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This chapter augments and expands the preceding
one and provides background information regarding the relationships of the
communities during the Emergency. It also gives examples of the special
preoccupations of the communities vis-d-vis
the Government and external affairs.
In 1949 the Communities Liaison Committee was
formed at the instigation of the Commissioner-General, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald.
The main races of Malaya were represented on it, and the Commissioner-General
attended as an observer. In a statement of agreed views issued on 18 September
it was recommended as a first step towards self-government there should be an
early introduction of the election of the members of the legislatures, but that
elections should first be held in those municipalities, States, and Settlements
that were ready for them. It recommended that the franchise should be based on
Federal citizenship, that the teaching of Malay and English should be
compulsory in all Government schools, and that the citizenship provisions of
the Federal constitution should be reviewed. It added that all races were now
more liberal and that working together in the Federal Council they had
discovered how closely linked in reality they were to each other.
A gesture which marked the feeling of the period
was the decisions of the MCA to follow the lead of UMNO, which had opened its
doors to non-Malays, in admitting non-Chinese as members. A contributor to The Eastern World (January 1950) said
that the Emergency had brought together all those who had a stake in the future
of the country and that barriers of race and creed were breaking down. The
writer then went on to speak of the ‘ardent desire for unity’ and gave his
belief that if election of members was introduced to the Legislative Council as
soon as circumstances permitted, ‘ there will emerge a united, free, and
democratic Malaya to join the newly independent nations of South-East Asia
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The article fairly reflected the widespread
optimism of the period, but three years afterwards it was clear that the writer
had been altogether too sanguine. The Communities Liaison Committee, after a
period of promise and useful performance, had languished. The reason for this
lay primarily in the contradiction between the principle of equality and good
will in which it had been inaugurated by Mr. MacDonald and the actual policy of
King’s House (where the executive power lay) to cultivate the Sultans, Mentris
Besar, and the Malay troops and police on whom the High Commissioner largely
relied in his battle with the terrorists. This situation the vested interests
in Malay who wanted to retain the status
quo indefinitely were not slow in exploiting. When any chance spark ignited
the tinder kept dry by the heated atmosphere of the Emergency, they carefully
fanned the flame.
One such spark fell in July, 1952. The MCA had,
through the sweepstakes it had been conducting with Government approval, raised
large sums for relief and welfare work in the new villages, and it was now
decided to offer through UMNO the sum of $500,000 for similar work among the
Malays. Indignation was worked up in certain sections of the Malay press on the
ground that the Malays refused to be bought by the Chinese at so many cents a
head and the offer was rejected. It was then withdrawn (but, as will be seen,
was later renewed in a changed atmosphere). But the most was made of it in
interested quarters to promote discord between the two communities.
In October the Manchester Guardian correspondent in Malaya reported that tension
between the Malays and the Chinese was now greater than it had been for two
years. He said that it was a matter for conjecture whether General Templer’s
efforts to train 500,000 Home Guards and arm them with 170,000 shot-guns would
help or worsen the problem. Dato Onn, alarmed, it seems, by the success of the
UMNO-MCA alliance in the Kuala Lumpur elections, declared that all talk about
racial harmony was a sham.
The truth of this was challenged by Mr. Tan
Siew-sin, son of Sir Cheng-lock Tan and chairman of MCA, in a letter to the Manchester Guardian.1 He
stated that in asserting growing tension between the Malays and the Chinese the
newspaper’s Malayan correspondent could not be further from the truth. He
quoted from Tungku [Tunku] Abdul Rahman’s statement that UMNO was more
1 29 October, 1952.
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solidly
behind its president than ever and that one of its main objectives this year
was to strengthen Sino-Malay harmony. He disputed the claim that IMP was a
non-communal body. ‘ It is non-communal in everything but in fact. The total
membership cannot possibly be more than 2,000, of which the majority are
Indians.’ He thought that the talk of communal tension sprang largely from the
hostility of ‘ miniscule parties ’ such as the Singapore Progressive Party
(which opposed the intervention of MCA into Singapore politics as a move likely
to perpetuate communalism) and IMP. Mr. Tan Siew-sin mentioned that the offer
of the $500,000 had been renewed and that details were now being discussed with
UMNO regarding its application.
