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In Europe and America at this time very little account was taken of the currents of propaganda in Asia. Some papers (notably the London Times) were excellently served by their correspondents in Malaya, who tried to emphasize the greater importance of the political over the military aspect of the situation, but for most papers the Malayan problem was long reduced to a comfortable simplicity. How was the shooting war progressing? How fast were we liquidating the Communist bandits? For the first year or so of his appointment General Templer enjoyed an enthusiastic ‘ press ’ in those journals that pinned their faith to a successful war of attrition.

Another Chinese bandit gone below,
Praise God from whom all blessings flow.

The effect of this was that the real issues of the campaign were overlooked by the general public, while the ‘bandit-killing’ book Jungle Green had an enormous sale. The damaging consequence was that there was not enough knowledge or interest in Britain—even in Parliament—to influence policy.

The people of Asia, on the other hand, were systematically fed with propaganda relating to Malaya which was never heard or seen by the British public. In most Asian countries this came largely from Communist sources, though (as the Asian Socialist Conference at Rangoon indicated) it was supplemented from other sources hostile to Britain or to ‘imperialism’. Some of the charges were of a highly plausible kind to which ‘hand-outs’ featuring ‘village councils’, ‘living a man’s life’, ‘slave-mistresses of the jungle’ (i.e. girls who voluntarily joined the terrorists even now), ‘loyalty to (e.g.) Perlis’, etc., were a feeble answer outside Malaya to claims that the terrorists are a ‘Liberation Army’, or to stories of the allegedly enormous profits of rubber and tin companies.

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Outside Malaya (where the facts are not known), the most telling piece of Communist propaganda was the charge that ‘Britain was suppressing a national movement’. It found contemporary expression in the book of a Communist writer, Mr. Palme Dutt. Here is what he says:

It is often said in quarters hostile to Malayan national aspirations that there is no Malayan nation.

‘There is no Malayan people and no Malayan national sentiment, let alone a national movement’ (Victor Purcell, author of The Chinese in Malaya, in The Times, August 24, 1948).

This approach is typical of the contemptuous attitude of imperialism to a developing nation and a national struggle for freedom. In the same way, a century ago the official spokesmen of the old Austrian Empire dismissed the Italy of the Risorgi-mento, of Mazzini and Garibaldi, and proclaimed that Italy was ‘only a geographical expression’. In the same way two generations ago the official spokesman of the British Empire in India airily dismissed Indian national aspirations. ‘There is not and never was an India, or even any country of India,’ pontificated Sir John Strachey in 1888. ‘The notion that India is a nationality rests upon vulgar error,’ proclaimed Sir John Seeley in his Expansion of England in 1883, utilizing the familiar argument from diversity to counter the demands of a national liberation movement, and continued, unconsciously echoing the Hapsburgs: ‘India is not a political name, but only a geographical expression.’ Indeed, the denial of nationality may be regarded as the hallmark of imperialism at a certain stage in relation to a subject people; and the time may yet come when a learned American thesis will be written, with abundant factual evidence, to prove the ‘vulgar error’ of ‘ British ’ nationality.1

Since I was reconsidering my whole position from first principles, this statement also deserved careful attention. Was Malaya, after all, a nation? Mr. Dutt and General Templer said that it was. If it was a nation, and we were merely attempting to suppress a national movement, then I would say that the sooner we got out

1 R. Palme Dutt, The Crisis of Britain and the British Empire (Lawrence & Wishart, 1953), p. lot. (Mr. Dutt, it is worthy of remark, avoids the trap of exampling the Indian Mutiny as a ‘national movement’.)

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of Malaya the better. General Templer and others of his school of thought would not, presumably, be impressed by this reasoning and would hang on as long as possible whether Malaya was a nation or not, since the General believed that ‘the fighting in Indo-China and the resistance there to Communist pressure were all part of the same problem’.1 For my part, I believed that the war in Indo-China was essentially a national movement and, as such, was bound to prevail in the end. It was possible, however, and, I think, realistic, to accept the Communist revolution in China, and even to approve it, and to be sympathetic to the rise of nationalism in Asia, and at the same time to feel that, owing to the special circumstances, Communism did not offer an acceptable solution in Malaya—and, while feeling like this, to vote Conservative at the elections in Britain (as I have known more than one well-informed person to do). But when these lines were written, I could see few signs of a similar national movement in Malaya.

Let me consider Mr. Dutt’s historical analogies. First of all that of the Italian Risorgimento.

