CHAPTER 09 - INTER-COMMUNAL RELATIONS | MALAYA : Communist or Free?



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This chapter augments and expands the preceding one and provides background information regarding the relationships of the communities during the Emergency. It also gives examples of the special preoccupations of the communities vis-d-vis the Government and external affairs.

In 1949 the Communities Liaison Committee was formed at the instigation of the Commissioner-General, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald. The main races of Malaya were represented on it, and the Commissioner-General attended as an observer. In a statement of agreed views issued on 18 September it was recommended as a first step towards self-government there should be an early introduction of the election of the members of the legislatures, but that elections should first be held in those municipalities, States, and Settlements that were ready for them. It recommended that the franchise should be based on Federal citizenship, that the teaching of Malay and English should be compulsory in all Government schools, and that the citizenship provisions of the Federal constitution should be reviewed. It added that all races were now more liberal and that working together in the Federal Council they had discovered how closely linked in reality they were to each other.

A gesture which marked the feeling of the period was the decisions of the MCA to follow the lead of UMNO, which had opened its doors to non-Malays, in admitting non-Chinese as members. A contributor to The Eastern World (January 1950) said that the Emergency had brought together all those who had a stake in the future of the country and that barriers of race and creed were breaking down. The writer then went on to speak of the ‘ardent desire for unity’ and gave his belief that if election of members was introduced to the Legislative Council as soon as circumstances permitted, ‘ there will emerge a united, free, and democratic Malaya to join the newly independent nations of South-East Asia

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The article fairly reflected the widespread optimism of the period, but three years afterwards it was clear that the writer had been altogether too sanguine. The Communities Liaison Committee, after a period of promise and useful performance, had languished. The reason for this lay primarily in the contradiction between the principle of equality and good will in which it had been inaugurated by Mr. MacDonald and the actual policy of King’s House (where the executive power lay) to cultivate the Sultans, Mentris Besar, and the Malay troops and police on whom the High Commissioner largely relied in his battle with the terrorists. This situation the vested interests in Malay who wanted to retain the status quo indefinitely were not slow in exploiting. When any chance spark ignited the tinder kept dry by the heated atmosphere of the Emergency, they carefully fanned the flame.

One such spark fell in July, 1952. The MCA had, through the sweepstakes it had been conducting with Government approval, raised large sums for relief and welfare work in the new villages, and it was now decided to offer through UMNO the sum of $500,000 for similar work among the Malays. Indignation was worked up in certain sections of the Malay press on the ground that the Malays refused to be bought by the Chinese at so many cents a head and the offer was rejected. It was then withdrawn (but, as will be seen, was later renewed in a changed atmosphere). But the most was made of it in interested quarters to promote discord between the two communities.

In October the Manchester Guardian correspondent in Malaya reported that tension between the Malays and the Chinese was now greater than it had been for two years. He said that it was a matter for conjecture whether General Templer’s efforts to train 500,000 Home Guards and arm them with 170,000 shot-guns would help or worsen the problem. Dato Onn, alarmed, it seems, by the success of the UMNO-MCA alliance in the Kuala Lumpur elections, declared that all talk about racial harmony was a sham.

The truth of this was challenged by Mr. Tan Siew-sin, son of Sir Cheng-lock Tan and chairman of MCA, in a letter to the Manchester Guardian.1 He stated that in asserting growing tension between the Malays and the Chinese the newspaper’s Malayan correspondent could not be further from the truth. He quoted from Tungku [Tunku] Abdul Rahman’s statement that UMNO was more

1 29 October, 1952.

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solidly behind its president than ever and that one of its main objectives this year was to strengthen Sino-Malay harmony. He disputed the claim that IMP was a non-communal body. ‘ It is non-communal in everything but in fact. The total membership cannot possibly be more than 2,000, of which the majority are Indians.’ He thought that the talk of communal tension sprang largely from the hostility of ‘ miniscule parties ’ such as the Singapore Progressive Party (which opposed the intervention of MCA into Singapore politics as a move likely to perpetuate communalism) and IMP. Mr. Tan Siew-sin mentioned that the offer of the $500,000 had been renewed and that details were now being discussed with UMNO regarding its application.

