-operatives. The farmers’ co-operatives
considered eligible included rice-growers as well as growers of tobacco, sugar,
kapok, copra and other produce. Remember, too, that these newly independent
countries were committed to nationalize industry. In Burma, the teak leases to
the British-controlled Bombay-Burma Company had not been renewed, the Irrawaddy
Flotilla had been nationalized, and the constitution provided that all timber,
mineral lands, forests, water, fisheries, minerals, coal and sources of natural
energy should be reserved for exploitation by Burmese nationals. The Sukiman
Government in Indonesia in May, 1951, announced a programme of nationalization
to include all enterprises of national interest, the Java Bank being the first.
Neither UMNO, MCA nor IMP had as yet included nationalization in their
programmes, but it was very probable that they would have to do so to a greater
or lesser degree if they hoped to win at the polls. The equally important
question of the
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availability
of Malaya’s sterling balances for capital development in Malaya would also
become a political issue in due time.
The economics referred to in this chapter are
not of the sort of immediate interest to investors, but the examples chosen
fairly indicate the economic issues of Malayan politics of the future—
certainly those that will be to the fore when more popular parties than the
present middle-class ones are competing for the votes of an enfranchised
Malaya.1
1 A specimen of the kind of news
item that does not find its way into the British Press is the following:
In reply to a cable of Christmas greetings from
Mr. Lyttelton, the Malay Seaman’s Union said, ‘ Your Christmas greetings do not
ring true to the Malayan Merchant Seamen whose daily pay amounts to about the
price of a tin of cigarettes. Why do you not take up the challenge of Mr. Stanley
Awbery, M.P., to send a commission to investigate the seafarer’s complaints of
racial discrimination, slave labour, and starvation wages in Singapore?’ Singapore Standard, 29 December, 1953.
MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS


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