1
October, 1951-
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Five
days after the issue of the new Malayan Communist ‘Politburo’ directive (set
out at length at the end of Chapter 05), the High Commissioner, Sir Henry
Gurney, was murdered on the road from Kuala Kubu to Fraser’s Hill. He was
travelling in an ordinary car—not an armoured vehicle. Mr. M. V. del Tufo,
Chief Secretary of the Federation, was on leave in the United Kingdom at the
time, but he immediately returned by air to Malaya to assume duty as Officer
Administering the Government.
The immediate effect of the murder was to reduce
the morale of the people of Malaya to its lowest ebb, but very soon a reaction
set in with a stiffening of determination to rid Malaya once and for all of the
authors of this new and greatest outrage. Indeed, the consequences of the
murder were in the long run so detrimental to the Communists that many have
doubted whether Sir Henry Gurney was specially selected for assassination. It
had not been the policy to assassinate officials of high rank, though
opportunities must have occurred for this in the past. But the official
opinion, based no doubt on secret information, seems to be that the murder was
deliberate (it would not have been inconsistent with the new Communist
directive which exempted officials from the new ‘amnesty’).
There had been a change in government in Britain
shortly after Sir Henry Gurney’s murder, but the statement of the new Colonial
Secretary, Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, in the House of Commons on 13 November, 1951,
in answer to a question, did not reveal any change in broad policy. Asked by
Mr. James Griffiths (ex-Colonial Secretary) to amplify his two fundamental
points of self-government within the British Commonwealth and the pursuance of
economic and social development, to make it clear that ‘ in all multi-racial
communities it must include participation
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of
all the people in these territories, irrespective of race, creed, or colour’.
Mr. Lyttelton replied, ‘ I think that in general terms I can accept what the
right honourable gentleman says.’ Later the same month Mr. Lyttelton visited
Malaya. On his arrival in Singapore on 29 November he declared that ‘ the
restoration of law and order in Malaya had first priority and that political
reforms must come after’. This statement provoked some unfavourable comment,
but Mr. Lyttelton afterwards explained that this should not be taken to mean
the complete suspension of political progress while the Emergency continued.
However, except by the English language press, it cannot be said that this
statement was accepted as altogether reassuring, and many felt that he had by
this original statement fairly revealed his attitude of mind.1
Mr. Lyttelton then went to Johore Bahru for
discussion with Mr. Malcolm Macdonald and the Governors of Singapore, North
Borneo, Sarawak, and others. From Johore he flew to Kuala Lumpur, where he had
long talks with the Rulers and with Asian and European leaders. In talks with
Dato Onn he reaffirmed that the British policy in Malaya was to work towards
self-government and the establishment of a united Malaya. Dato Onn told Mr.
Lyttelton that if the British Government remembered that the constitutional relationship
was a partnership and not a direct imperial responsibility unity of purpose
could be guaranteed and the logical goal would be dominion status; his party
was not unduly impatient in its demands for independence and wanted to avoid
the fate of countries that had attained their aspirations too early.
Mr. Lyttelton then visited Hong Kong, and on his
return to Singapore made a broadcast on 11 December, outlining his programme
for putting down terrorism. This plan was to be put before the Cabinet on his return
to London. His six points were: (i) all-over direction of military and civil
forces; (ii) reorganization and training of the police; (iii) an education
1 Utusan Melayu (Malay
language daily) on 5 December, 1951, contended that there was no strong ground
for Mr. Lyttelton’s statement that progress towards self-government for Malaya
should come after the Emergency was over. It said that the majority of the
people wanted an independent Malaya and they believed that only by the
establishment of their own government would their interests receive preference.
A week later the same paper said that the visit of Mr. Lyttelton to the
Federation had not impressed anyone. It had served only the interests of the
tin magnates and proved that he (Mr. Lyttelton) had not come with an open mind.
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programme,
including compulsory primary education as a means of winning the war of ideas;
(iv) much more protection for squatter areas; (v) a Home Guard of large numbers
of Chinese; and (vi) a review of the Civil Service and its terms of service,
with recruitment of the best men available in Britain and Malaya.