In late 1952 it was undeniable that IMP had
withered, Dato Onn having failed to obtain widespread Malay support for his
party, and his new bid to recommend his party to the Malays by limiting
membership of IMP to Federal Citizens came rather late in the day. Yet in spite
of the MCA alliance (at that time purely local and limited to Selangor), UMNO
itself was in no flourishing condition. The Sultans and Mentris Besar were
naturally lukewarm towards it since it promised to reduce their powers, though
several of them found it convenient to pay lip-service to it and even to
preside at its meetings or assemblies. Its membership was said to have dropped
to less than 3,000 in its stronghold, Perak. (Many subscriptions, I was told,
remained unpaid.) Its leadership seemed to be vacillating. Most importantly,
perhaps, it was a middle-class party and did not therefore receive the support
of the mass of Malays. From what one heard and saw one would have imagined that
its fortunes were at their lowest ebb. Yet it was on the eve of ‘staging a
come-back’ in Malayan politics owing to the MCA-UMNO alliance which was in the
process of being extended on a nation-wide basis.1
The Malays in 1952 were in a state of
frustration and disquiet. They were bearing the brunt of the Emergency from a
military point of view and were supplying the majority of the Security Forces.
The mobilization of such a high proportion of their manpower was undoubtedly
having a bad effect on their agricultural production. RIDA (the Rural and
Industrial Development
1I have in the preceding chapter
described the activities of the MCA-UMNO alliance which were to be stepped up
so greatly during 1953, and therefore do not repeat what I said there. My
concern here is to ascertain as far as possible the state of Malay feeling at
this period.
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Authority—incidentally,
the responsibility of Dato Onn as Member for Home Affairs), from which so much
was hoped for the betterment of the rural areas and for the benefit of the
Malays in particular, was not coming into operation at any speed. The boom
following on rearmament and the Korea War had been of relatively little benefit
to the Malays while they saw members of other races around them making
fortunes. They seemed to be making no headway economically or politically. It
was scarcely surprising that they were highly suspicious of any new move— most
of all of any attempt to amend the constitution which could be only in the
direction of curtailing their privileges.
Some idea of the state of Malay opinion at this
period can be obtained from the vernacular press. The Malay press at this time
agitated for the independence of Malaya more frequently and consistently than
did either the Chinese or Indian press. Warta
Negara (Penang, 2 April, 1952), for example, commended UMNO’s resolution
that the British Government should fix an early date for the independence of
Malaya and should in the meantime appoint an interim government. (Utusan Melayu, Singapore, and the Indian
paper Majlis, Kuala Lumpur, also
supported the UMNO demand. It is interesting to note, however, that the Indian
paper Tamil Murasu opposed UMNO on
the ground that premature independence would be a mistake.)
The Malay press was very disappointed that the
post of Deputy High Commissioner was given to a European and not to a Malay. Utusan Melayu (9 June, 1952) complained
that since General Templer’s arrival in Malaya more and more Europeans were
being brought in to fill old and new appointments in the country.
At all times Malay press opinion was sensitive
to the external political associations of the Malayan Chinese. Warta Negara (17 November, 1952)
complained of the attitude of certain Chinese towards Malaya and said that this
was causing a headache to those who were trying to create unity among the races
of Malaya. The paper referred to the statement made by a Chinese leader in
Kuala Lumpur during the celebration of the ‘Double Tenth’, that the real
Chinese could be loyal both to China and to Malaya, and also drew attention to
the complaint of a Chinese leader at Ipoh who said that it was very unfair to
deny citizenship rights to Chinese who retained their loyalty to China. (The
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce had petitioned the Singapore Government
for a status that would give them full
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citizenship
rights in Malaya while remaining citizens of China, but the request had been
refused.)
In late 1952 Dato Onn, in a public statement,
supported the opinion of the Manchester
Guardian correspondent that interracial tension had greatly increased in
Malaya. The Singapore Free Press (11
November, 1952) questioned the wisdom of raising spectres that were best left
alone in the evil past, but the (Kuala Lumpur) Malay Mail of the same day gave its opinion that Dato Onn had never
been an alarmist and that his position in the country justified full heed being
paid to his statement. It seemed that whether one believed in increased
inter-racial tension or increased harmony between Malays and Chinese was now
becoming a matter of political creed. Dato Onn took the position that the
Chinese Chambers of Commerce were now running the MCA in the interest of
turning Malaya into ‘the Nineteenth Province of China’, whilst the MCA-UMNO
alliance held that relations between Malays and Chinese had never been better.
