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The history of the occupation of Malaya by the
Japanese has yet to be written, though some graphic impressions of it have
already appeared.1 But one thing is certain, and that is that the
people of Malaya discovered that Asian imperialism could be far more oppressive
than the British variety had ever been. At least 5,000 Chinese were executed by
the Japanese shortly after the fall of Singapore—(supporters of the China
Relief Fund, newspapermen, schoolmasters, high-school students, Hainanese (whom
the Japanese regarded as Communists one and all), men with tattoo marks, who,
according to the Japanese, were all members of secret societies, Volunteers,
and ‘pro-British’ persons such as justices of the peace and members of the
Legislative Council. The conquerors then proceeded to extract a ‘gift’ of $50
million from the Chinese community, and then within five months of the fall of
Singapore the economic exploitation of Singapore began in earnest. The Kaishas
arrived, the Mitsui and Mitsubishi being the first in the field. Lesser
Japanese traders came in shoals for what was left of the spoils. They formed
Kumiai, i.e. syndicates or guilds, and became, in effect, Government-protected
departments of the black market. They held the monopoly to fleece the public,
but were assisted by unscrupulous, get-rich-quick elements among the Chinese.
It is clear that the Japanese regime was marked by bribery, corruption and
incompetence (in the shortage of trained administrators the Japanese had to
rely on ex-barbers, packers and photographers).
Meanwhile the population, and the urban Chinese
in par-
1 See Chin Kee Onn, Malaya
Upside Down (Singapore, 1946), and Ma-rai-ee
(Harrap, 1952); N. I. Law and H. M. Cheng, This
Singapore (Singapore, 1947), and ‘Nationalism
in Malaya’, in Asian Nationalism and the
Wes I (ed. W. H. Holland (New York, Macmillan (IPR), 1953). Also F. Spencer
Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral
(Chatto & Windus, 1949), for impressions of the MPAJA. An official history of the liberation (1945-6), by F. S. V.
Donnison, is in the press.
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ticular,
were suffering terrible hardships. Those who lived in the country districts
were somewhat better off than the town dwellers, but all over Malaya
malnutrition was general. The Japanese had no shipping to spare for the
importation of rice from Siam, even if they had been disposed to allow the
expenditure. A campaign was started to compel the population to learn the
Japanese language in place of English, but this was barren of results. The Kempeitai, or secret police, inflicted
unspeakable tortures on suspects in their power. But it was the unconcealed
contempt of the Japanese for Chinese, Malays and Indians alike, manifested in
face-slapping and other indignities, which did most to alienate the sympathies
of the people of Malaya from the ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ engineered primarily in
the interests of Japan.
Very soon after the Japanese occupation
resistance groups began to be organized in the country (already in the last
stages of the retreat the British had utilized Communist units in the mangrove
swamps of Singapore). The Chinese were the only ones in the field for the first
two years except the Malay Wataniah
in Penang, but thereafter Malay resistance groups were formed under British
officers in North Perak and Kedah.
There were two kinds of resistance groups: the
armed military groups living hidden in the hills and jungles, and the
underground organizations whose members lived openly in the towns and villages
and who assisted the guerillas or resisted the Japanese in some way.
Intermingled with the underground movement was a political association at first
called the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU), which was an almost
entirely Chinese organization controlled by the Malayan Communist Party. The
MPAJU supported the guerillas and was known as the Malayan People’s
Anti-Japanese Army—MPAJA. It was also known as the ‘Three Star’ Army from its
badge—one star for each race (Chinese, Malay, and Indian), but it was in
essence a Chinese movement. The so-called Kuomintang guerillas were of minor
importance, numbering not more than five hundred, largely peace-time bandits,
and they were engaged in no serious opposition to the Japanese.
Two or three British officers had remained
behind to organize sabotage behind the Japanese lines, but it was not until
May, 1943, that reconnaissance parties of Force 136 arrived in the country by
submarine. These were able to make contact with the Perak group of the MPAJA,
and eventually an agreement was drawn
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up
whereby the MPAJA pledged itself to co-operate with and accept orders from the
Supreme Allied Commander during the period of hostilities and in the period of
military occupation thereafter in return for arms, ammunition, and explosives,
and the equivalent of 150 taels of gold a month (roughly $3,000).