It was no doubt in the interest of the Austrian Empire to dismiss Italy as a ‘geographical expression’, and while Italy remained politically divided there was some plausibility in the claim. But the fact was that Italy consisted of homogeneous elements with a common culture and a common language and had been increasingly conscious of its unity since the Renaissance. Nationalism (being, as Mr. Nehru has said, an ‘anti-movement’) was stimulated by the presence of a power in Italy which was universally regarded as ‘foreign’ and ‘un-Italian’. To compare Italy with Malaya is absurd. Whereas the people from Sicily to the Alps had a common language and culture, Malaya has several languages and cultures and only an embryonic sense of being ‘Malayan’. Italy had also a powerful memory of an ancient unity: Malaya has none. Malaya, moreover, had produced no Mazzini and no Garibaldi. There is, indeed, no point of similarity between the two countries.

In citing the case of India, however, Mr. Dutt has chosen a more plausible comparison. India, like Malaya, consists of a number of peoples of different race and language. India, on the other hand, had never been a political unity as Italy once had been (Asoka and the Moguls notwithstanding). The bulk of

1 The Times, 19 May, 1953.

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the Indians nevertheless possessed a common cultural inheritance and a common religion, namely Hinduism. India had, therefore, the makings of a modern nation. But when Sir John Strachey and Sir John Seeley spoke or wrote in the 1880s they were quite right in saying that there was no ‘Indian people and no Indian nation’. Remember, too, that they were speaking of what are now India and Pakistan together and not of what is now India alone. Taking the sub-continent as a whole, they are still right. If one accepts Mr. Dutt’s analogy, then one must visualize his ‘Malayan nation’ as the partition of Malaya, like India and Pakistan, into a Malay and a Chinese state. Indian nationalism came into being (again to quote Mr. Nehru) as an ‘anti-movement’ in opposition to government by a foreign race. Gandhi himself said that the ‘founder of Indian nationalism’ was the Parsee Dadabhai, who converted him to his views in 1892.1

It is possible to distinguish the phases of the process, none of which have so far been reproduced in Malaya. There is a Malay nationalism, a Chinese nationalism, and an Indian nationalism, all products of an opposition to foreign control, but so far nothing that deserves to be called ‘ Malayan nationalism ’.

But when I say that there was no Malayan nationalism I would not go so far as to say that such may not have germinated. It probably had. When the progressive elements in Malaya came together, as they were allowed to do before the Emergency controls were imposed, they showed a strong sense of having problems in common, of ‘being in the same boat’. In many essential respects, too, the communal elements showed a much better disposition to compromise on intercommunal questions than were evinced by their middle-class counterparts who have been occupying the stage without competition for nearly five years. But what I did say in 1948, and what I still said in 1953, was that so far Malayan nationalism has not become a political force, and Communism has failed to induce it to emerge. The Communist leaders were Chinese with Chinese names and not ‘Malayan’ names, as Mazzini and Garibaldi were Italians with Italian names.

What was as important—indeed more so—was that the Malayan communities were not represented among the guerillas in any way proportionate to their numbers. Mr. Dutt’s answer was that the Malay and Indian guerillas did approach the Chinese in numbers; and, in any case, it was reasonable to expect the Chinese

1 Romain Rolland, Mahatma Gandhi, Paris, 1948, p. 19.

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to be in a majority, as they were mostly workers, while the Malays were mostly peasants, and the workers had elsewhere provided the leaders of the Communist revolution.

Mr. Dutt says, ‘The official reports of British Intelligence officers brought back by Malcolm MacDonald in May, 1949, had to admit that 25 per cent of the guerillas were Malays’ (Sunday Times, 15 May, 1949). The report in the Sunday Times was that of their correspondent and it did not state that it was supported by Mr. MacDonald, and it has certainly never been stated by an official source that 25 per cent of the guerillas were Malays. Casualty lists, published by the Federal Government in Kuala Lumpur, and covering the period from the beginning of the Emergency, in June, 1948, to 31 January, 1952, show that, out of a total of 2,778 bandits killed in that time, 2,599 were Chinese and 102 Malays—a proportion of twenty-five Chinese to each Malay. The remaining 117 were Indian, Siamese, Indonesian and aborigine (the aborigines are the nomadic hill men of central Malaya). The official figures published in January, 1953, show 3,791 terrorists as having been killed since June, 1948, of whom 3,510 were Chinese. That is to say, that only 7.4 per cent were Malays and Indians, and, while these are not separated in the returns, we can assume that the proportion of twenty-five Chinese to each Malay still held.

According to the official White Paper, No. 24, of 1953, the total number of persons in detention camps on 1 June, 1952, was 7,480, of whom 750 were Malays. However, a large number of Chinese Communists and Communist sympathizers had been sent back to China, as the following figures from the same source show:

Repatriations from June 1948 to March 1953



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Taking this evidence together it is safe to say that the proportion of Malay to Chinese guerillas was only about one in twenty.