The change from the suspicious and non-co-operative attitude on the part of
UMNO in the autumn of 1952 to the later close co-operation with MCA could be
traced, to a great extent, to the personal influence of Colonel H. S. Lee, who
had been absent from Malaya when the friction took place over the $500,000
offer but who had now returned to Malaya with the intention of welding the two
parties into a strong political alliance. The Singapore Standard expressed the view that all current talk about
communalism had arisen from tension between IMP and the UMNO-MCA alliance. It
said that communalism persisted not because the people were naturally inclined
towards communal politics but because the political leaders and parties
channelled the political ambitions of the people along communal lines. The
Chinese press adopted the MCA-UMNO line that communal relations were
improving—which, indeed, was the case.
It must not be forgotten, however, that ill
feeling was not by any means confined to Malay-Chinese relations but was even
more frequently directed towards the protecting power. A determination to
abolish hated ‘ colonialism ’ was heard in practically every statement of UMNO;
and while in 1953 the Sultans were vieing with one another in showing their
loyalty to the British Crown, more than one Malay newspaper spoke of Malays who
refused to celebrate the Coronation.1
1 See pp. 237-8 regarding the
reports on the Coronation by Abdul Aziz ben Ishak.
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Special
Worries of the Chinese
The question which provoked the greatest
emotional reaction among the Chinese of Malaya in 1952 was undoubtedly that of
education (discussed in Chapter 13). Federal Citizenship aroused no
corresponding feeling, and the Chinese leaders seemed ready in an
unenthusiastic way to accept the concessions made in the new legislation—at
least for the time being. Immigration, however, they regarded as a more
immediate problem, and the new Immigration Bill passed in 1952 brought forth a
chorus of protest. Then in early 1953 fresh legislation was introduced which
roused the Chinese business community to as great an indignation as that of the
schoolteachers a few months before. These matters I will now refer to in
greater detail under their separate headings.
Immigration
Control Bill
The Select Committee on Immigration appointed in
1950 did not present its report until 24 November, 1951, and when it did so it
was in the form of a Majority and a Minority Report. The Minority Report
(representing the Chinese point of view) was that it was unfair to the Chinese.
The signatories objected to the requirement that the following classes of
persons should have to obtain a permit or pass to enter the Federation from any
place outside Malaya:
(a) any
person who had been born in a Malay State and was ordinarily resident in
Malaya; and
(b) any
person who had been resident in the Federation for fifteen years out of the
twenty years immediately preceding his re-entry into the Federation and was of
good character. (The expression ‘ordinarily resident in Malaya’ meant lawfully
resident for a period of not less than seven years out of a period of ten years
immediately preceding.)
This discrimination would (said the Minority
Report) mainly affect the Chinese. The excuse given by the Majority Report
(said Sir Cheng-lock Tan in his comments) that these two classes of persons
could apply for Federal Citizenship if they so desired and thus avoid being
classed as ‘prohibited immigrants’ did
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not
hold water when it was remembered that there were few facilities for acquiring
an adequate knowledge of the Malay or English languages, a necessary
requirement for an applicant for Federal Citizenship. The point at issue was
not whether aliens should be allowed to enter the country, but whether those
born and bred in the country and who but for the extraordinary citizenship laws
would be natural-born citizens should be treated as aliens.
The Bill was passed on 21 November, 1952.
The
Registration and Licensing of Businesses Bill
This legislation was intended to raise 50 per
cent of the money required for the Education Development Fund in connection
with the new National Schools scheme by taxes on businesses. It was opposed by
the Chinese members of the Federal Legislative Council on the ground that money
required for education should come out of the general revenues.