In January, 1952, General Sir Gerald Templer was
appointed High Commissioner for the Federation. He was sworn in in Kuala Lumpur
on 7 February and then made known the following Directive, given to him by the
Secretary of State for the Colonies:
General
Templet’s Directive
The
policy of H.M. Government in the United Kingdom is that Malaya should in due
course become a fully self-governing nation. H.M. Government confidently hope
that that nation will be within the British Commonwealth. In assisting the
peoples of Malaya to achieve this object, you will at all times be guided by
the declaration of policy expressed in the preamble of the Federation of Malaya
Agreement and by the statement of the special responsibilities of the High
Commissioner contained in Section ig of that Agreement.
To
achieve a united Malayan nation there must be a common form of citizenship for
all who regard the Federation or any part of it as their real home and the
object of their loyalty. It will be your duty to guide the peoples of Malaya
towards the attainment of these objectives and to promote such political
progress of the country as will, without prejudicing the campaign against the
terrorists, further our democratic aims in Malaya.
The
ideal of a united Malayan nation does not involve the sacrifice to any
community of its traditional culture and customs but before it can be fully realised
the Malays must be encouraged and assisted to play a full part in the economic
life of the country, so that the present uneven economic balance may be
redressed. It will be your duty to foster this process to the best of your
ability.
H.M.
Government believe that the British have a mission to fulfil in the achievement
of these objects, and that, even after self-government has been attained, the
British in Malaya will have a worthy and continuing part to play in the life of
the country.
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Communist
terrorism is retarding the political advancement and economic development of
the country and the welfare of its peoples. Your primary task in Malaya must,
therefore, be the restoration of law and order, so that this barrier to
progress may be removed. Without victory and the state of law and order which
it can alone bring there can be no freedom from fear, which is the first human
liberty.
In
furtherance of your task, not only will you fulfil the normal function of High
Commissioner, but you will assume complete operational command over all armed
forces assigned to operations in the Federation and will be empowered to issue
operational orders to their commanders without reference to the Commanders-in-Chief,
Far East. You should establish the closest consultation between yourself and
the Commanders-in-Chief, Far East, in matters of common concern.
You may
assure the Malayan peoples of all communities that they can count on the
powerful and continuing assistance of H.M. Government not only in the immediate
task of defeating the terrorists but in the longer-term objective of forging a
united Malayan nation. H.M. Government will not lay aside their
responsibilities in Malaya until they are satisfied that Communist terrorism
has been defeated and that the partnership of all communities, which alone can
lead to true and stable self-government, has been firmly established.
At the same time that General Templer was
appointed as High Commissioner, Mr. D. C. MacGillivray, Colonial Secretary,
Jamaica, was appointed as his Deputy. He had had no previous service in Malaya
or in the Far East. The official statement said that while Mr. Lyttelton had
considered all factors affecting the appointment and particularly the wish of
the responsible leaders of Malaya that an officer of local experience should be
appointed, and while understanding their wish, he considered that the Deputy
must be a man who would bring a fresh mind to bear on the many complexities of
the present administrative machine. Dato Onn’s party, IMP, had in particular
asked that an Asian should be appointed to the post. There was considerable
criticism of the appointment from community leaders and the press (led by the
British-owned Straits Times). One result of Mr. MacGillivray’s appointment was
that Mr. M. V. del Tufo, the Chief Secretary, an officer with nearly thirty
years’ experience
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of
Malaya and with a knowledge of several of its languages, felt that there was
now no room for him and obtained permission to retire. It was an established
tradition in Malaya to import a ‘ fresh mind ’ as Governor, but it had always
been ensured that his Deputy was a man of long experience of Malaya, but a
departure from this was now made with two fresh minds occupying the principal
posts.
Another new appointment was that of Colonel
Young, seconded for a year from the Metropolitan Police to undertake to
reorganize the police force after the resignation of Mr. Gray, the Commissioner
of Police, who had come from the Palestine Police Force.1
The impact of General Templer upon Malaya was
immediately felt. Only five days after his assumption of duties the Times Kuala
Lumpur correspondent reported that he had approached his task with a military
determination and speed which had heartened the people of Malaya and compared
him with the late Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny. On 2 March it was announced
that the War Council would be merged with the Federal Executive Council. In
future Members of the Government would refer matters to the Deputy High
Commissioner, thus freeing General Templer for operations against the bandits.