In late 1952 it was undeniable that IMP had withered, Dato Onn having failed to obtain widespread Malay support for his party, and his new bid to recommend his party to the Malays by limiting membership of IMP to Federal Citizens came rather late in the day. Yet in spite of the MCA alliance (at that time purely local and limited to Selangor), UMNO itself was in no flourishing condition. The Sultans and Mentris Besar were naturally lukewarm towards it since it promised to reduce their powers, though several of them found it convenient to pay lip-service to it and even to preside at its meetings or assemblies. Its membership was said to have dropped to less than 3,000 in its stronghold, Perak. (Many subscriptions, I was told, remained unpaid.) Its leadership seemed to be vacillating. Most importantly, perhaps, it was a middle-class party and did not therefore receive the support of the mass of Malays. From what one heard and saw one would have imagined that its fortunes were at their lowest ebb. Yet it was on the eve of ‘staging a come-back’ in Malayan politics owing to the MCA-UMNO alliance which was in the process of being extended on a nation-wide basis.1

The Malays in 1952 were in a state of frustration and disquiet. They were bearing the brunt of the Emergency from a military point of view and were supplying the majority of the Security Forces. The mobilization of such a high proportion of their manpower was undoubtedly having a bad effect on their agricultural production. RIDA (the Rural and Industrial Development

1I have in the preceding chapter described the activities of the MCA-UMNO alliance which were to be stepped up so greatly during 1953, and therefore do not repeat what I said there. My concern here is to ascertain as far as possible the state of Malay feeling at this period.

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Authority—incidentally, the responsibility of Dato Onn as Member for Home Affairs), from which so much was hoped for the betterment of the rural areas and for the benefit of the Malays in particular, was not coming into operation at any speed. The boom following on rearmament and the Korea War had been of relatively little benefit to the Malays while they saw members of other races around them making fortunes. They seemed to be making no headway economically or politically. It was scarcely surprising that they were highly suspicious of any new move— most of all of any attempt to amend the constitution which could be only in the direction of curtailing their privileges.

Some idea of the state of Malay opinion at this period can be obtained from the vernacular press. The Malay press at this time agitated for the independence of Malaya more frequently and consistently than did either the Chinese or Indian press. Warta Negara (Penang, 2 April, 1952), for example, commended UMNO’s resolution that the British Government should fix an early date for the independence of Malaya and should in the meantime appoint an interim government. (Utusan Melayu, Singapore, and the Indian paper Majlis, Kuala Lumpur, also supported the UMNO demand. It is interesting to note, however, that the Indian paper Tamil Murasu opposed UMNO on the ground that premature independence would be a mistake.)

The Malay press was very disappointed that the post of Deputy High Commissioner was given to a European and not to a Malay. Utusan Melayu (9 June, 1952) complained that since General Templer’s arrival in Malaya more and more Europeans were being brought in to fill old and new appointments in the country.

At all times Malay press opinion was sensitive to the external political associations of the Malayan Chinese. Warta Negara (17 November, 1952) complained of the attitude of certain Chinese towards Malaya and said that this was causing a headache to those who were trying to create unity among the races of Malaya. The paper referred to the statement made by a Chinese leader in Kuala Lumpur during the celebration of the ‘Double Tenth’, that the real Chinese could be loyal both to China and to Malaya, and also drew attention to the complaint of a Chinese leader at Ipoh who said that it was very unfair to deny citizenship rights to Chinese who retained their loyalty to China. (The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce had petitioned the Singapore Government for a status that would give them full

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citizenship rights in Malaya while remaining citizens of China, but the request had been refused.)