The operation of the Bill, they said, would be a
burden to the middle-class businessman but would deal a deadly blow against the
small businessman. In the case of a business with a capital of $100,000, it would
be called upon to pay only a $300 licensing fee; if a man had $500 shares in
the company he would pay only $1.50, whereas in the case of a business run by
partners with a capital of $500, each of them would be called upon to pay $100
as a licensing fee. The small businessmen were therefore victims of
discrimination. It was not only wrong in principle to impose taxation for a
special purpose in this way, but, what was more important, paddy planters,
small farmers, small estate owners, and many others interested in rural
industries would also come in for their share of taxation which would mean that
the prices of essential commodities such as rice, vegetables, etc.—the staple
food of the people—would shoot up to new heights.
In consequence of the opposition a Select
Committee was appointed to examine the Bill and to report to the Legislative
Council. The committee recommended that to prevent hardship the Bill should not
be made to apply to the small businessman who had no place of business, or to
the craftsman who sold his services and who had no place of business, or
fishermen, small agriculturalists and others who were self-employed and in a
very small way of business. The Bill still did not meet with the approval of
the
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Chinese
members, and an amendment to the schedule was moved by Colonel H. S. Lee so
that the $100 payable by every associate in the business in urban areas should
be on a descending scale, with $100 for the first associate, $50 for the second
associate, $40 for the third, and so on down to $10 for the sixth and every
additional associate. The amendment, however, was lost by 17 ayes to 44 noes, 7
abstaining, on 8 January, 1953.
At the Annual Conference of the Associated
Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Malaya held at Kuala Lumpur on 25 January a
resolution was unanimously passed protesting against the Bill, and it was
further resolved that, subject to the concurrence of the various constituent
chambers, to declare a hartal as a
protest. The chairman, however, reminded the meeting that the 1947 hartal had caused an estimated loss of
£4 million. Subsequently a question was asked in the House of Commons regarding
the Ordinance by Mr. Hamilton Kerr, M.P. but elicited no reply from the Colonial
Secretary beyond the statement that the matter was being considered by the High
Commissioner.
Indian
Opinion
If little has been said in these pages regarding
the Indians it is not because they are unimportant as a community but because
Malay-Chinese relations are more fundamental in Malayan politics. The Indians,
because of their experience of the working of democratic institutions in their
own country, had availed themselves of the franchise to a much greater extent
than other communities in the Singapore elections, both those for the
Legislative and the Municipal Councils. They also greatly outnumbered the other
races in the trade-unions, and were the mainstay of the IMP, which received its
principal, if not its only, press support from the Indian newspapers.
As was to be expected, the Indian press took a
line in international affairs similar to that taken by the Indian Government. Tamil Murasu (21 December, 1952), for
example, condemned the reported decision of the NATO (sic) to take part in the war in Indo-China, since the latter was,
it said, a struggle between a spontaneous national movement and French
colonialism. It also praised Mr. Krishna Menon’s statements on Korea. The
Indian press kept an eye constantly open on the march of events in Africa,
supporting the point of view of the Indian minorities there.
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In Malayan domestic politics the Indian press
was critical of the MCA-UMNO alliance and in this respect identified itself
with the view of the Federation of Indian Organizations and of Dato Onn, that
these parties, powerful at the moment, were merely perpetuating communalism in
the interests of the ambitions of their leaders. But later it cooled towards
Dato Onn and the Mentris Besar when they sought to postpone Federal elections.
A typical Indian view of the position of the
Indian community in Malaya was the following (Tamil Murasu, 14 January, 1953):
Whatever
the political position of the Chinese may be, their influence in the economic
field closely rivals that of the British who rule the country. In contrast with
the Chinese, the Indians of Malaya are considered to be of no consequence in
any field. Although the Indians consider themselves experienced in politics and
capable of leading other communities, there is not a single Indian in the
Federal Cabinet. In the economic field the Indians are looked down upon as
coolies, and Indian chettiars
(money-lenders) are criticized, although they lend money at a fair and legal
rate of interest. Local English newspapers are ever ready to put the Indians in
their place. If the Indians go to India, they are ‘dodgers’ (of National
Service); if they immigrate they are accused of being an economic burden on the
country. Such is the predicament of the Indians of Malaya who by the sweat of
their brow have made the country prosperous.
