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In Europe and America at this time very little
account was taken of the currents of propaganda in Asia. Some papers (notably
the London Times) were excellently
served by their correspondents in Malaya, who tried to emphasize the greater
importance of the political over the military aspect of the situation, but for
most papers the Malayan problem was long reduced to a comfortable simplicity.
How was the shooting war progressing? How fast were we liquidating the
Communist bandits? For the first year or so of his appointment General Templer
enjoyed an enthusiastic ‘ press ’ in those journals that pinned their faith to
a successful war of attrition.
Another
Chinese bandit gone below,
Praise
God from whom all blessings flow.
The effect of this was that the real issues of
the campaign were overlooked by the general public, while the ‘bandit-killing’
book Jungle Green had an enormous
sale. The damaging consequence was that there was not enough knowledge or
interest in Britain—even in Parliament—to influence policy.
The people of Asia, on the other hand, were
systematically fed with propaganda relating to Malaya which was never heard or
seen by the British public. In most Asian countries this came largely from
Communist sources, though (as the Asian Socialist Conference at Rangoon
indicated) it was supplemented from other sources hostile to Britain or to
‘imperialism’. Some of the charges were of a highly plausible kind to which
‘hand-outs’ featuring ‘village councils’, ‘living a man’s life’,
‘slave-mistresses of the jungle’ (i.e. girls who voluntarily joined the
terrorists even now), ‘loyalty to (e.g.) Perlis’, etc., were a feeble answer
outside Malaya to claims that the terrorists are a ‘Liberation Army’, or to
stories of the allegedly enormous profits of rubber and tin companies.
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Outside Malaya (where the facts are not known),
the most telling piece of Communist propaganda was the charge that ‘Britain was
suppressing a national movement’. It found contemporary expression in the book
of a Communist writer, Mr. Palme Dutt. Here is what he says:
It is
often said in quarters hostile to Malayan national aspirations that there is no
Malayan nation.
‘There
is no Malayan people and no Malayan national sentiment, let alone a national
movement’ (Victor Purcell, author of The
Chinese in Malaya, in The Times,
August 24, 1948).
This
approach is typical of the contemptuous attitude of imperialism to a developing
nation and a national struggle for freedom. In the same way, a century ago the
official spokesmen of the old Austrian Empire dismissed the Italy of the
Risorgi-mento, of Mazzini and Garibaldi, and proclaimed that Italy was ‘only a
geographical expression’. In the same way two generations ago the official
spokesman of the British Empire in India airily dismissed Indian national
aspirations. ‘There is not and never was an India, or even any country of
India,’ pontificated Sir John Strachey in 1888. ‘The notion that India is a
nationality rests upon vulgar error,’ proclaimed Sir John Seeley in his Expansion of England in 1883, utilizing
the familiar argument from diversity to counter the demands of a national
liberation movement, and continued, unconsciously echoing the Hapsburgs: ‘India
is not a political name, but only a geographical expression.’ Indeed, the
denial of nationality may be regarded as the hallmark of imperialism at a
certain stage in relation to a subject people; and the time may yet come when a
learned American thesis will be written, with abundant factual evidence, to
prove the ‘vulgar error’ of ‘ British ’ nationality.1
Since I was reconsidering my whole position from
first principles, this statement also deserved careful attention. Was Malaya,
after all, a nation? Mr. Dutt and General Templer said that it was. If it was a
nation, and we were merely attempting to suppress a national movement, then I
would say that the sooner we got out
1 R. Palme Dutt, The Crisis of Britain and the British Empire
(Lawrence & Wishart, 1953), p. lot. (Mr. Dutt, it is worthy of remark,
avoids the trap of exampling the Indian Mutiny as a ‘national movement’.)
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of
Malaya the better. General Templer and others of his school of thought would
not, presumably, be impressed by this reasoning and would hang on as long as
possible whether Malaya was a nation or not, since the General believed that
‘the fighting in Indo-China and the resistance there to Communist pressure were
all part of the same problem’.1 For my part, I believed that the war
in Indo-China was essentially a national movement and, as such, was bound to
prevail in the end. It was possible, however, and, I think, realistic, to
accept the Communist revolution in China, and even to approve it, and to be
sympathetic to the rise of nationalism in Asia, and at the same time to feel
that, owing to the special circumstances, Communism did not offer an acceptable
solution in Malaya—and, while feeling like this, to vote Conservative at the
elections in Britain (as I have known more than one well-informed person to
do). But when these lines were written, I could see few signs of a similar
national movement in Malaya.
