CHAPTER 03 - OCCUPATION AND LIBERATION | MALAYA : Communist or Free?



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The history of the occupation of Malaya by the Japanese has yet to be written, though some graphic impressions of it have already appeared.1 But one thing is certain, and that is that the people of Malaya discovered that Asian imperialism could be far more oppressive than the British variety had ever been. At least 5,000 Chinese were executed by the Japanese shortly after the fall of Singapore—(supporters of the China Relief Fund, newspapermen, schoolmasters, high-school students, Hainanese (whom the Japanese regarded as Communists one and all), men with tattoo marks, who, according to the Japanese, were all members of secret societies, Volunteers, and ‘pro-British’ persons such as justices of the peace and members of the Legislative Council. The conquerors then proceeded to extract a ‘gift’ of $50 million from the Chinese community, and then within five months of the fall of Singapore the economic exploitation of Singapore began in earnest. The Kaishas arrived, the Mitsui and Mitsubishi being the first in the field. Lesser Japanese traders came in shoals for what was left of the spoils. They formed Kumiai, i.e. syndicates or guilds, and became, in effect, Government-protected departments of the black market. They held the monopoly to fleece the public, but were assisted by unscrupulous, get-rich-quick elements among the Chinese. It is clear that the Japanese regime was marked by bribery, corruption and incompetence (in the shortage of trained administrators the Japanese had to rely on ex-barbers, packers and photographers).

Meanwhile the population, and the urban Chinese in par-

1 See Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upside Down (Singapore, 1946), and Ma-rai-ee (Harrap, 1952); N. I. Law and H. M. Cheng, This Singapore (Singapore, 1947), and ‘Nationalism in Malaya’, in Asian Nationalism and the Wes I (ed. W. H. Holland (New York, Macmillan (IPR), 1953). Also F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (Chatto & Windus, 1949), for impressions of the MPAJA. An official history of the liberation (1945-6), by F. S. V. Donnison, is in the press.

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ticular, were suffering terrible hardships. Those who lived in the country districts were somewhat better off than the town dwellers, but all over Malaya malnutrition was general. The Japanese had no shipping to spare for the importation of rice from Siam, even if they had been disposed to allow the expenditure. A campaign was started to compel the population to learn the Japanese language in place of English, but this was barren of results. The Kempeitai, or secret police, inflicted unspeakable tortures on suspects in their power. But it was the unconcealed contempt of the Japanese for Chinese, Malays and Indians alike, manifested in face-slapping and other indignities, which did most to alienate the sympathies of the people of Malaya from the ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ engineered primarily in the interests of Japan.

Very soon after the Japanese occupation resistance groups began to be organized in the country (already in the last stages of the retreat the British had utilized Communist units in the mangrove swamps of Singapore). The Chinese were the only ones in the field for the first two years except the Malay Wataniah in Penang, but thereafter Malay resistance groups were formed under British officers in North Perak and Kedah.

There were two kinds of resistance groups: the armed military groups living hidden in the hills and jungles, and the underground organizations whose members lived openly in the towns and villages and who assisted the guerillas or resisted the Japanese in some way. Intermingled with the underground movement was a political association at first called the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU), which was an almost entirely Chinese organization controlled by the Malayan Communist Party. The MPAJU supported the guerillas and was known as the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army—MPAJA. It was also known as the ‘Three Star’ Army from its badge—one star for each race (Chinese, Malay, and Indian), but it was in essence a Chinese movement. The so-called Kuomintang guerillas were of minor importance, numbering not more than five hundred, largely peace-time bandits, and they were engaged in no serious opposition to the Japanese.

Two or three British officers had remained behind to organize sabotage behind the Japanese lines, but it was not until May, 1943, that reconnaissance parties of Force 136 arrived in the country by submarine. These were able to make contact with the Perak group of the MPAJA, and eventually an agreement was drawn

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up whereby the MPAJA pledged itself to co-operate with and accept orders from the Supreme Allied Commander during the period of hostilities and in the period of military occupation thereafter in return for arms, ammunition, and explosives, and the equivalent of 150 taels of gold a month (roughly $3,000).