The announcement by the Federation Government
that the Indian worker should no longer be considered an immigrant to this
country but an integral part of the Malayan community was hailed as a ‘Charter
of Rights for the Indian labourer’. (By the constitution of India an Indian did
not lose his Indian nationality by becoming a Federal Citizen.) Also, in
recognition of their services, the Federal Government had decided to allot land
near the estates they worked on to Indian labourers to cultivate. Hitherto
Indian labourers had mostly been housed in coolie lines, but this was regarded
as an opportunity for Indians, too, to build their kampongs like the Malays or
their new villages like the Chinese. But this proved to be but temporary and
illusory comfort, and in October, 1953, all five Indian members of the
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Federal
Legislative Council resigned their seats ‘as a matter of honour’ in protest
against the non-inclusion of an Indian as a ‘member’ in the Federal Government.
In the prevailing situation it was natural that
the Indians also should fall back on communalism, and their intensified concern
for their own language and culture was evidenced by the insistence of the
Indian press that the person in charge of the direction of the Tamil section of
Radio Malaya should himself be proficient in Tamil and in Indian music.
The
Influence of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald
In 1946 Mr. Malcolm MacDonald was appointed
Governor-General of the territories comprising the Malayan Union, Singapore,
Sarawak, and North Borneo, and when the appointment of Special Commissioner for
South-East Asia (held by Lord Killearn) came to an end and Mr. MacDonald took
over many of the duties of the post and became Commissioner-General for the
United Kingdom in South-East Asia, communicating with the Colonial Office on
colonial affairs and with the Foreign Office on diplomatic matters. He had no
administrative functions whatever and effected co-ordination between the
several governments purely by advice. It was a very special and delicate
position in which Mr. MacDonald was called upon to be a sort of universal
solvent disposing of difficulties by his personal magic. He seemed to be in a
perpetual state of locomotion, flying to Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, and
Thailand as well as to Hong Kong and the British Bornean territories and, of
course, to the Federation of Malaya, pouring oil on troubled waters as from some
inexhaustible container. He was by temperament admirably suited for his
appointment, being a prince of good mixers as well as a sword-dancer and a
talented acrobat. He had, above all, the gift of identifying himself so closely
with the views of those he talked to that everyone left him with the conviction
that the Commissioner-General’s opinions were the only right ones and, by a
coincidence, the same as their own.
There were, of course, shortcomings attaching to
this gift. He could not in the nature of things share everyone’s opinion,
especially if they happened to conflict, and since his function was to dispense
optimism and to boost morale in South-East Asia he sometimes took a more
rosy-coloured view of the situation
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than
proved justified in the event (he was, for example, for years alternately
prophesying a speedy French victory in Indo-China and urging caution in taking
an optimistic view). At the same time, he was undeniably popular with a wide
circle of people of all races. He owed this in some small measure, no doubt, to
the fact that his socialist principles were understood to run counter to vested
interest and he had therefore something of the character of a people’s champion
even while representing a Conservative Government. If any suggestion was made
that he should be replaced or his post dispensed with (and he had a number of
enemies in Britain), there was bound to be a flood of letters to the press from
Malays, Chinese, Indians and Eurasians demanding that he should stay where he
was. The peoples of Malaya and of South-East Asia sensed his complete freedom
from colour prejudice, and when he sponsored democratic moves in the direction
of independence (without, of course, taking sides) he always secured a
respectful hearing. Coming from him, well-worn counters such as ‘democracy’ and
‘independence’ or ‘the hearts of the people’, sounded entirely sincere and not
just ‘uplift’ or unctuous humbug.
Whereas General Templer had contented himself
with so much philosophy of history as was contained in his Directive, Mr.
MacDonald had often speculated as to the nature of the revolution now taking
place in Asia. In a pamphlet entitled Healing
Thoughts, issued by him in 1953, he said that the Asian revolution was
frequently represented as anti-Western. It was not fundamentally so. It was a
positive, not a negative, movement: not anti-Western but pro-Asian. What was
really being overthrown in Asia was the economic, social and political system
called feudalism (which was what the Communists also said).
Lord Acton remarks somewhere that in history the
man with the sword is always followed by the man with the sponge, and this
seems in a striking way to describe the respective roles of the High
Commissioner and the Commissioner-General. The fact, however, was that in 1954
the Commissioner-General’s sponge had become saturated and could hold no more.
It was quite plain, too, to everyone that it was General Templer who had the
ear of the Home Government and not Mr. MacDonald. The latter’s ability to
influence events or policy in Malaya had therefore become practically nil.
MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
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