In late 1952 Dato Onn, in a public statement, supported the opinion of the Manchester Guardian correspondent that interracial tension had greatly increased in Malaya. The Singapore Free Press (11 November, 1952) questioned the wisdom of raising spectres that were best left alone in the evil past, but the (Kuala Lumpur) Malay Mail of the same day gave its opinion that Dato Onn had never been an alarmist and that his position in the country justified full heed being paid to his statement. It seemed that whether one believed in increased inter-racial tension or increased harmony between Malays and Chinese was now becoming a matter of political creed. Dato Onn took the position that the Chinese Chambers of Commerce were now running the MCA in the interest of turning Malaya into ‘the Nineteenth Province of China’, whilst the MCA-UMNO alliance held that relations between Malays and Chinese had never been better. The change from the suspicious and non-co-operative attitude on the part of UMNO in the autumn of 1952 to the later close co-operation with MCA could be traced, to a great extent, to the personal influence of Colonel H. S. Lee, who had been absent from Malaya when the friction took place over the $500,000 offer but who had now returned to Malaya with the intention of welding the two parties into a strong political alliance. The Singapore Standard expressed the view that all current talk about communalism had arisen from tension between IMP and the UMNO-MCA alliance. It said that communalism persisted not because the people were naturally inclined towards communal politics but because the political leaders and parties channelled the political ambitions of the people along communal lines. The Chinese press adopted the MCA-UMNO line that communal relations were improving—which, indeed, was the case.

It must not be forgotten, however, that ill feeling was not by any means confined to Malay-Chinese relations but was even more frequently directed towards the protecting power. A determination to abolish hated ‘ colonialism ’ was heard in practically every statement of UMNO; and while in 1953 the Sultans were vieing with one another in showing their loyalty to the British Crown, more than one Malay newspaper spoke of Malays who refused to celebrate the Coronation.1

1 See pp. 237-8 regarding the reports on the Coronation by Abdul Aziz ben Ishak.

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Special Worries of the Chinese

The question which provoked the greatest emotional reaction among the Chinese of Malaya in 1952 was undoubtedly that of education (discussed in Chapter 13). Federal Citizenship aroused no corresponding feeling, and the Chinese leaders seemed ready in an unenthusiastic way to accept the concessions made in the new legislation—at least for the time being. Immigration, however, they regarded as a more immediate problem, and the new Immigration Bill passed in 1952 brought forth a chorus of protest. Then in early 1953 fresh legislation was introduced which roused the Chinese business community to as great an indignation as that of the schoolteachers a few months before. These matters I will now refer to in greater detail under their separate headings.

Immigration Control Bill

The Select Committee on Immigration appointed in 1950 did not present its report until 24 November, 1951, and when it did so it was in the form of a Majority and a Minority Report. The Minority Report (representing the Chinese point of view) was that it was unfair to the Chinese. The signatories objected to the requirement that the following classes of persons should have to obtain a permit or pass to enter the Federation from any place outside Malaya:

(a)    any person who had been born in a Malay State and was ordinarily resident in Malaya; and
(b)    any person who had been resident in the Federation for fifteen years out of the twenty years immediately preceding his re-entry into the Federation and was of good character. (The expression ‘ordinarily resident in Malaya’ meant lawfully resident for a period of not less than seven years out of a period of ten years immediately preceding.)

This discrimination would (said the Minority Report) mainly affect the Chinese. The excuse given by the Majority Report (said Sir Cheng-lock Tan in his comments) that these two classes of persons could apply for Federal Citizenship if they so desired and thus avoid being classed as ‘prohibited immigrants’ did

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not hold water when it was remembered that there were few facilities for acquiring an adequate knowledge of the Malay or English languages, a necessary requirement for an applicant for Federal Citizenship. The point at issue was not whether aliens should be allowed to enter the country, but whether those born and bred in the country and who but for the extraordinary citizenship laws would be natural-born citizens should be treated as aliens.

The Bill was passed on 21 November, 1952.

The Registration and Licensing of Businesses Bill

This legislation was intended to raise 50 per cent of the money required for the Education Development Fund in connection with the new National Schools scheme by taxes on businesses. It was opposed by the Chinese members of the Federal Legislative Council on the ground that money required for education should come out of the general revenues.