Let me consider Mr. Dutt’s historical analogies.
First of all that of the Italian Risorgimento.
It was no doubt in the interest of the Austrian
Empire to dismiss Italy as a ‘geographical expression’, and while Italy
remained politically divided there was some plausibility in the claim. But the
fact was that Italy consisted of homogeneous elements with a common culture and
a common language and had been increasingly conscious of its unity since the
Renaissance. Nationalism (being, as Mr. Nehru has said, an ‘anti-movement’) was
stimulated by the presence of a power in Italy which was universally regarded
as ‘foreign’ and ‘un-Italian’. To compare Italy with Malaya is absurd. Whereas
the people from Sicily to the Alps had a common language and culture, Malaya
has several languages and cultures and only an embryonic sense of being
‘Malayan’. Italy had also a powerful memory of an ancient unity: Malaya has
none. Malaya, moreover, had produced no Mazzini and no Garibaldi. There is,
indeed, no point of similarity between the two countries.
In citing the case of India, however, Mr. Dutt
has chosen a more plausible comparison. India, like Malaya, consists of a
number of peoples of different race and language. India, on the other hand, had
never been a political unity as Italy once had been (Asoka and the Moguls
notwithstanding). The bulk of
1 The Times, 19 May, 1953.
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the
Indians nevertheless possessed a common cultural inheritance and a common
religion, namely Hinduism. India had, therefore, the makings of a modern
nation. But when Sir John Strachey and Sir John Seeley spoke or wrote in the
1880s they were quite right in saying that there was no ‘Indian people and no
Indian nation’. Remember, too, that they were speaking of what are now India
and Pakistan together and not of what is now India alone. Taking the
sub-continent as a whole, they are still right. If one accepts Mr. Dutt’s
analogy, then one must visualize his ‘Malayan nation’ as the partition of
Malaya, like India and Pakistan, into a Malay and a Chinese state. Indian
nationalism came into being (again to quote Mr. Nehru) as an ‘anti-movement’ in
opposition to government by a foreign race. Gandhi himself said that the
‘founder of Indian nationalism’ was the Parsee Dadabhai, who converted him to
his views in 1892.1
It is possible to distinguish the phases of the
process, none of which have so far been reproduced in Malaya. There is a Malay
nationalism, a Chinese nationalism, and an Indian nationalism, all products of
an opposition to foreign control, but so far nothing that deserves to be called
‘ Malayan nationalism ’.
But when I say that there was no Malayan
nationalism I would not go so far as to say that such may not have germinated.
It probably had. When the progressive elements in Malaya came together, as they
were allowed to do before the Emergency controls were imposed, they showed a
strong sense of having problems in common, of ‘being in the same boat’. In many
essential respects, too, the communal elements showed a much better disposition
to compromise on intercommunal questions than were evinced by their
middle-class counterparts who have been occupying the stage without competition
for nearly five years. But what I did say in 1948, and what I still said in
1953, was that so far Malayan nationalism has not become a political force, and
Communism has failed to induce it to emerge. The Communist leaders were Chinese
with Chinese names and not ‘Malayan’ names, as Mazzini and Garibaldi were
Italians with Italian names.
What was as important—indeed more so—was that
the Malayan communities were not represented among the guerillas in any way
proportionate to their numbers. Mr. Dutt’s answer was that the Malay and Indian
guerillas did approach the Chinese in
numbers; and, in any case, it was reasonable to expect the Chinese
1 Romain Rolland, Mahatma Gandhi, Paris, 1948, p. 19.
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to
be in a majority, as they were mostly workers, while the Malays were mostly
peasants, and the workers had elsewhere provided the leaders of the Communist
revolution.