While Malaya was still in the occupation of the
Japanese, the Malayan Communist Party published a nine-point programme, namely:
(1) to drive the ‘Japanese Fascists’ out of Malaya and establish a republic;
(2) to establish a Government with representation from all the nationalities,
improve living conditions, and develop industry, agriculture and commerce; (3)
to give freedom of speech, association, etc.; (4) increase wages, abolish high
taxation, money-lending at high interest etc.; (5) reorganize the guerillas
into a National Defence Army; (6) establish free education in the several
languages; (7) confiscate Fascist property and restore property confiscated by
the Japanese; (8) practise tariff autonomy; and (9) combine with Russia and
China to free the oppressed peoples of the East. After the agreement with the
Supreme Allied Commander, the establishment of a republic was placed in
abeyance.
The total strength of the MPAJA proper in 1944
was only about 3,000-4,000; and in 1945, before the intended invasion, it had
grown to 6,000-7,000.
The British forces reached Malaya early in
September, 1945. But the establishment of the British military administration
took some time and some out-stations were not occupied until the end of the
month. In the interval between the Japanese evacuation of centres, to assemble
to surrender, and the arrival of the British troops, the MPAJA came out of the
jungle and assumed control. The welcome of the people to the British Services
was entirely spontaneous and genuine, but the welcome had been prepared by the
Chinese generally on the assumption that the liberation forces would be those
of Chiang Kai-shek.
During the occupation the Japanese made liberal
use of the Malayan police force, which was composed mostly of Malays, to
suppress the Chinese resistance movement. This fact led to strong and lasting
resentment, and after the surrender the MPAJA, who had seized power, turned the
tables on the police. The result was that the latter became demoralized, and a
complete reorganization of the force became necessary after the liberation.
Even so, the police remained weak, corrupt and arbitrary, and
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another
reorganization was undertaken in 1952. In the clashes which took place in
November, 1945, onwards the Malays were, however, the aggressors and many
Chinese lost their lives. In March, 1946, the Chinese at length retaliated on a
village on the Perak River and killed thirty or forty Malays.
At the moment of the British return to Malaya
the old Chinese Towkay (head of a
business) had for the time being entirely lost his leadership of the community.
Upon the liberation the leadership passed to the MPAJA leaders, who were
converting the MPAJU into a People’s Democratic Movement. In Singapore and the
other large towns the Communist Party and the New Democratic Youth Corps were
much to the fore, the Kuomintang and San Min Chu Youth Corps having completely
disappeared for the time being (though they reappeared for a while later). It
was clear from the beginning that the Leftist leaders were making a determined
bid for power and that the promise of ‘co-operation’ with the British Military
Administration was only a pretence. The serious food situation, the delay in
the arrival of the rice for relief, the fact that the British refused to
recognize the Japanese paper money, and the inflation, were exploited to arouse
discontent. This led to rice riots in Perak in October. Had not the general
feeling towards the British (in contrast with that towards the Japanese) been
so favourable it is likely that these incidents would have developed into an
insurrection.
One of the outstanding tasks of the British
Military Administration was to disband the guerillas without incident. An
obstacle to this was the demand for payment for their services during the
occupation and afterwards on the same basis as British troops—a demand which
the British higher command firmly refused to consider. Finally, however, the
MPAJA was disbanded at the beginning of December, each man handing in his arms
and equipment and receiving a gratuity of $350. Altogether some 6,800 men
handed in a rifle, revolver, etc., each and received gratuities.
Against the British Military Administration the
obvious weapon was the strike. Soon after the return of the British a series of
strikes occurred which, while fundamentally economic in origin, were worked up
by trouble-makers for political ends. It must be admitted, too, that the
attitude of a section of the British and Indian troops who treated Malaya
rather as an occupied instead of a liberated country and the rampant corruption
among
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another
section which extended to more than one department of the BMA were factors that
assisted the Communists in stirring up trouble. Then in January, 1946, the
General Labour Union (GLU) became more ambitious in its aims. Utilizing the
fact that about thirty ex-members of the MPAJA had been arrested for offences
which ranged from the possession of stolen property to murder, the GLU demanded
their unconditional release or, in default, threatened a general strike. The
demand was refused, and over 150,000 persons stopped work. The strike, however,
for reasons that are not yet quite clear, was called off within three days (its
unpopularity with the Chinese business community undoubtedly had something to
do with it). But the appetite of the Communists was only whetted by their
success, and they now called for a complete stoppage for 15 February—nominally
as a day of ‘ humiliation ’, but obviously to celebrate the surrender of the
British to the Japanese on that day in 1942.
Before the strike of January the GLU had got its
bands of intimidators out early, but this time the BMA and the military
authorities had taken precautions. The result was that the attempted stoppage
was a fiasco. Only one incident, in which two Chinese were killed, marred the
day. Otherwise things were completely normal and the public services ran as
usual. The immediate result of the firm measures taken by the authorities on 15
February was that an almost audible sigh of relief went up from all races
throughout the country. The membership of the Leftist organizations fell off in
a spectacular way. But the revolutionary elements were by no means defeated.