In the military aspect, at least, the dynamic
personality and vigour of the new High Commissioner seemed to produce
spectacular results in a very short time. In June Lord Alexander told the House
of Lords that General Templer’s rigorous direction of affairs in Malaya was
already beginning to have its effect, though he (Lord Alexander) could not promise
any early ending of the conflict. The planting and mining industries
wholeheartedly approved the High Commissioner’s methods and results.
The successes under the Templer regime received
vastly greater publicity than under preceding regimes, and bandit eliminations
that would not have ‘made the news’ in Sir Henry Gurney’s time were now often
headlined. One of the more conservative organs of the British press seemed to
find General Templer’s personality and methods especially congenial, though
1 The subsequent resignation or retirement of other officials with long
experience which followed upon ability to see eye to eye with the new
High Commissioner even more fully established the new principle that a
knowledge of the peoples, languages, and customs of Malaya rendered an officer
unsuitable for the higher posts, while being an Asian ruled him out entirely.
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two
leading national dailies treated his policy with notable reserve.1
A
Policy of Reprisals
Quite early in the Emergency there had been
incidents in which troops and police had retaliated on the local population for
violence offered them whose precise source they could not trace. The Straits
Times said that public opinion was undeniably worried about the burning of
squatters’ huts and the destruction of their crops, ‘unavoidable though it
might be’. The paper thought that there was a real danger of turning purely
passive or forced co-operation with the terrorists into a bitter resentment against
the Government. The Chinese press of this period showed great concern at the
drastic action being taken, and gave the fullest publicity to the burning by
the police of Kachau village, near Kuala Lumpur. The paper Kin Kwok, of Ipoh, published a leader headed ‘Don’t drive them to
the hills!’ Another incident was at Batang Kali, when twenty-four Chinese were
shot dead in December, 1948, by the military forces when they attempted to
escape from custody. The towns of Pulai and Tras were also heavily fined.
General Templer, however, from the beginning
deliberately, used reprisals as a weapon of warfare and greatly stiffened the
penalties imposed. He had been in Malaya only two months when Communist
guerillas ambushed and killed a British patrol of twelve men near Tanjong
Malim. The General soon afterwards arrived at the town with his armoured cars,
‘ glared at the town elders over his spectacles’, and said, ‘It doesn’t amuse
me to punish innocent people, but many among you are not innocent. You have
information you are too cowardly to give. Have some guts and shoulder the
responsibility of citizenship.’ There was no response. The High Commissioner
then imposed a twenty-two-hour curfew and reduced the rice ration of the town.
Work stopped, and the villagers had only two hours a day in which to
1 In the six months preceding
September 1952, 843 Communists had been eliminated, including 648 killed. In
the whole of 1949 only 628 were killed. The 1950 figure (whole year) was 239,
and the 1951 figure, 1,035. momentum (it was officially stated) was likely to
increase. A sign of improved morale was the reopening of the night mail service
between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore after a lapse of 20 months.
Surrenders in September, 1953 were 35—10 fewer
than the record of 45 in August but 5 more than the monthly average so far that
year. The average, therefore, was rather less than one a day.
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buy
food. Questionnaires in Chinese, Malay and Tamil were issued and afterwards
collected in sealed boxes, which General Templer himself opened. Some of the
replies contained only insults, but a few days later twenty-eight people in
Tanjong Malim and a village nearby were arrested. After thirteen days the
curfew was lifted, the rice ration restored, and the people of Tanjong Malim
went back to work. (How many of the twenty-eight were Communist collaborators
and how many the victims of a unique opportunity to pay off old scores by
placing false information in the boxes no one knows. No one ever will!)