As regards Mr. Dutt’s subsidiary arguments, his actual words are, ‘ Since the working class is the vanguard and main fighting force of the national movement, equally against Japanese domination and against British domination, with the peasants in general acting as suppliers of food and other assistance, it is not surprising that the bulk of the guerillas should be Chinese.’ That there are Malay Communists there can be no doubt; but though the Malay are peasants, by far the greater part of the guerillas ’ supplies has come from the 500,000 squatters of their own race. In China, Mao Tse-tung had been able to rally the peasantry to the Communist banner; the Communists in Malaya had failed to any important degree to rally the Malay peasantry to their side. Again, if the war was a nationalist movement, would the Malays—police, soldiers, Home Guard, etc., have provided the great bulk of the opposition to the Communists? If it was a national movement, why should the great bulk of the people, Chinese and Indians, have remained indifferent, if not actively hostile, to the rising?

Quite apart from his invalid analogies, I feel that Mr. Dutt’s error lies in a doctrinaire ‘blanket’ application of Marxist doctrine in precisely the same way that his comrades in Malaya have erred. International Communist propaganda alleges that the rising was forced on the Malayan Communists by the action of the British. But surely the Communists would not have taken up the gage unless they had believed in their ability to win a military victory? There was nothing to stop them carrying on their underground activities as before without resorting to arms. In their new directive of 1 October, 1951, the Communists themselves admitted their error and ordered what was partially a reversion to the old underground warfare. Many things in MCP propaganda also confirm that they had mistaken the nature of Malayan society. They were unable to create any of the ‘ liberated areas’ provided for in their original plan, and the bulk of the working population remained at their places of employment and did not desert to the hills. Malayan industry continued almost normally, and, although the cost of the Emergency was, and is, great, the US dollars continued to flow into the sterling pool.

If it is held proven that the war in Malaya was not a national rising, the main plank on the Communist platform was destroyed. But it did not follow that everything else the Communists said

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was false or implausible. Indeed, much of their propaganda was also included in the nationalist and socialist propaganda of the independent countries of South-East Asia, e.g.:

British capital investments in Malaya have been estimated at about £100 million. . . . Dividends of 60 per cent and 65 per cent have been common, reaching even 100 per cent. . . . Workers’ wages in the rubber plantations in 1947-8, according to official figures, reached 86.4d. to 116.8d monthly, plus allowances in kind valued at 15s. a month. Whereas prices had risen five times since pre-war, wages had only doubled, thus representing a heavy fall in real wages on the low pre-war colonial rates. . . .*

Reports in the British financial press seemed to support at least part of this propaganda. One tin company declared a dividend of 222 per cent for 1952, having placed $1 1/2 million to reserve, another tin company declared a 100 per cent dividend, and certain rubber companies dividends of 60 and 50 per cent, apart from amounts placed to reserve.

As against this, a spokesman of the rubber industry to whom I referred this propaganda commented as follows. First of all, as regards the earnings of rubber companies, an examination of a cross-section of Malayan companies for the twenty years 1933-52 showed that the average gross dividend paid was 7 per cent, or, allowing for tax current at the time, the net return to stockholders would be 4 per cent. Another significant feature was that an examination of the current (1953) quotations for rubber shares showed that the vast majority stood at heavy discounts on the price at which they were issued despite the fact that all such companies had ploughed back quite substantial sums into the business. Consequently it would be impossible to raise the capital for the betterment or extension of the rubber-producing in Malaya. These facts (said the spokesman) pointed clearly to the

1 On field-workers’ wages, which exclude variable bonus and other payments, the Statistics Department of the Federation of Malaya drew up the following figures:
 Wages of Field Workers, Rubber Industry, Federation of Malaya (percentages).



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conclusion that despite the occasional and temporary profits due to particular causes, such as in 1951-2, the rubber-producing industry had in the long term been far from prosperous.