Mr. Dutt says, ‘The official reports of British
Intelligence officers brought back by Malcolm MacDonald in May, 1949, had to
admit that 25 per cent of the guerillas were Malays’ (Sunday Times, 15 May, 1949). The report in the Sunday Times was that of their correspondent and it did not state
that it was supported by Mr. MacDonald, and it has certainly never been stated
by an official source that 25 per cent of the guerillas were Malays. Casualty
lists, published by the Federal Government in Kuala Lumpur, and covering the
period from the beginning of the Emergency, in June, 1948, to 31 January, 1952,
show that, out of a total of 2,778 bandits killed in that time, 2,599 were
Chinese and 102 Malays—a proportion of twenty-five Chinese to each Malay. The
remaining 117 were Indian, Siamese, Indonesian and aborigine (the aborigines
are the nomadic hill men of central Malaya). The official figures published in
January, 1953, show 3,791 terrorists as having been killed since June, 1948, of
whom 3,510 were Chinese. That is to say, that only 7.4 per cent were Malays and
Indians, and, while these are not separated in the returns, we can assume that
the proportion of twenty-five Chinese to each Malay still held.
According to the official White Paper, No. 24,
of 1953, the total number of persons in detention camps on 1 June, 1952, was
7,480, of whom 750 were Malays. However, a large number of Chinese Communists
and Communist sympathizers had been sent back to China, as the following
figures from the same source show:
Repatriations
from June 1948 to March 1953
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Taking this evidence together it is safe to say
that the proportion of Malay to Chinese guerillas was only about one in twenty.
As regards Mr. Dutt’s subsidiary arguments, his
actual words are, ‘ Since the working class is the vanguard and main fighting
force of the national movement, equally against Japanese domination and against
British domination, with the peasants in general acting as suppliers of food
and other assistance, it is not surprising that the bulk of the guerillas
should be Chinese.’ That there are Malay Communists there can be no doubt; but
though the Malay are peasants, by far the greater part of the guerillas ’
supplies has come from the 500,000 squatters of their own race. In China, Mao
Tse-tung had been able to rally the peasantry to the Communist banner; the
Communists in Malaya had failed to any important degree to rally the Malay
peasantry to their side. Again, if the war was a nationalist movement, would
the Malays—police, soldiers, Home Guard, etc., have provided the great bulk of
the opposition to the Communists? If it was a national movement, why should the
great bulk of the people, Chinese and Indians, have remained indifferent, if
not actively hostile, to the rising?
Quite apart from his invalid analogies, I feel
that Mr. Dutt’s error lies in a doctrinaire ‘blanket’ application of Marxist
doctrine in precisely the same way that his comrades in Malaya have erred.
International Communist propaganda alleges that the rising was forced on the
Malayan Communists by the action of the British. But surely the Communists
would not have taken up the gage unless they had believed in their ability to
win a military victory? There was nothing to stop them carrying on their underground
activities as before without resorting to arms. In their new directive of 1
October, 1951, the Communists themselves admitted their error and ordered what
was partially a reversion to the old underground warfare. Many things in MCP
propaganda also confirm that they had mistaken the nature of Malayan society.
They were unable to create any of the ‘ liberated areas’ provided for in their
original plan, and the bulk of the working population remained at their places
of employment and did not desert to the hills. Malayan industry continued
almost normally, and, although the cost of the Emergency was, and is, great,
the US dollars continued to flow into the sterling pool.
If it is held proven that the war in Malaya was
not a national rising, the main plank on the Communist platform was destroyed.
But it did not follow that everything else the Communists said
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was
false or implausible. Indeed, much of their propaganda was also included in the
nationalist and socialist propaganda of the independent countries of South-East
Asia, e.g.:
British
capital investments in Malaya have been estimated at about £100 million. . . .
Dividends of 60 per cent and 65 per cent have been common, reaching even 100
per cent. . . . Workers’ wages in the rubber plantations in 1947-8, according
to official figures, reached 86.4d. to 116.8d
monthly, plus allowances in kind valued at 15s. a month. Whereas prices had
risen five times since pre-war, wages had only doubled, thus representing a
heavy fall in real wages on the low pre-war colonial rates. . . .*
Reports in the British financial press seemed to
support at least part of this propaganda. One tin company declared a dividend
of 222 per cent for 1952, having placed $1 1/2 million to reserve, another tin
company declared a 100 per cent dividend, and certain rubber companies
dividends of 60 and 50 per cent, apart from amounts placed to reserve.