In London General Templer’s action provoked a
storm in a teacup. The Observer
described it as ‘lamentable’, and the Manchester
Guardian as ‘odious’. In the House of Lords Lord Stansgate likened it to
the activities of the Black and Tans, and remarked, ‘It is not a bad idea to
introduce an element of morality when you are trying to govern a country ’; and
Lord Listowel said that ‘collective punishment will turn many people, including
the Chinese . . . into Communist sympathisers’. But the Colonial Secretary
defended the High Commissioner’s action and it was approved by the British
press in general, and Tanjong Malim became only the first of a series of
reprisals continuing into 1953. They included those at Sungei Pelek and Pekan
Jabi, but that at Permatang Tinggi was of a somewhat special nature and
attracted more public attention than the others.
A Chinese resettlement officer was murdered in a
coffee shop at a small hamlet named Permatang Tinggi on the main road between
Butterworth and Parit Buntar in August, 1952. Soon after the discovery of the
murder General Templer arrived with his escort of eight armoured cars, and,
collecting the inhabitants together, he addressed them in soldierlike terms and
warned them that if information as to the murderer were not forthcoming within
four days he would send the whole village into detention. No information was
given, and at the expiry of the ultimatum sixty-two men, women, and children
were removed to a detention camp in Perak. The village was afterwards levelled
to the ground.1 Some of the inhabitants were repatriated to China
1 On my visit to the site of
Permatang Tinggi a few days afterwards I made careful enquiry of the Chinese in
the neighbourhood which I supplemented in Penang, and was assured by everyone
that the murder was an ‘inside job’. Though I have no means of proving this, I
was satisfied at the time that this was the true explanation. If so, no amount
of threat of punishment could have persuaded the villagers to convict
themselves of murder.
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and
some months afterwards others were released on promising to be good citizens in
future.
The English and Malay press approved the
punishment of Permatang Tinggi, but the Chinese press was not happy about it.
The cautious Nanyang (29 August,
1952) remarked that collective punishment was ‘not the way to win the hearts of
the people’; and Nanyang (same day)
said that collective punishment ‘did more harm than good’.
In spite of the obvious failure of collective
punishment to achieve its purpose, it was not for another fifteen months that
General Templer was persuaded to abandon it, and in his speech to the Federal
Legislative Council on 25 November, 1953, he made a virtue of a necessity and
announced the revocation of Emergency Regulation 17DA, under which collective
punishment had been administered. But he still maintained the ‘operational
rice-ration’ which was not, he said, a ‘punishment’ at all.
General Templer visited England in June 1952,
and again in December, when he gave press conferences. On returning to
Singapore on 18 December, he described the Emergency news as a ‘tremendous
welcome home present’. Mr. Oliver Lyttelton referred to him as an ‘absolute
ace’, and in course of a reply to the speech of Her Majesty, Lord Mancroft,
speaking in the House of Lords, declared, ‘ One hesitates to prophesy anything
about Malaya in case facts immediately prove him wrong, but it looks as if at
the end of these four long and weary years we can now see our way out of that
jungle of bloodshed and terror. If my prophecy is true, then the reason for it
can be explained, I think, in one word, and that word is “Templer”! ’ But
satisfaction of a more sober and practical kind was expressed by the Malayan Bulletin of 25 November, which
stated, ‘Recent reports indicate that the Federation Government anticipate a
possible early end to the campaign of active terrorism, and there are plans for a reduction of 10,000 in the police force next
year.’
But this new elation was tempered by
reservations. The Times correspondent in October warned against undue optimism
over the recent setback suffered by the terrorists and said that the withdrawal
might be temporary or otherwise; strategically the initiative still rested with
them, as they could always withdraw to the jungle to re-train and plan new
campaigns. The same correspondent pointed out that the reduction in violence
was obviously in consequence of the Communist Party’s directive of
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October,
1951. The number of incidents had dropped, and at least nine-tenths of them
occurred in only three States; the remaining six and the Settlement of Penang
were quiet, while, presumably, the Communists were busy carrying out their
policy of establishing a national united front of all communities and classes
against a ‘colonial regime’.1 That the core of the bandits had
indeed withdrawn into the inner jungle was clear by January, when Mr. Rawle
Knox of the Observer reported that
the vital problem of finding the enemy was daily growing more difficult as he
withdrew deeper and deeper into the jungle. Security Forces were therefore
having to work much harder to get results. In the Batu Pahat-Yong Peng area,
which had long been the worst district in the worst State in Malaya, the number
of incidents had diminished to a mere trickle, but the Fijians, who had arrived
to replace with one battalion rather less than a company of Gurkhas and had
killed ten terrorists, owed not one of
their successes to advance intelligence. It was this, combined with a
startling decline in incidents, that was the significant feature of the new
phase in the Malayan war. Information on terrorist movements had always come
very largely from those whom the enemy contacted in order to get food. With
rigid food control these contacts were largely drying up.2
On 26 March, 1953, in the Federal Legislative
Council, the High Commissioner again surveyed the situation to date.3 As
a measure of the change of emphasis which had taken place on conditions he did
not (he said) intend to say very much about the
1 Observer, 4 January, 1953. The
Times, 16 January, 1953.