As regards the mining industry, the Malayan Chamber of Mines, to whom I referred the matter, replied to the following effect. Little useful purpose, said the Chamber, is served by picking on one particular year; the proper approach is to see what dividends have been paid continuously over a reasonably representative period. The dividends paid by the tin-mining companies in the year 1952 reflect the exceptionally high prices for the metal due to panic-buying by consumers owing to the war in Korea. As the issued capital upon which the rate of dividends is calculated is, in the case of the majority of tin mines owned by Malayan companies, vastly less than the actual capital employed in the business, the published rate of dividend is most misleading—the real dividend on capital employed in the business being a very much lower figure. Tin mining in Malaya, as elsewhere, is essentially a high-risk investment and individuals risking their money sometimes lose it altogether. A mine is a wasting asset with a limited and, in most cases, comparatively short life. Dividends paid to shareholders contain an appreciable element of return on capital, and every dividend paid (including the portion which is really a return on capital) is subject to extremely heavy taxation. The Japanese extracted a very large quantity of tin from Malayan properties (for which the owners received no compensation) and the life of a large number of properties was considerably reduced thereby and the return-of-capital element in dividends received by shareholders correspondingly increased. A very large number of tin-mining concerns in Malaya are marginal producers. Their owners, whether Chinese or companies, have received over the years a most inadequate return on capital. Today they are facing financial ruin. Good returns in times of exceptional demand and high tin prices are essential if the necessary capital is to be made available to Malaya for such a high-risk operation as mining.

On my visits to Burma, Indonesia and India in 1950, and to Burma and India in 1952 (though I did not hear it often in the Philippines, Malaya, Hong Kong, or Siam), the ‘socialist’ argument cited above was the stock-in-trade of the politician and the intellectual. I am not concerned here with the validity of the propaganda—merely with its existence—for it deals with matters

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of the first appeal to the socialist politician and his electorates in the newly independent countries. A politician in these countries who was not also a ‘socialist’ could not survive.

The grave weakness of Government propaganda in Malaya was that apart from (largely nominal) protection from intimidation (‘negative’, because this is the minimum that would be offered by any stable government) it had nothing to offer except the dubious gifts of General Templer’s reform programme. The one great strength of the British position was that Malaya was weak and divided in the absence of a genuine national movement and therefore needed Britain to defend it. It was apparent also that the democratic or capitalist West would not rapidly succumb to Communist conquest or revolution. In an isolated peninsula like Malaya, where superiority of naval and air forces counted for so much, Britain and the West could assure protection that would not be available from any other source. It was for this reason among others that none of the Malayan political parties except the Communists had any wish to cut the tie with Britain. On the contrary, the fear of a possible British withdrawal, leaving another power to fill the vacuum, was at the back of the minds of a large majority of the members of the communal and other parties. So long, therefore, as Britain felt that her imperial strategy, economics and communications made the retention of Malaya desirable, and so long as she could afford the cost in money and armament, so long would she be able to retain Malaya —provided, always, that it became a stable, self-governing dominion.

MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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An article in Ta Kung Pao, Shanghai, of 28 January, 1950, was taken as adumbrating the future policy of the Central People’s Government of China towards Overseas Chinese and the Governments of South-East Asia. It began by saying: ‘Now that the People’s Republic of China has been established and diplomatic relations have been opened between the Central People’s Government and a number of countries, the more than ten million Overseas Chinese shall and must not be subjected to further abuse.’ The article pointed out that it was clearly stipulated in Article 58 of the Communist Programme that the People’s Government ‘shall do its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad’. In pursuance of this principle the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged strong protests with the French and Thai authorities against the abuse of Chinese nationals. The same statement referred to the ‘persecution of Chinese nationals in Thailand, Indo-China, and Malaya’ and to ‘the imperialist plot for both direct and indirect attack against the Chinese people’. Peking Radio thereafter systematically attacked the South-East Asian Governments for their alleged ill-treatment of the Overseas Chinese, but in the case of Malaya it was noticeable that the terrorist campaign was ignored for some months, and when later it was mentioned it was as a national uprising against the imperialists and not as a virtually Chinese insurrection.1

It is interesting, though scarcely surprising, to note that Communist propaganda asserted that the Emergency was provoked by the British and that the ‘ people ’ were merely protecting themselves against aggression. It is admitted in some of their

1 I was engaged in controversy on this issue with Mr. Harry Pollitt, Secretary of the British Communist Party, in The Times in August, 1948. Mr. Pollitt contended that the war in Malaya was a national movement and I contended that it was not.

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literature that a series of strikes were timed for May, but an intention to start a shooting war is denied.1

It seemed on the face of it as if Malayan Communist Party policy was shaped in Malaya with freedom from direct external direction but following CCP models. There is ample evidence, however, of the central planning and direction of propaganda by a Central Bureau in close touch with the Central Executive Committee. From this group, directives and lines of treatment were disseminated to regional and branch agencies for use by them. The propaganda sections of the regional or branch organizations throughout the peninsula produced a continuous flow of leaflets, news-sheets, slogans, and booklets for the public. In addition there were political or propaganda officers at all levels of the bandit organizations, and each operational section had a propagandist attached. His responsibilities included lecturing, the holding of study groups and ‘quizzes’, the conduct of examinations on political theory, and the general indoctrination of party members which fell under the title of ‘ Political Education ’. These functions were frequently allied to the teaching of illiterate recruits, the establishment of ‘Reading Rooms’ and ‘ Information Centres’, and with general educational activities. The editorials in the underground newspaper Vanguard frequently formed the foundation of the propaganda issued in other forms.