While Malaya was still in the occupation of the Japanese, the Malayan Communist Party published a nine-point programme, namely: (1) to drive the ‘Japanese Fascists’ out of Malaya and establish a republic; (2) to establish a Government with representation from all the nationalities, improve living conditions, and develop industry, agriculture and commerce; (3) to give freedom of speech, association, etc.; (4) increase wages, abolish high taxation, money-lending at high interest etc.; (5) reorganize the guerillas into a National Defence Army; (6) establish free education in the several languages; (7) confiscate Fascist property and restore property confiscated by the Japanese; (8) practise tariff autonomy; and (9) combine with Russia and China to free the oppressed peoples of the East. After the agreement with the Supreme Allied Commander, the establishment of a republic was placed in abeyance.

The total strength of the MPAJA proper in 1944 was only about 3,000-4,000; and in 1945, before the intended invasion, it had grown to 6,000-7,000.

The British forces reached Malaya early in September, 1945. But the establishment of the British military administration took some time and some out-stations were not occupied until the end of the month. In the interval between the Japanese evacuation of centres, to assemble to surrender, and the arrival of the British troops, the MPAJA came out of the jungle and assumed control. The welcome of the people to the British Services was entirely spontaneous and genuine, but the welcome had been prepared by the Chinese generally on the assumption that the liberation forces would be those of Chiang Kai-shek.

During the occupation the Japanese made liberal use of the Malayan police force, which was composed mostly of Malays, to suppress the Chinese resistance movement. This fact led to strong and lasting resentment, and after the surrender the MPAJA, who had seized power, turned the tables on the police. The result was that the latter became demoralized, and a complete reorganization of the force became necessary after the liberation. Even so, the police remained weak, corrupt and arbitrary, and

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another reorganization was undertaken in 1952. In the clashes which took place in November, 1945, onwards the Malays were, however, the aggressors and many Chinese lost their lives. In March, 1946, the Chinese at length retaliated on a village on the Perak River and killed thirty or forty Malays.

At the moment of the British return to Malaya the old Chinese Towkay (head of a business) had for the time being entirely lost his leadership of the community. Upon the liberation the leadership passed to the MPAJA leaders, who were converting the MPAJU into a People’s Democratic Movement. In Singapore and the other large towns the Communist Party and the New Democratic Youth Corps were much to the fore, the Kuomintang and San Min Chu Youth Corps having completely disappeared for the time being (though they reappeared for a while later). It was clear from the beginning that the Leftist leaders were making a determined bid for power and that the promise of ‘co-operation’ with the British Military Administration was only a pretence. The serious food situation, the delay in the arrival of the rice for relief, the fact that the British refused to recognize the Japanese paper money, and the inflation, were exploited to arouse discontent. This led to rice riots in Perak in October. Had not the general feeling towards the British (in contrast with that towards the Japanese) been so favourable it is likely that these incidents would have developed into an insurrection.

One of the outstanding tasks of the British Military Administration was to disband the guerillas without incident. An obstacle to this was the demand for payment for their services during the occupation and afterwards on the same basis as British troops—a demand which the British higher command firmly refused to consider. Finally, however, the MPAJA was disbanded at the beginning of December, each man handing in his arms and equipment and receiving a gratuity of $350. Altogether some 6,800 men handed in a rifle, revolver, etc., each and received gratuities.

Against the British Military Administration the obvious weapon was the strike. Soon after the return of the British a series of strikes occurred which, while fundamentally economic in origin, were worked up by trouble-makers for political ends. It must be admitted, too, that the attitude of a section of the British and Indian troops who treated Malaya rather as an occupied instead of a liberated country and the rampant corruption among

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another section which extended to more than one department of the BMA were factors that assisted the Communists in stirring up trouble. Then in January, 1946, the General Labour Union (GLU) became more ambitious in its aims. Utilizing the fact that about thirty ex-members of the MPAJA had been arrested for offences which ranged from the possession of stolen property to murder, the GLU demanded their unconditional release or, in default, threatened a general strike. The demand was refused, and over 150,000 persons stopped work. The strike, however, for reasons that are not yet quite clear, was called off within three days (its unpopularity with the Chinese business community undoubtedly had something to do with it). But the appetite of the Communists was only whetted by their success, and they now called for a complete stoppage for 15 February—nominally as a day of ‘ humiliation ’, but obviously to celebrate the surrender of the British to the Japanese on that day in 1942.

Before the strike of January the GLU had got its bands of intimidators out early, but this time the BMA and the military authorities had taken precautions. The result was that the attempted stoppage was a fiasco. Only one incident, in which two Chinese were killed, marred the day. Otherwise things were completely normal and the public services ran as usual. The immediate result of the firm measures taken by the authorities on 15 February was that an almost audible sigh of relief went up from all races throughout the country. The membership of the Leftist organizations fell off in a spectacular way. But the revolutionary elements were by no means defeated. Henceforth they would have to work more underground than they had since the liberation of Malaya, and underground they remained until the open guerilla war began in June, 1948.