2 In January, 1953, it was
announced that since the beginning of the Emergency in June 1948, 3,791
Communist terrorists had been killed, of whom 3,510 were Chinese. Altogether
7,640 casualties were inflicted on the Communists (more than the estimated
present strength) including 1,949 wounded, 991 captured, and 909 surrendered.
In the same period there were 3,588 casualties among the Security Forces,
including troops, regular police, jungle companies, special and auxiliary
constables, and home guards. The number of civilians killed was 2,180 and
missing 623. More terrorists were killed in 1952 than in any previous year but
the casualties suffered by the Security Forces and civilians were almost
halved.
The chastening reflection, however, was that in
spite of heavy casualties there were still Malayan Chinese ready to fill the
gaps in the terrorist ranks. It was impossible to tell how large the Malayan
Races Liberation Army would have been if they had sufficient weapons to arm all
volunteers (assuming, that is, that 5-6,000 was not the optimum strength for a
guerilla force in Malaya).
3 High Commissioner's Speech,
meeting of the Sixth Session, Legislative Council, Federation of Malaya, 18
March, 1953.
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Emergency.
It was a disease that was still with
them, and still potentially virulent, and might be taking on a more
insidious turn in that the present tendency of Communism in Malaya was to seep
underground. However, they had antidotes that were becoming increasingly
effective. Yet he had to admit the growth of a feeling of complacency. The shooting
war was not over yet, and they should remember that there were probably about
the same number of Communist terrorists in the jungle as there were one or two
years ago and they were still in a position to stage incidents in which
everything was in their favour and of their choosing.
The general position had improved so greatly (so
it seemed) that the High Commissioner felt able to repeal Emergency Regulations
No. 17D (mass detention) and to abolish the huge rewards for terrorist leaders
killed or captured, substituting a more moderate scale. The number of
terrorists killed continued to increase and that of the Security Forces and
civilians killed to fall.
But General Templer continued to insist on the
danger of complacency. ‘I’ll shoot the bastard who says that this emergency is
over,’ he told Mr. Homer Bigart of the New
York Herald-Tribune.1 ‘There are probably as many Communist
terrorists in the jungle as there were two years ago.’
There was a setback in April, when twelve
members of the Security Forces lost their lives compared with five in March,
one in February, and four in January. The Times correspondent commented from
Kuala Lumpur in decidedly chastening terms:
These
figures are not necessarily significant, although they break the rising curve
of statistical success. They do, however, reflect a certain resilience on the
part of the enemy that has modified official hopes. It would now seem to be
generally accepted that the Emergency will continue, perhaps indefinitely, at
the present pressure, amounting not to a threat to authority but at least
imposing a heavy financial burden and maintaining a constant danger that may
increase should the situation in South-East Asia deteriorate.
1
15
April, 1953.
But when Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief
of the Imperial General Staff, visiting Singapore on his way to Australia (The
Times, 14th October) stated that ‘thanks to General Templer’s inspired
leadership the battle against the terrorists was nearly won’, General Templer
apparently regarded this as a privileged occasion for he did not, apparently,
carry out his threat.