In addition to the distribution of written material, bandit propaganda was disseminated by means of ‘whispering campaigns’, by agents who were deputed to educate the local population in Communist aims and principles, and by public addresses given in areas where circumstances permitted. In the earlier

1 G. L. Bondarevsky, Crisis of the Colonial System, National Liberation Struggle of the Peoples of East Asia, Reports presented in 1949 to the Pacific Institute of the Academy of Sciences, USSR (Bombay, People’s Publishing House, 1951), traces the beginning of the Malayan War to the decision of the Joint Council of Chiefs of Staff at Washington in 1948. It goes on to say that ‘After much careful preparation, the British Colonial Power thought that in June, 1948, a most appropriate moment had been reached for dealing a blow to the Communist Party of Malaya and to the progressive trade-unions. At a signal from London, all over the country raids began upon Communists accompanied by arrests and the murder of democratic leaders’. The book quotes Ian Morrison (of The Times) in Far Eastern Survey as saying, ‘An incontestable conviction is being developed that the Malayan Communists were compelled to launch military operations much earlier than they were prepared for them, i.e. it turns out (seems) as though they were drawn into the revolution.’
The evidence on the subject is summarized in Chapter VII (by Joseph Frankel) in Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-1951 (Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1953).

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cases it was usual to select a suitable anniversary and to utilize community singing or a play as a part of the proceedings. The Min Yuen (fifth column) and intelligence agents were responsible for the organization of such gatherings, and to them fell the task of disseminating leaflets and propaganda to the public, with the exception of propaganda related to specific operations when the killer squad, or Liu Tong Tai, scattered leaflets at the scene of the incident.

The anniversaries selected for celebration (and for the dissemination of propaganda) included the October Revolution or Red Army Day and the Paris Commune or May Day, on the World Communist level, and 1 September, 1943, when the Japanese at Batu Caves surrounded and killed a number of the leaders of the MPAJA, on the Malayan level.

Early manifestoes issued at the outbreak of hostilities in 1948 were signed on behalf of a variety of organizations—the Malayan Communist Party, the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army, the Malayan Communist Party’s People’s Liberation Army, the National Liberation Alliance, and the Malayan National Emancipation Army. By the end of 1949, however, the title National Liberation Army (no doubt chosen to accord with the Communist Army’s title in China) was generally adopted and material was issued in its name, but the greater part of the propaganda to members of the party continued to originate from the Central Bureau of the Central Executive Committee.

The foundations of the MCP’s creed were solidly laid in international Communism and Marxism-Leninism, though Maoist ‘deviation’ could be detected. After the outbreak of the insurrection in 1948 the international aspect of Communism was stressed even though the immediate enemy was Britain. The action in Malaya was represented as part of a world-liberation movement. The objective in Malaya was the liberation of the people and the establishment of a ‘Democratic People’s Republic’. This could be achieved only through the annihilation of the ‘British imperialist’.

When the Communist Revolution in China succeeded and the People’s Republic was established, the Malayan Communists were naturally jubilant and many of them undoubtedly expected substantial material aid from that quarter. Broadcasts over Peking Radio by a deported Chinese member of the Malayan Communist Party which were reproduced in the Malayan press

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encouraged the view that the New China would exert considerable influence on the situation in Malaya, even if it did not promise practical assistance. But the Political Bureau of the MCP very soon issued a warning to party members against over optimism and over-reliance on help from China. This folly (said the Bureau) had been encouraged by ‘Overseas Chinese intellectuals’, but the correct solution was neither to return to China nor to rely on help from China to carry the revolution through. ‘The way out is along one path only: the overthrow of British imperialism.’ Any other action would interfere with the local revolution.

But in order that the MCP aims should not appear merely destructive or vague regarding the future, their propagandists in 1949 produced a plan for the People’s Democratic Republic. This plan included franchise for all persons over eighteen who were to have the right to vote in a People’s State ‘controlled by the united revolutions of all races ’, complete equality of status for all workers who would be the ‘armies of state-controlled industries ’, a comprehensive scheme of national and social insurance, and the free education of all children and adults. Land, with security of tenure, was to be granted to the landless and assistance given to the farmers in the form of loans from Land Banks and the supply by the State of seed, implements, and fertilisers. (It is interesting to compare these promises with some actual assistance given by the Federal Government in the shape of seed, pedigree pigs, etc., in this competition for the ‘hearts of the people’.)