In the interim the principal incidents were in the field of more or less peaceful politics.

Political Developments

Before the Second World War there were no domestic political parties in Malaya except the Malayan Communist Party which worked underground, but in the great ferment of the liberation it was confidently expected that it would not be long before such parties made their appearance. The first in the field proved to be the Malay Nationalist Party, which was reported from Ipoh

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on 30 November, 1945. Many people jumped to the conclusion that this was a spontaneous movement on the part of the Malays, but it was soon clear that it was Indonesian in origin. It identified Malay and Indonesian interests, and its sponsors were mainly Indonesians. The eight resolutions it passed at its inaugural meeting were very similar to the Communist Party’s Eight Points. After some initial success the MNP lost ground rapidly, though later recovered it to some extent. The Malays as a whole were conservative and refused to identify themselves with the Indonesian movement. MCP tactics were to be on the watch for every new development in Malayan politics and to exploit it in their own interests. Seeing that there was the beginning of a strong national movement among the Malays, it did its best to get control of it. When the Malayan Democratic Union was formed in December, its sponsors were mainly Chinese of the professional class, but the ‘guest’ speakers included several members of the MCP. But since the ‘Eight Points’ of the MDU manifesto began with the key point, ‘Self-government for Malaya within the British Commonwealth’, it was not easy to see what legitimate appeal the party would have to the Communists. The MDU aimed at being the party of the domiciled non-Malay communities —local-born Chinese, local-born Indians, Eurasians, and others. During the first months of its existence it remained a small but vocal group in Singapore, no doubt because the prevailing atmosphere was uncongenial to its development, but it soon exercised considerable influence by reason of the intellectual and professional standing of some of its members. It found no great favour with the British authorities, since, in its character of an incipient national movement, it had of necessity to be hostile towards the British regime (for, as Mr. Nehru has said, nationalism is essentially an ‘anti-movement’ and must nourish itself on opposition). Looking back, it seems that most of its members were democrats in the Western sense of the term, and their demand for an elected legislature was in accordance with genuine democratic principles.1

1 April, 1946, saw the inauguration of the Malayan Union, which was an attempt by the British Government to meet on a far-reaching scale—even to anticipate—the ambitions of the Malayan people (it is dealt with in the next chapter). The restoration of civil government was the sign for a great outburst of

1 See Asian Nationalism and the West, p. 305.

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political activity. Most prominent in the first phase was to be the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), founded by Dato Onn bin Jaafar. He had already in January, 1946, founded the Malay Peninsula Movement in Johore. This was only one of many organizations which were springing up at this time to oppose the Malayan Union proposals, but its leadership made it one of the most important. By 1 March, 1946, enough Malay organizations had been formed throughout Malaya for a conference to be called in Kuala Lumpur to organize UMNO. Dato Onn was then elected President of the organization.

To summarize the situation as it was early in 1946, the British, having been unceremoniously ousted from Malaya in 1941-2, were (somewhat unexpectedly to many Malayans) back again in the saddle. So far as US opinion was, at that time, interested in Malaya at all, it was suspicious of restored ‘colonial’ rule and would, on the face of things, be reassured only by a rapid move towards self-government. (The ‘strategical’ phase of American thinking in Asia had not yet been reached.) In Britain itself the advent of a Labour Government made constitutional development a matter of expedience as well as of policy. The fact that the British were back in Malaya at all was due mainly to the ‘plural’ nature of Malayan society and the equal balancing of Malays and Chinese; in India and Burma they were already contemplating complete withdrawal. But instead of being flanked by other colonial empires, that of the Dutch in Indonesia was in a state of dissolution and the French hold on Indo-China was distinctly precarious. The immediate danger was that Chinese nationalism would attempt to dominate Malaya or that Chinese Communism would assume control in the form of the MPAJA and that Indonesian nationalism would take over among the Malays. The dislocation of the Malayan economy owing to the Japanese occupation and the acute shortage of rice made reconstruction an urgent problem. Moreover, the accentuation of inter-communal feeling due to Japanese policy had created an atmosphere less favourable to Malayan unity than before the occupation. These were the principal problems confronting the British on their return to Malaya.

MALAYA : Communist or Free? by Victor Purcell.
Published in 1954 by STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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