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General Templer was again in England for the
Coronation, and at a press conference in London he summed up the situation to
date.1 He said that a new volunteer force was to be raised in Malaya
from Communist terrorists who surrendered otherwise than in the field of
battle. Training had already begun for this force for which 18o volunteers had
been enlisted. The Emergency (said the General) was becoming more and more an
underground campaign and less of a ‘shooting war’. So far as the ‘shooting war’
was concerned, the security forces had ‘got the Communists down’. But they were
not finished yet, and retained a dangerous potential. The real core of the
Communist terrorist organization had been ‘shaken a bit by kills and internal
disruption, but it was not giving up’. This hard core, with a semi-regular
armed force, was withdrawing into deep jungle. The rest of the so-called
Liberation Army was split up into small groups of between thirteen and fifteen,
called ‘armed work forces’. Although these too had an offensive role, their
task was presumably to provide protection for the party members who were in
contact with the civil population for supplies and subversion. Consequently
there was a real danger of subversion and infiltration of apparently harmless
bodies like trade unions, political associations, and youth movements.2
It will be seen that General Templer’s alternate
optimism and caution almost cancel out. Yet his appreciation of the situation
was sometimes less than candid. The Straits
Times, a little over two months before, had said in an editorial:
. . .
The steady stream of optimistic reviews of the week’s or the month's operations
would be more reassuring if at the same time there were a realistic
appreciation of the effect of the Communist directive which ordered that
terrorism should be discreet. The
somewhat unwise publicity given that directive has been dropped. [My
italics—V.P.]
What,
however, has been the result of the Communist change of tactics? Has there been
more infiltration of the towns? Is there a ‘phoney’ phase in which the
Communists are rebuilding their organization? . . . The decline in terrorist
incidents is very largely the result of Communist policy . . . while attention
has been drawn in official releases to the
1 The Times, 4 May, 1953. 1 The Times, 19 May.
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number
of Communist district and branch committee members who have been disposed of,
the real leadership has not been touched. . . .1
Colonel
Young, on his return to England, also gave a press conference, at which, in
answer to an insistent representative of the Daily Worker, he said that Communist losses were not now being
replaced.2
It was not to be expected that General Templer
would willingly provide propaganda for the enemy, but if he had said that his
predecessors had succeeded in subjecting the Communists to such pressure that
they had virtually called off the shooting war four months before his arrival
in Malaya and that his own success was mainly the natural consequence of
Communist change of policy he would have earned the approval of history as
being a man of exceptional honesty as well as of bravery, even though he might
legitimately, for effect, have exaggerated what he had been able to do to beat
the guerillas.
The expectation raised by the offensive spirit
of General Templer that in the foreseeable future the Communist guerillas would
suffer a complete military defeat and be compelled to surrender en masse was altogether disposed of by
the General’s statement in June to a visiting journalist that he could improve
the existing situation by 15 per cent, or perhaps 20 per cent, but that while
the Communists survived as an organized force no security system could
guarantee internal peace. The war, therefore, would continue sporadically. The
Communists still had at their disposal 6,000 men (a figure in excess of most
previous official estimates).3
The most disquieting feature of the situation
was that there was recrudescence of ‘incidents’ in areas that had been
considered clear of terrorists. On 26 June a European planter, Mr. C. A. Gray,
was murdered in an area where terrorists had been unknown for the past year.4
There was, indeed, scarcely a State or Settlement from which violence or
intimidation were not reported. General Templer continued to punish villages by
fines,
1 Straits Times, 9 February,
1953.
2 Manchester Guardian, 2 May, 1953.
3 The Times, 24 June.
4 But ‘A Resident’ of the district (Mentelab, Pahang)
wrote to the Straits Times (2 July) to say that, in spite of the official
statement, ‘The district had never been free of terrorists since the Emergency
began’.
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curfews,
etc., and these punishments extended even to more than one of the new villages
whose inhabitants had been placed behind barbed-wire to protect them from the
terrorists.