The establishment of the Malayan Chinese Association in February, 1949, was regarded by the Communists with especial hostility, since its success would inevitably weaken the hold of the MCP on the squatter population. A tirade of abuse against the ‘running dog’ leaders of the Association was soon begun. The officials of the Association were mentioned by name and accused of all manner of crimes against the people during the Japanese occupation and afterwards. The new organization (the propaganda said) would never be able to protect the farmers (i.e. squatters), and its funds would be squandered by the leaders. The MCA was ‘ nothing but a big iron chain and a mouse trap’ and would attempt to massacre the people and cripple their resistance. The bomb incident at Ipoh in which Mr. Tan Cheng-lock was wounded and other attacks upon members of the MCA and officials were given widespread publicity in the

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underground newspapers as part of the campaign against the Association.

Most of the Communist propaganda was directed to the workers. In the early days of the Emergency it was apparently expected that in response to the flood of manifestoes and appeals the workers would leave their employment on estates and mines and withdraw to what were expected to become ‘liberated areas’. But such areas never eventualized except in theory. The Pan-Malayan Federation of Trades Unions (a Communist body which had disappeared at the time of the Emergency) was represented as operating underground, and appeals were issued in its name.

During 1949 propaganda directed at the student class was intensified since, with the disappearance of the KMT and the setting up of the Communist Government in China, the students offered a promising field for exploitation. Youth generally was also appealed to. The World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Youth Day Celebrations in Budapest, and the relation of Democratic Youth to youth movements in other countries were prominently publicized. Appeals to nationalism and to Chinese patriotic sentiment were made, and it was claimed that the KMT abuses in China had been abolished. Students were encouraged to record the habits and characteristics of their teachers and to assist in formulating grievances to provide focal points for agitation.

When National Registration was introduced the Communists did their best to make it ineffectual. They instigated the murder of photographers and others concerned with its organization. When this registration was successfully completed, they alleged that the National Registration cards were ‘dead cards’. Later on they raided new villages and destroyed these cards (this was one of the activities forbidden by the Directive of 1 October, 1951, see pp. 69 ff.)

The strength of the Communists lay in their appeal to the Overseas Chinese—especially the China-born; they were handicapped in addressing the Malays. The Communist organization among the Malays was poor, except in Pahang, where local factors unconnected with Communism (e.g. traditional feuds) had enabled the Communists to enlist some support. A small outpost of propaganda literature in Tamil was directed towards the Tamil rubber estate workers.

A basic thesis of Communist propaganda was that the armed revolt of 1948 onwards was a spontaneous movement on the part

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of the people of Malaya. The MCP as the party of the ‘powerful labouring class ’ was represented as having worked and sacrificed itself on behalf of the people of Malaya for twenty-five years and having actively waged war against the Japanese for three and a half years. The period from September, 1946, to June, 1948, was termed the Peace Period United Front and was condemned as having been based on ‘incorrect policy’ (though by the Directive of 1 October, 1951, that policy was, in part, readopted). It seems that it was decided early in 1948 that it was impossible to defeat the Government without a strongly equipped army and that conflict was to be preferred to ‘ revolution by constitutional means’. Thus the Central Committee said, ‘Under these circumstances we Communists have not only eliminated past errors but at the same time are determined to carry out a new policy and definitely to choose a new direction for our struggle.’ The British were the immediate target, and persons not assisting the British would not be harmed.

Since the enemies were the British imperialists and their ‘running-dogs’, the Communists (said their propaganda) would respect the freedom of all political views and religious faith and would not interfere with the activities of the KMT of China unless their propaganda assisted the British imperialists. (With the success of the Communists in China, references to the KMT disappeared and the KMT itself ceased to function actively towards the end of 1949.)

Considering the largely illiterate and semi-literate condition of the bulk of the persons to whom Communist propaganda was directed, it was somewhat surprising that such pains should have been taken to disseminate and explain the basic ideological theory. But Lenin’s saying that ‘without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement’ was accepted by the intellectuals of the party as dogma. Lenin had also said, ‘The attempt of practical workers to brush aside theory runs counter to the whole spirit of Leninism and is fraught with serious danger to the cause.’ This resulted in an attempt to interpret the basic theory of Marxism-Leninism to workers who were not in a position to understand its terms. Nevertheless the Communists persevered in their endeavour.