Henceforth they would have to work more underground than they had since the
liberation of Malaya, and underground they remained until the open guerilla war
began in June, 1948.
In the interim the principal incidents were in
the field of more or less peaceful politics.
Political Developments
Before the Second World War there were no
domestic political parties in Malaya except the Malayan Communist Party which
worked underground, but in the great ferment of the liberation it was
confidently expected that it would not be long before such parties made their
appearance. The first in the field proved to be the Malay Nationalist Party,
which was reported from Ipoh
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on
30 November, 1945. Many people jumped to the conclusion that this was a
spontaneous movement on the part of the Malays, but it was soon clear that it
was Indonesian in origin. It identified Malay and Indonesian interests, and its
sponsors were mainly Indonesians. The eight resolutions it passed at its
inaugural meeting were very similar to the Communist Party’s Eight Points.
After some initial success the MNP lost ground rapidly, though later recovered
it to some extent. The Malays as a whole were conservative and refused to
identify themselves with the Indonesian movement. MCP tactics were to be on the
watch for every new development in Malayan politics and to exploit it in their
own interests. Seeing that there was the beginning of a strong national
movement among the Malays, it did its best to get control of it. When the
Malayan Democratic Union was formed in December, its sponsors were mainly
Chinese of the professional class, but the ‘guest’ speakers included several
members of the MCP. But since the ‘Eight Points’ of the MDU manifesto began
with the key point, ‘Self-government for Malaya within the British
Commonwealth’, it was not easy to see what legitimate appeal the party would
have to the Communists. The MDU aimed at being the party of the domiciled
non-Malay communities —local-born Chinese, local-born Indians, Eurasians, and
others. During the first months of its existence it remained a small but vocal
group in Singapore, no doubt because the prevailing atmosphere was uncongenial
to its development, but it soon exercised considerable influence by reason of
the intellectual and professional standing of some of its members. It found no
great favour with the British authorities, since, in its character of an
incipient national movement, it had of necessity to be hostile towards the
British regime (for, as Mr. Nehru has said, nationalism is essentially an
‘anti-movement’ and must nourish itself on opposition). Looking back, it seems
that most of its members were democrats in the Western sense of the term, and
their demand for an elected legislature was in accordance with genuine
democratic principles.1
1 April, 1946, saw the inauguration of the
Malayan Union, which was an attempt by the British Government to meet on a
far-reaching scale—even to anticipate—the ambitions of the Malayan people (it
is dealt with in the next chapter). The restoration of civil government was the
sign for a great outburst of
1 See Asian Nationalism and the West, p. 305.
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political
activity. Most prominent in the first phase was to be the United Malays
National Organization (UMNO), founded by Dato Onn bin Jaafar. He had already in
January, 1946, founded the Malay Peninsula Movement in Johore. This was only
one of many organizations which were springing up at this time to oppose the
Malayan Union proposals, but its leadership made it one of the most important.
By 1 March, 1946, enough Malay organizations had been formed throughout Malaya
for a conference to be called in Kuala Lumpur to organize UMNO. Dato Onn was
then elected President of the organization.
To summarize the situation as it was early in
1946, the British, having been unceremoniously ousted from Malaya in 1941-2,
were (somewhat unexpectedly to many Malayans) back again in the saddle. So far
as US opinion was, at that time, interested in Malaya at all, it was suspicious
of restored ‘colonial’ rule and would, on the face of things, be reassured only
by a rapid move towards self-government. (The ‘strategical’ phase of American
thinking in Asia had not yet been reached.) In Britain itself the advent of a
Labour Government made constitutional development a matter of expedience as
well as of policy. The fact that the British were back in Malaya at all was due
mainly to the ‘plural’ nature of Malayan society and the equal balancing of
Malays and Chinese; in India and Burma they were already contemplating complete
withdrawal. But instead of being flanked by other colonial empires, that of the
Dutch in Indonesia was in a state of dissolution and the French hold on
Indo-China was distinctly precarious. The immediate danger was that Chinese
nationalism would attempt to dominate Malaya or that Chinese Communism would
assume control in the form of the MPAJA and that Indonesian nationalism would
take over among the Malays. The dislocation of the Malayan economy owing to the
Japanese occupation and the acute shortage of rice made reconstruction an
urgent problem. Moreover, the accentuation of inter-communal feeling due to
Japanese policy had created an atmosphere less favourable to Malayan unity than
before the occupation. These were the principal problems confronting the
British on their return to Malaya.
MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
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