The operation of the Bill, they said, would be a burden to the middle-class businessman but would deal a deadly blow against the small businessman. In the case of a business with a capital of $100,000, it would be called upon to pay only a $300 licensing fee; if a man had $500 shares in the company he would pay only $1.50, whereas in the case of a business run by partners with a capital of $500, each of them would be called upon to pay $100 as a licensing fee. The small businessmen were therefore victims of discrimination. It was not only wrong in principle to impose taxation for a special purpose in this way, but, what was more important, paddy planters, small farmers, small estate owners, and many others interested in rural industries would also come in for their share of taxation which would mean that the prices of essential commodities such as rice, vegetables, etc.—the staple food of the people—would shoot up to new heights.

In consequence of the opposition a Select Committee was appointed to examine the Bill and to report to the Legislative Council. The committee recommended that to prevent hardship the Bill should not be made to apply to the small businessman who had no place of business, or to the craftsman who sold his services and who had no place of business, or fishermen, small agriculturalists and others who were self-employed and in a very small way of business. The Bill still did not meet with the approval of the

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Chinese members, and an amendment to the schedule was moved by Colonel H. S. Lee so that the $100 payable by every associate in the business in urban areas should be on a descending scale, with $100 for the first associate, $50 for the second associate, $40 for the third, and so on down to $10 for the sixth and every additional associate. The amendment, however, was lost by 17 ayes to 44 noes, 7 abstaining, on 8 January, 1953.

At the Annual Conference of the Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Malaya held at Kuala Lumpur on 25 January a resolution was unanimously passed protesting against the Bill, and it was further resolved that, subject to the concurrence of the various constituent chambers, to declare a hartal as a protest. The chairman, however, reminded the meeting that the 1947 hartal had caused an estimated loss of £4 million. Subsequently a question was asked in the House of Commons regarding the Ordinance by Mr. Hamilton Kerr, M.P. but elicited no reply from the Colonial Secretary beyond the statement that the matter was being considered by the High Commissioner.

Indian Opinion

If little has been said in these pages regarding the Indians it is not because they are unimportant as a community but because Malay-Chinese relations are more fundamental in Malayan politics. The Indians, because of their experience of the working of democratic institutions in their own country, had availed themselves of the franchise to a much greater extent than other communities in the Singapore elections, both those for the Legislative and the Municipal Councils. They also greatly outnumbered the other races in the trade-unions, and were the mainstay of the IMP, which received its principal, if not its only, press support from the Indian newspapers.

As was to be expected, the Indian press took a line in international affairs similar to that taken by the Indian Government. Tamil Murasu (21 December, 1952), for example, condemned the reported decision of the NATO (sic) to take part in the war in Indo-China, since the latter was, it said, a struggle between a spontaneous national movement and French colonialism. It also praised Mr. Krishna Menon’s statements on Korea. The Indian press kept an eye constantly open on the march of events in Africa, supporting the point of view of the Indian minorities there.

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In Malayan domestic politics the Indian press was critical of the MCA-UMNO alliance and in this respect identified itself with the view of the Federation of Indian Organizations and of Dato Onn, that these parties, powerful at the moment, were merely perpetuating communalism in the interests of the ambitions of their leaders. But later it cooled towards Dato Onn and the Mentris Besar when they sought to postpone Federal elections.

A typical Indian view of the position of the Indian community in Malaya was the following (Tamil Murasu, 14 January, 1953):

Whatever the political position of the Chinese may be, their influence in the economic field closely rivals that of the British who rule the country. In contrast with the Chinese, the Indians of Malaya are considered to be of no consequence in any field. Although the Indians consider themselves experienced in politics and capable of leading other communities, there is not a single Indian in the Federal Cabinet. In the economic field the Indians are looked down upon as coolies, and Indian chettiars (money-lenders) are criticized, although they lend money at a fair and legal rate of interest. Local English newspapers are ever ready to put the Indians in their place. If the Indians go to India, they are ‘dodgers’ (of National Service); if they immigrate they are accused of being an economic burden on the country. Such is the predicament of the Indians of Malaya who by the sweat of their brow have made the country prosperous.

The announcement by the Federation Government that the Indian worker should no longer be considered an immigrant to this country but an integral part of the Malayan community was hailed as a ‘Charter of Rights for the Indian labourer’. (By the constitution of India an Indian did not lose his Indian nationality by becoming a Federal Citizen.) Also, in recognition of their services, the Federal Government had decided to allot land near the estates they worked on to Indian labourers to cultivate. Hitherto Indian labourers had mostly been housed in coolie lines, but this was regarded as an opportunity for Indians, too, to build their kampongs like the Malays or their new villages like the Chinese. But this proved to be but temporary and illusory comfort, and in October, 1953, all five Indian members of the

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Federal Legislative Council resigned their seats ‘as a matter of honour’ in protest against the non-inclusion of an Indian as a ‘member’ in the Federal Government.

In the prevailing situation it was natural that the Indians also should fall back on communalism, and their intensified concern for their own language and culture was evidenced by the insistence of the Indian press that the person in charge of the direction of the Tamil section of Radio Malaya should himself be proficient in Tamil and in Indian music.

The Influence of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald

In 1946 Mr. Malcolm MacDonald was appointed Governor-General of the territories comprising the Malayan Union, Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo, and when the appointment of Special Commissioner for South-East Asia (held by Lord Killearn) came to an end and Mr. MacDonald took over many of the duties of the post and became Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia, communicating with the Colonial Office on colonial affairs and with the Foreign Office on diplomatic matters. He had no administrative functions whatever and effected co-ordination between the several governments purely by advice. It was a very special and delicate position in which Mr. MacDonald was called upon to be a sort of universal solvent disposing of difficulties by his personal magic. He seemed to be in a perpetual state of locomotion, flying to Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, and Thailand as well as to Hong Kong and the British Bornean territories and, of course, to the Federation of Malaya, pouring oil on troubled waters as from some inexhaustible container. He was by temperament admirably suited for his appointment, being a prince of good mixers as well as a sword-dancer and a talented acrobat. He had, above all, the gift of identifying himself so closely with the views of those he talked to that everyone left him with the conviction that the Commissioner-General’s opinions were the only right ones and, by a coincidence, the same as their own.

There were, of course, shortcomings attaching to this gift. He could not in the nature of things share everyone’s opinion, especially if they happened to conflict, and since his function was to dispense optimism and to boost morale in South-East Asia he sometimes took a more rosy-coloured view of the situation

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than proved justified in the event (he was, for example, for years alternately prophesying a speedy French victory in Indo-China and urging caution in taking an optimistic view). At the same time, he was undeniably popular with a wide circle of people of all races. He owed this in some small measure, no doubt, to the fact that his socialist principles were understood to run counter to vested interest and he had therefore something of the character of a people’s champion even while representing a Conservative Government. If any suggestion was made that he should be replaced or his post dispensed with (and he had a number of enemies in Britain), there was bound to be a flood of letters to the press from Malays, Chinese, Indians and Eurasians demanding that he should stay where he was. The peoples of Malaya and of South-East Asia sensed his complete freedom from colour prejudice, and when he sponsored democratic moves in the direction of independence (without, of course, taking sides) he always secured a respectful hearing. Coming from him, well-worn counters such as ‘democracy’ and ‘independence’ or ‘the hearts of the people’, sounded entirely sincere and not just ‘uplift’ or unctuous humbug.

Whereas General Templer had contented himself with so much philosophy of history as was contained in his Directive, Mr. MacDonald had often speculated as to the nature of the revolution now taking place in Asia. In a pamphlet entitled Healing Thoughts, issued by him in 1953, he said that the Asian revolution was frequently represented as anti-Western. It was not fundamentally so. It was a positive, not a negative, movement: not anti-Western but pro-Asian. What was really being overthrown in Asia was the economic, social and political system called feudalism (which was what the Communists also said).

Lord Acton remarks somewhere that in history the man with the sword is always followed by the man with the sponge, and this seems in a striking way to describe the respective roles of the High Commissioner and the Commissioner-General. The fact, however, was that in 1954 the Commissioner-General’s sponge had become saturated and could hold no more. It was quite plain, too, to everyone that it was General Templer who had the ear of the Home Government and not Mr. MacDonald. The latter’s ability to influence events or policy in Malaya had therefore become practically nil.

MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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