It has been found that some of our comrades have become confused and possess only a vague understanding of these

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principles and in consequence lean towards ‘liberal’ and capitalistic ideas. These are signs that they cannot fulfil their duty and are opposed to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore it is essential to make renewed efforts to fulfil the Marxist-Leninist principles. Comrade Stalin has said, ‘ Organization is the only weapon for the proletariat during the struggle for political rights.’ Our party is established on the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. The systematic organization is based on the individual obeying the organization, the minority obeying the majority. Lower ranks must obey the higher, and the whole party must obey the principles of the Central Committee. This is the highest form of the organization of the proletariat.

The ‘British enemy’ was unveiled in uncompromising terms. An early manifesto said:

The war waged by the British imperialists today is a war suppressing the colonial people. It is a retrogressive, reactionary, criminal war. Their object is to destroy the revolutionary strength of the people and suppress the resistance of the people in order to stabilize their colonial domination over Malaya, thus providing themselves with an opportunity to exploit Malayan resources and manpower indefinitely. ... It is a national, revolutionary, progressive, and sacred war to oppose them. If in this war the British were to triumph, Malaya would in the future be everlastingly the colony of the British imperialists. We, the Malayan people, would remain hungry slaves leaving all we earned at the disposal of the British imperialists and allowing them to make use of Malayan resources and manpower to save their homeland in its economic crisis. Hence this life-and-death struggle of the Malayan people.

Membership of the People’s Liberation Army did not in itself qualify a person to be a member of the MCP. To become a party member called for a long period of apprenticeship and training in which the candidate underwent tests of endurance and was purged of the remnants of all bourgeois ideas.

Developments in Government policy are reflected in Communist counter-proposals. Thus the Federation and Singapore were to be replaced by a Malayan People’s Democratic Republic

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uniting the two regions and in which citizenship would be synonymous with nationality. The national constitution (said MCP propaganda) was to be determined democratically by Malayan citizens who would enjoy equal rights and would have the right to vote and be elected on attaining the age of eighteen. There was to be complete freedom of association, assembly, speech, publication, correspondence, religious creed, strikes, demonstration, etc. The administrative body would be the Central People’s Council, the formation of which would be in accordance with the principle of racial equality with safeguards for the backward sections of the community. The National Constitution of the Malayan People’s Republic would neither be a Soviet republic of proletarian despotism nor a republic of bourgeois dictatorship; it would be a combined autocracy of the various revolutionary classes.

In the new dispensation, when the revolution had finally succeeded, all British capital was to be confiscated. Farmers would then own their own land and the peasants would be given sufficient land to support them. The economy of the agricultural co-operative society would be developed systematically and methodically. The People’s Republic would establish National Enterprises, but at the same time privately financed trade and industry and agricultural industry carried on by capitalism would be protected. The National Enterprises would be financed by the State under the management of deputies of the People’s Government, Labour Unions, and of workers in all the Departments. These National Enterprises were not intended as a blow against private enterprise or to eliminate private capital. On the contrary, under the principle of public and private mutual regard, and in accordance with the national economic division of labour, private enterprises (especially small enterprises) would secure protection, support, and development. Within the national economy private capital and economy were an indispensable part; the latter was not in opposition to the former but the two were complementary.

Land policy included the improvement of drainage and irrigation, improved methods of agricultural production, close attention to the co-operative movement, and mechanisation. ‘The ownership of land by peasants in Malaya is the only correct land policy for the liberation of the peasants and the improvement of their standard of living.’ Only on the foundation of this policy could Malaya’s economy be developed and industry and commerce prosper.

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Not a single one of the social and economic matters which had for years figured in the annual reports of the Government failed to receive attention in the voluminous propaganda of the MCP. There was to be a new fiscal policy in which ‘ extortionate taxes ’ were to be replaced by ‘reasonable and light taxes’. Malayan industry was to be protected from foreign exploitation, the difficulties of peasants, food hawkers (a perennial ‘problem’ in Malaya owing to their unhygienic practices) and small businessmen were particularly to be borne in mind. The latter were to be exempted from paying taxes in the early stages of the Republic. Among the provisions for raising the standard of living, minimum wages, scales of increment, the elimination of the colour bar, and sex equality were listed. The contract system (the bane of the old labour system and the most fruitful sources of disputes) together with apprenticeship was to be abolished. Rural banks were to be established which would grant loans to the peasants at low interest, and the State would supply agricultural implements and tools, manure, and seeds at low prices and guarantee rights of free purchase and sale of agricultural produce. Social welfare and education also received detailed attention. Free elementary education was to be provided in the several languages; colonial culture and education must be eradicated. A National Defence Army was to be created.