As against this, a spokesman of the rubber
industry to whom I referred this propaganda commented as follows. First of all,
as regards the earnings of rubber companies, an examination of a cross-section
of Malayan companies for the twenty years 1933-52 showed that the average gross
dividend paid was 7 per cent, or, allowing for tax current at the time, the net
return to stockholders would be 4 per cent. Another significant feature was
that an examination of the current (1953) quotations for rubber shares showed
that the vast majority stood at heavy discounts on the price at which they were
issued despite the fact that all such companies had ploughed back quite
substantial sums into the business. Consequently it would be impossible to
raise the capital for the betterment or extension of the rubber-producing in
Malaya. These facts (said the spokesman) pointed clearly to the
1 On field-workers’ wages, which exclude variable bonus and other
payments, the Statistics Department of the Federation of Malaya drew up the
following figures:
Wages of
Field Workers, Rubber Industry, Federation of Malaya (percentages).
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conclusion
that despite the occasional and temporary profits due to particular causes,
such as in 1951-2, the rubber-producing industry had in the long term been far
from prosperous.
As regards the mining industry, the Malayan
Chamber of Mines, to whom I referred the matter, replied to the following
effect. Little useful purpose, said the Chamber, is served by picking on one
particular year; the proper approach is to see what dividends have been paid
continuously over a reasonably representative period. The dividends paid by the
tin-mining companies in the year 1952 reflect the exceptionally high prices for
the metal due to panic-buying by consumers owing to the war in Korea. As the
issued capital upon which the rate of dividends is calculated is, in the case
of the majority of tin mines owned by Malayan companies, vastly less than the
actual capital employed in the business, the published rate of dividend is most
misleading—the real dividend on capital employed in the business being a very
much lower figure. Tin mining in Malaya, as elsewhere, is essentially a
high-risk investment and individuals risking their money sometimes lose it
altogether. A mine is a wasting asset with a limited and, in most cases,
comparatively short life. Dividends paid to shareholders contain an appreciable
element of return on capital, and every dividend paid (including the portion
which is really a return on capital) is subject to extremely heavy taxation.
The Japanese extracted a very large quantity of tin from Malayan properties
(for which the owners received no compensation) and the life of a large number
of properties was considerably reduced thereby and the return-of-capital
element in dividends received by shareholders correspondingly increased. A very
large number of tin-mining concerns in Malaya are marginal producers. Their
owners, whether Chinese or companies, have received over the years a most
inadequate return on capital. Today they are facing financial ruin. Good
returns in times of exceptional demand and high tin prices are essential if the
necessary capital is to be made available to Malaya for such a high-risk
operation as mining.
On my visits to Burma, Indonesia and India in
1950, and to Burma and India in 1952 (though I did not hear it often in the
Philippines, Malaya, Hong Kong, or Siam), the ‘socialist’ argument cited above
was the stock-in-trade of the politician and the intellectual. I am not
concerned here with the validity of the propaganda—merely with its
existence—for it deals with matters
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of
the first appeal to the socialist politician and his electorates in the newly
independent countries. A politician in these countries who was not also a
‘socialist’ could not survive.
The grave weakness of Government propaganda in
Malaya was that apart from (largely nominal) protection from intimidation (‘negative’,
because this is the minimum that would be offered by any stable government) it
had nothing to offer except the dubious gifts of General Templer’s reform
programme. The one great strength of the British position was that Malaya was
weak and divided in the absence of a genuine national movement and therefore
needed Britain to defend it. It was apparent also that the democratic or
capitalist West would not rapidly succumb to Communist conquest or revolution.
In an isolated peninsula like Malaya, where superiority of naval and air forces
counted for so much, Britain and the West could assure protection that would
not be available from any other source. It was for this reason among others
that none of the Malayan political parties except the Communists had any wish
to cut the tie with Britain. On the contrary, the fear of a possible British
withdrawal, leaving another power to fill the vacuum, was at the back of the
minds of a large majority of the members of the communal and other parties. So
long, therefore, as Britain felt that her imperial strategy, economics and
communications made the retention of Malaya desirable, and so long as she could
afford the cost in money and armament, so long would she be able to retain
Malaya —provided, always, that it became a stable, self-governing dominion.
MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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