Meanwhile the cost of the Emergency did not
decrease as had been hoped—indeed the opposite was the case. Whereas the cost
had been estimated at $144 million out of a total budget of $686 million for
1953,1 the Financial Secretary, Mr. E. Himsworth, on 12 August,
1953, said that it would now probably amount to $270 million—a figure nearly
double that of the original estimate! This was against the background of a
severe trade recession (the word ‘slump’ is officially eschewed) which by
mid-year had assumed the proportions of a financial crisis. The Deputy High
Commissioner, Sir Donald MacGillivray, flew to England for consultations with
the Government. He estimated the joint cost of the Emergency to Britain and
Malaya at £500,000 a week. In August Mr. Himsworth said that the cost of the
Emergency since the beginning had been $700 million to the Federation alone.
The Federation faced a deficit of $208 million (in place of the $97 million
budgeted for) and this would therefore mean a reduced surplus from past
balances of $274 million. Financial help from Britain was needed if Malaya was
to avoid bankruptcy.2
Food supply remained the key to the situation.
In addition to the rigid control of the transport of every mouthful of food (so
far as this was practicable), the Security Forces stepped up their air
surveillance over the interior, and wherever jungle gardens were found they
were sprayed with destructive chemicals or destroyed by patrols. Lately the
Communists had taken to growing their crops under trees which made detection
more difficult, so that the RAF resorted to infra-red photography—an expensive
technique that could not be used without second thoughts. Yet in spite of all
this, the High Commissioner in October, 1953, had ordered a house-to-house
search of Kuala Lumpur, involving 300,000 persons, in an attempt to prevent the
flow of food to the jungle and to stop the terrorists using the town as a rest
station.
Nor was the situation mitigated by the prospect
of a reduction in the British forces in Malaya in spite of a scheme for the
1 Speech of General Templer in
the Federal Legislative Council, 19 November, 1952.
But see the comment from The Economist quoted on p. 30 n.
2 The Times, 13 August, 1953.
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creation
of a Federal Army of 12,500 men by 1962 (which involved a new gift from Britain
of £7 million).1 Nine new battalions were to be added to the Malay
Regiment. There was, in spite of an area of two hundred square miles in coastal
Malacca having been declared ‘white’ and free from terrorists, in October,
1953, little prospect of the early ending of a war that had been in progress
for over five years.2
What the war was actually costing was very
difficult to determine, since a large proportion of the cost was hidden, Mr. Palme
Dutt (op. cit., p. 109) says. ‘The real cost has been unofficially estimated at
over £ 100 million a year. ’ But he does not say how this figure was arrived
at. Large money contributions were received by the Federation from Singapore
and Britain. According to The Times Singapore correspondent, one battalion
alone cost a million pounds a year to maintain. General Templer in his Budget
speech on 25 November, 1953, said that in 1953 the Emergency would cost the
Federation M$250 million and in 1954 it was likely to cost M$204 million.
‘This,’ he said, ‘is the major cause of our financial difficulties.’
Postscript. In
March, 1954, the military situation seemed basically unchanged. In January
there had been twenty-nine major ‘incidents’, a total well over the average for
1953. It was reported that the MCP headquarters had been moved to Sumatra and
also that arms for the Indonesian insurgents were being ferried over the
Straits of Malacca in fishing-boats. In February there were only 15 surrenders,
while major ‘incidents’ numbered 25.
1 According to The British
Survey of June, 1952, the forces employed in Malaya were as follows—regulars,
40,000, regular police, 20,000, extra police, 4,000, special constables, 37,000
(total 61,000 extra police including 53,000 Malays, 3,000 Chinese, and 3,100
Indians). This was in addition to the Home Guard (of about 250,000). The
Communist army was said to comprise twelve regiments with a total strength of
5,000-6,000 (the numbers had increased since 1951). In The Times (2 October, 1953) the Singapore correspondent of that
paper stated that there were nearly three divisions of troops in Malaya,
including local battalions. ‘ In some areas there is an armed man to police
every two of his fellows, and more than sixty-five for every known terrorist.
Their scope has been increased by helicopters and parachute formations and they
can call upon two air forces and the Royal Navy for support. ’
One reason for not decreasing the number of
British troops was that they accounted for the majority of the terrorists
killed (the Gurkhas easily leading).
2 The situation was accurately
described in two articles in The Times
by their Singapore correspondent on 1 and 2 October, 1953, as a ‘stalemate’.
MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
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