All this propaganda (of which the above summary accounts for only a tithe) belongs to the earlier part of the Emergency, though subsequent items have been published in the press. The news-sheets included those in Chinese, with names such as Humanity News, Vanguard, Lenin News, Worker-Peasant News, etc., and in Malay Seruan Raayat (Call of the People) and Suara Pembrontak (Voice of the Revolutionary). There does not appear to have been any regular Tamil bandit newspaper but only occasional manifestos and pamphlets in that language.

Comparisons with Communist China

Communist propaganda and strategy were interlocked. Such documents as Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War (Ma-lai-ya ko-ming chan-cheng ti chan-luch wen-ti), published first by the Assault Press in 1948 and reissued in November, 1950, were not much different from Mao Tse-tung’s own Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War, first written in 1936. The MCP’s revised views were set out in Supplementary Views of the

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Central Political Bureau of the MCP on 'Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War' (Chung-yang cheng-chih-chu tui Ma-lai-ya ko-ming chan-cheng chan-liieh wen-ti pu-ch’ung kuan-chien), first issued by the Assault Press on 12 November, 1949, and reissued on 15 December, 1950.1

A study of the documents issued by the Chinese Communist Party reveals a number of sources of MCP policy and propaganda (which was actually Maoist rather than Marxist-Leninist) and also a number of points of contrast, since MCP policy was not Maoist by definition but orthodox Marxist-Leninist.

At the Seventh CCP Congress, held in Yenan between 23 April and 11 June, 1945, a main item on the agenda was Mao Tse-tung’s report On Coalition Government,2 Negotiations between the CCP and the Nationalist Government at Chungking concerning a solution of the Communist problem by ‘political means ’ and eventually by the incorporation of the CCP in a coalition regime had been proceeding since 1944. Mao’s report of April, 1945, summed up the theoretical basis on which the CCP approached the coming post-war problem of its relationship to the recognized National Government of the KMT. The theme of Mao’s report, one of the key documents of the CCP history, was that since China was still ‘ in the stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution’ it needed ‘a new democratic government of a coalition nature, embracing all parties and non-partisan representatives’. This announcement of the MCP’s willingness to share political power with other parties and groups had a great effect on the various political elements in KMT China which were opposed to KMT tutelage and had become increasingly conscious of its undesirable effects. After the defeat of the KMT in 1949 and the fact that nearly all effective power now lay in the hands of the CCP, the ‘people's democratic dictatorship’ could still be interpreted as a coalition made up of an alliance of four classes—workers, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and national capitalist under the leadership of the working classes, while the Central People's Government set up at Peking was also in form controlled by a coalition of CCP and other parties or groups. ‘ Coalition ’ had been a potent and persuasive slogan.

1 Translations of these documents are contained in Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Strategy and Tactics of Communism in Malaya, shortly to be published by the Institute of Pacific Relations. This latter work throws a great deal of new light on the history and policy of the MCP.
2 Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (London, Allen and Unwin, 1952), pp. 285-7.

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Another salient feature of the report, Coalition Government, was the great importance attached to the peasantry. Thus Mao says, ‘The CCP, which has a resolute agrarian policy, fights for the interests of the peasants, and looks upon them as their allies, naturally becomes the leader of the peasants.’ Such statements (say Conrad Brandt and his co-authors) try to reconcile the orthodox Marxist role of the CCP as the leader of the proletariat with the practical necessity of leading the Chinese peasantry. The central feature of the agrarian policy advocated by Mao, that ‘the tiller of the land should own the land’, is a phrase borrowed or inherited from Sun Yat-sen, and in 1950 still remained in essence the immediate goal of the CCP land programme.

Other basic points outlined in Coalition Government were to call for a ‘ new democratic economy which is managed partly by the State, partly by private capital, and partly by co-operation’, and the statement that ‘ all religions are allowed to exist in Communist areas’. How long the admittedly transitional period represented by these policies would last before being supplanted by the next, socialist, stage has not been specifically stated. But Mao Tse-tung in his report on The Present Situation and our Tasks made to the Central Committee on 25 December, 1947, stated that ‘the capitalist economy, which is an integral part of the national economy, must be allowed to exist for a long time, even after the revolutionary victory on a national scale is achieved’. The length of this ‘ long time ’ still remained a question for the future in 1953.

The above description reveals the main features of MCP policy which the Federation Government was called upon to counter by action and by propaganda of its own. The change in Communist strategy and the dying down of the shooting war made no difference to the real nature of its task; they merely increased its urgency.1

1 Some examples of the Communist books in my possession are not only evidence of the crude jungle conditions under which they were printed but also of the resourcefulness of the MCP.

MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS